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ABSTRACT
This report contains analysis that shows that existing technology exists to 
improve Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) by approximately 30%.  
Furthermore, analysis contained herein will aid MIO planning for future 
operations.  Since MIOs are an inherently dangerous, but necessary activity with 
far reaching implications to theater political and economic dynamics, this 
improvement is of great interest.  MIO is a Naval solution to the problems of 
smuggling weapons, explosives, people and narcotics.  MIO, when employed 
correctly has the potential to save lives and limit economic/political damage.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In situations where U.S. and Coalition forces are confronted with more 
potential targets to conduct Maritime Interdiction Operations on than can possibly 
be achieved, the success rate (and associated probabilities of making a find) is
inherently linear.  The amount of time spent onboard a vessel needed to achieve 
a given probability of detection against a specific type of cargo is the key metric 
for success.  
Given that metric, research and analysis contained within (chapter 6) 
details how the amount of time spend onboard a target vessel can be 
significantly reduced and/or the probability of detection against specific cargoes 
(notable explosives, narcotics, and chemical weapons) can be greatly improved.  
Exploration was done to show how probability of detection against human 
trafficking can be done and is detailed in the same chapter.
A communications architecture is proposed that will allow seamless 
communications for the boarding team.  Throughput requirements are detailed 
that will allow boarding teams to prosecute biometrics from a target ship as well 
as communicate with each other and the parent ship under channel conditions 
similar to what would be found on typical cargo vessels in chapter seven.
Contingencies (chapter four) and equipment that might be used for a 
response (chapter eight) is identified as well.  This paper describes possible 
ways of dealing with an opposed boarding scenario without risking an 
untrained/uncertified boarding team or requiring special operations forces (SOF) 
support.
Throughout, very few assumptions are made regarding the logistics 
provided in theater.  Analysis also explores the effects of reduced logistics on a 
MIO force under a variety of different scenarios (chapter nine).  A cost estimation 
is provided in chapter ten.  
xvi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
xvii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The students of SEA-13/TDSI would like to specifically acknowledge the hard 
work and contributions from the following:
Mr. Peter Dreher, OPNAV N867
LT Tad Drozdowski, Coast Guard Deploying Operations Group
Professor Gary Langford – Naval Postgraduate School, Project Advisor
Professor Charles Calvano – Naval Postgraduate School, Project Advisor
Professor Mark Rhoades – Naval Postgraduate School, Systems Engineering Advisor
Professor Dave Meyer – Naval Postgraduate School, Operations Research Advisor
Professor Tom Hoivik – Naval Postgraduate School, Operations Research Advisor
Professor Cliff Brophy – Naval Postgraduate School, Physics Advisor
Professor Murali Tummala – Naval Postgraduate School, Electrical Engineering Advisor
Professor Karen Burke – Naval Postgraduate School, Electrical Engineering Advisor
Professor Dick Harkins – Naval Postgraduate School, Sensors Advisor
Professor Bard Mansager – Naval Postgraduate School, TDSI Coordinator
We would like to thank our families and friends for their tireless support of all of 
us that made up this great organization and fantastic report.
Lastly, this report is dedicated to all those who have or ever will don a flak jacket 
and do a MIO.  It is our sincere hope that the contents of this report will have 
made your mission either safer or more effective.
xviii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
1I. INTRODUCTION TO MARITIME INTERDICTION 
OPERATIONS (MIO)
A. DEFINITION OF MIO
1. NATO Definition
Although the phrase Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) may be 
largely of U.S. origin, the implementation of such actions is certainly not.  The 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allied Joint Publication 3.1 defines 
MIO as being principally composed of five distinct areas.  Those areas are: 
Seaborne Enforcement, Interdiction of Enemy Forces, Interdiction of Commercial 
Shipping, Embargoes and Quarantine, and Blockades.1  
a. Seaborne Enforcement
Seaborne enforcement refers to the use of naval forces to stop the 
movement of specific maritime supplies.  In general, this is done as a measure to 
compel the targeted nation to take an action that said nation would not otherwise 
take under their own volition.  In general, seaborne enforcement achieves this 
end by threatening the combat effectiveness of the target country’s military.  The 
target country’s military is affected as the MIO would be limiting the influx of 
needed military supplies.
b. Interdiction of Enemy Forces
The same maritime forces can be applied directly against enemy 
warships and fit within the NATO definition for MIO.  The purpose of such action 
is to prevent a potential adversary from utilizing the maritime domain for a 
purpose deemed undesirable by an internationally recognized authority.  Use of 
                                           
1 AJP 3.1, 1-11.
2naval forces to interdict an adversarial surface combatant constitutes an act of 
war.
c. Interdiction of Commercial Shipping
As with seaborne enforcement measures, interdiction of 
commercial shipping is intended to target an adversary’s ability to wage an 
armed conflict of any form.  An insurgency is an example of such an armed 
conflict.  One example goal of a MIO campaign might be to limit the flow of 
supplies necessary to operate an insurgency. 
d. Embargoes and Quarantines
In general, embargoes and quarantines associated with a United 
Nations Security Council Resolution target a specific country and specific set of 
cargo.  This style of MIO campaign is also done to influence the behavior of a 
targeted country or organization.
e. Blockades
A total blockade is by definition an act of war.  A blockade is 
intended to completely deny the use of the maritime environment to an 
adversary.  Economic trading partners of the targeted country are also affected 
as it is a total stoppage of material supplies into and out of the waters of a 
country.
2. U.S. Joint Publication Definition
Compared to the NATO definition for MIO, the U.S. definition is a great 
deal broader.  It states the following:
Interdiction operations are actions to divert, disrupt, delay, or 
destroy an enemy’s surface capabilities before they can be used 
effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve 
objectives.  In support of law enforcement, interdiction includes 
activities conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, intercept, board, 
3detain, or destroy, as appropriate, vessels, vehicles, aircraft, 
people, and cargo.2  
The use of the phrase “surface forces” implies that this definition is directly 
applicable to the definition of a MIO.  The list of to divert, disrupt, delay, intercept, 
board, detain or destroy implies the start of a very high level view of the principal 
functions of a MIO.  While the U.S. definition does not specify the reasoning for 
why a MIO would take place, it can be reasonably concluded that the intentions 
are very much the same as are defined in the NATO definition.
B. PURPOSE OF MIO
As a very strong generalization, the fundamental purpose of doing a MIO 
is to influence an event on land.  MIOs are generally not done as a result of 
anything that is intrinsically maritime in character, but instead targeted against 
the second order effects of the movement of personnel and equipment through 
the maritime domain.  While MIOs have been employed against hijacked 
passenger liners for the purposes of interdicting a team of pirates, the 
probabilities of such an occurrence are historically shown to be very rare, while 
the vast preponderance of MIOs are targeting cargo carries of one form or 
another.  As it is the second order effects of the conduct of a MIO that stand the 
greatest chance of influencing world events, the optimal generation of these 
types of second order effects is the target purpose of this analysis.
MIOs are selective in nature.  While a full blockade of a country or 
countries is included in the definition of a MIO, a MIO campaign must be able to 
selectively interdict only certain cargoes, while allowing non-targeted cargoes to 
pass.  An implied goal of that task is to allow non-targeted cargoes to pass with 
minimal disruption or delay.  Disruption and delay to legitimate commercial 
shipping is likely to incur adverse effects regarding the perception of coalition 
forces.  
                                           
2 Joint Publication 3-03, I-1.
4MIOs are done for the purpose of constricting the flow of all or specific 
cargoes through the maritime domain in accordance with an internationally 
sanctioning body.  Examples of MIOs throughout history include the blockade of 
oil out of Iraq from 1991-2003, attempting to stop the flow of elicit narcotics into 
the United States using the Coast Guard, and the coalition forces operating off 
the coast of Iraq from 2003 to the time of the writing of this report attempting to 
prevent insurgent materials from entering into Iraq.  
The MIOs orchestrated by SOUTHCOM to interdict narcotic flow into the 
United States is done for the specific purpose of reducing the profit of the drug 
cartels, and to prevent narcotics from entering into the United States.  In no case 
is a MIO purely a naval event.  In all cases, MIO is done in support of a ground 
activity somewhere.
C. SCOPE OF ANALYSIS
1. Tasking Statement 
The problem statement for SEA-13 to consider is as follows:
Design a system of systems to employ a regional Maritime 
Interdiction Operation in a logistically barren environment.  
The system should be capable of collecting maritime intelligence 
and conducting rapid intercepts based on that intelligence to 
execute theater security, crisis response, and law enforcement 
missions in a coalition, interagency and joint environment.  
Consider current fleet structure and funded programs as the 
baseline system of systems to execute security and shaping 
missions in developing these concepts of operations, then develop 
alternative architectures for platforms, manning, command and 
control, communication, and operational procedures to evaluate 
against the current program.3  
                                           
3 SEA-13 Tasking letter, see Appendix A.
5There are seven major terms identified in the above subject area that have 
reaching and definitive implications for the analysis in this paper.  The full tasking 
letter is included in Appendix A.
2. System of Systems 
A system is an interacting interdependent (or temporary) set of variables 
(exemplified as elements) that maintain certain relations (functions, behaviors, 
and performance) through time, where the present state of a given variable is 
dependent on its own past state as well as the other variables.  The principle of 
“the whole is more than the sum of its parts” is implied by the systemic 
construction of system elements into a higher-order configuration of stability.  
Since the configuration is stable there are a number of emergent properties and 
constraints.  Therefore a stable system can then again function as a building 
block, and combined with other building blocks form an assembly of an even 
higher order, in a recursive way.  Stable assemblies will tend to contain a 
relatively small number of building blocks, since the larger a specific assembly, 
the less probable that it would arise through blind variation.  This leads to a 
hierarchical architecture that can be represented by a “tree”.  As the building 
blocks are constructed and integrated within the system, a time results when the 
continuing dependence on overall operational, managerial, geographic, emergent 
behavior, and evolutionary development become less distinct and contrived.  
Thus when the system is comprised of large scale concurrent and distributed 
systems with independent operational and managerial stewardship it is 
necessarily better considered as a system of systems.
The requirement for this to be a system of systems to conduct maritime 
interdictions opens up some latitude with regards to the scope.  Systems whose 
operational and managerial functions are controlled outside of the MIO system 
but which could otherwise be in the general vicinity of the operating environment 
may be considered in the analysis.  In order to be able to function inside of a 
logistically barren environment, the logistics system of U.S. TRANSCOM is 
6required.  The exact requirements and measures of effectiveness and 
performance for this system are detailed in chapter nine.  Also, some degree of 
overhead ISR may be available.  These systems are not described in detail, but 
their implications are closely studied in the both chapters four and eleven.  
3. MIO 
The extent of MIOs being studied in this document is less than the total 
breadth of MIO as defined by the NATO definition above.  In this particular case, 
full blockades are of little interest.  Such events are acts of war that are done with 
a multitude of warships.  Since the intent of the blockade is the forced total 
cessation of the targeted country’s use of the maritime environment, rules of 
engagement allow the employment of significantly greater destructive measures.  
The ability of the U.S. Navy to sink ships is not the intent of this study as it is 
believed by the authors that this capability is already refined to an adequate 
degree.
The interdiction of enemy surface forces is also not considered in this 
study.  Such events are either in the realm of general naval surface warfare (i.e. 
sinking enemy combatants), or very unlikely (i.e. utilization of Special Operating 
Forces to capture enemy surface combatants).  In either case, interdiction of 
enemy surface forces is not considered in this paper.
Embargoes against generic goods are not specifically addressed in this 
document.  Although the ability to stop ships and search them will be discussed 
at great length here, targeting a generic cargo is not considered.
The remaining three areas of the NATO definition of MIO are the principal 
subject of this document.  Targeted cargoes are limited to smuggled 
humans/animals, illicit narcotics, and conventional weapons in the forms of guns, 
mortars and explosives.
74. Logistically Barren Environment (LBE)
a. General LBE Constraints
As “barren” is the operative word, it is important to carefully define 
what this means.  Taken straight from the Merriam-Webster dictionary, barren 
simply means “devoid, lacking.”  As barren is an adjective and it is implied to the 
environment, then it can be taken to mean that the environment (for which the 
MIO system of systems will be operating) is devoid or lacking of something.  
Since the environment is defined to be logistically barren, then one can conclude 
that the environment is lacking or devoid of all logistic support necessary for the 
MIO system of systems.
As a consequence of operating in a logistically barren environment 
(LBE), it becomes necessary to identify any constraints imposed as a result of a 
lack of logistic support.  Some assets can be considered universally available.  
As an example, the Inmarsat communication system is available everywhere on 
Earth where a geostationary satellite can be seen from the ground.  As this 
encompasses one-third of the Earth’s surface per satellite, and there are only 
four Iridium satellites, it can be reasonably assumed that Inmarsat 
communications services are available everywhere that MIOs will be performed.  
Geostationary satellites cannot cover the polar regions of the planet, but this only 
presents a problem in the Arctic Ocean.  As it is assumed the majority of “hot-
spots” in the world will be in the equatorial band, it is assumed that existing geo-
stationary satellite capacity will be available for use as part of the system of 
systems.  Further analysis will be careful to delineate when this assumption is 
used.  By the same logic, satellites in low Earth Orbit (LEO) are assumed to be 
available for the period of time consistent with the overall footprint of a given 
satellite constellation (i.e. Iridium).
Perfect logistics cannot be assumed in real life, and are not 
assumed in this report.  It is however assumed that any given part that is ordered 
by an operating task force will eventually arrive, though the time of arrival cannot 
8be guaranteed.  As such, the definition of a logistically barren environment is 
expanded to state that if the time of arrival of a part or system is strongly 
guaranteed, then the environment is not logistically barren.  
For example, operating off the coast of California is not logistically 
barren, as a well established shipping system within the Continental United 
States (CONUS) does a generally superb job of getting things where they need 
to go.  If ISR assets are requested off of the coast of CONUS, then there are a 
multitude of US military bases that can supply such a force.  However, when 
operating off the coast of a country whose participation and/or support for a given 
operation is potentially more limited, then the time of arrival of a coalition asset 
cannot be guaranteed.  The current supply system used by US and coalition 
militaries does a good job in delivering parts and supplies to its consumers, but 
makes few guarantees about when any particular part will arrive.
High value assets like Navy SEALs are considered scoped out of 
this problem.  While their presence would be immensely valuable in a number of 
situations presented in this report, it cannot be guaranteed that such special 
operations forces (SOF) would be present at the outset of a crisis.  Since a crisis 
would be intensely time dependent, and the time of arrival of a SEAL team is not 
considered a guarantee (at least, not as reliable as supply delivery in CONUS), 
situations that would ordinarily be handled by SOF forces must have alternative 
solutions developed for them.
Part of the system of systems architecture includes a 
logistics/transport system.  This system will have to be capable of bringing in 
materials (critically needed spare parts, food, fuel, etc) needed for continued 
operations of any kind.  As this system will be bringing things into the 
environment, it is immune to the constraints of a logistically barren environment. 
9b. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
In the event a WMD is smuggled on board a ship targeted towards 
CONUS or any other city, all the implements of national power by all nations will 
be available for use in locating the carrying ship.  It could be reasonably argued 
that there are not enough naval forces to find an atomic bomb loaded on an 
arbitrary ship somewhere in the world.  However, this paper makes no effort to 
solve that problem.  
If one were to attempt to develop a solution to such a problem, then 
one would start by removing any and all logistically barren constraints and 
assume the absolute and enthusiastic support of every nation on the planet.  
Since the idea of developing a MIO system that is designed to operate in 
logistically barren environments (as defined earlier) runs directly counter to the 
best starting location for solving the problem of WMD onboard ships, this 
problem is scoped out of the analysis.
5. Collecting Maritime Intelligence
The main purpose for this project is to study MIOs, as opposed to devising 
different means of collecting maritime intelligence.  Collecting maritime 
intelligence is considered here, but is mostly limited to how it relates towards 
doing better MIOs and the collection of intelligence during a MIO.
The problem of how to find a given ship at sea is considered here, and two 
fundamentally different means of solving this “macroscopic intelligence” problem 
will be addressed in chapter 7 of this report.  Studying the problem of how to 
locate contacts at sea or conduct large area ISR is not a new problem to the 
Navies of the world.  This problem is considered the “macroscopic intelligence 
problem” and will be given a due consideration in this analysis.
The intelligence needed to determine which ship to board next is not going 
to be easily gleaned from a macroscopic intelligence picture.  It is assumed in 
this report that the actual intelligence necessary to determine which ship to board 
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next will be obtained via exploitation of material and people found onboard 
targeted ships.  Intelligence collected from previously boarded ships by the MIO 
task force is also used.  Furthermore, access to national databases is assumed 
(as they are as ubiquitous as the global information grid) to further assist in the 
processing of intelligence gathered from the conduct of MIOs.  The problem of 
how to collect intelligence gathered during a MIO is referred to as the 
“microscopic intelligence problem” and is the subject of primary consideration in 
this report.
Both macroscopic and microscopic intelligence problems are considered 
here, with due deference given to the latter rather than the former.
6. Conducting Rapid Intercepts
“Rapid” is considered to imply speeds on the scale of common manned 
and unmanned aircraft.  Paired with the word “intercept” and in the context of this 
problem statement, this suggests that the designed system of systems must be 
able to move at a “rapid” speed to be able to stop a designated target within the 
designated LBE.
7. Execute Theater Security, Crisis Response, and Law 
Enforcement Missions
This implies that a certain minimum degree of force must be organic to the 
system of systems.  That minimum degree of force needs to be sufficient to be 
able to influence the decisions of countries within the region.  Assumed examples 
of crisis that the system of systems would need to respond to include the 
Indonesian tsunami of 2004, the mudslide of Leyte Gulf in 2006 or the tropical 
cyclone that struck Myanmar in 2008.  With regards to law enforcement missions, 
the MIO teams must be able to collect evidence (as well as intelligence), and 
must be able to exert ample force to selectively arrest, detain or kill specific 
individuals as situations and rules of engagement require.
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8. …coalition, interagency and joint environment
There are three principal implications to this statement:
a. Communications Standards
Especially in the case of coalition inter-operability, it cannot be 
assumed that all participating coalition countries would have purchased 
compatible communications equipment.  For the purposes of this analysis, US 
ships will have a communications capability comparable to present day 
technology, and communications needs and standards for coalition ships will be 
defined.  In some cases, designated “fly-away” equipment to loan to coalition 
ships will be identified in this analysis.
b. Legal Issues
While the US is not a signatory to the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the preponderance of nations are signatories.
While the U.S. Senate had not yet ratified the treaty at the time of the writing of 
this report, the US conduct of operations has always been in concert with the 
spirit of the UNCLOS.  The United States President George W. Bush has also 
sent the UNCLOS treaty to the U.S. Senate where it awaits ratification.  As this is 
assumed to be a coalition environment, restrictions of this convention and where 
applicable, recommendations for changes will be introduced.
c. Intelligence vs. Evidence
Intelligence collected for the purposes of combating an adversarial 
entity need not necessarily always adhere to the rules of evidence necessary to 
convict an individual in a court of law.  The standard for documentation and 
collection of evidence is significantly higher for evidence than intelligence.  As 
one of the primary targets for a MIO is an insurgency, and the establishment and 
authority of a working legal system is key to the success of a counter-insurgency 
operation, this report will target intelligence collection to the standard of 
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“evidence collection” whenever possible.  If there is a discrepancy in capability 
limiting collection to only “intelligence”, the difference will be identified for the 
reader.
Additionally, as the problem statement requires an inter-agency 
environment, some federal agencies potentially cannot utilize intelligence 
information to accomplish their functions.  Information about the guilt of an 
individual that is garnered through less than legal means (intelligence) is often 
not admissible in courts of law.  Collection of “evidence” that can be freely shared 
with law-enforcement agencies would be a key tenant to the successful 
employment in the real world of such a system of systems.
9. … security and shaping missions …
As stated earlier, the ability to perform security and shaping missions 
implies a minimal amount of force.  MIO is inherently a subset of security and 
shaping operations.  Security and shaping operations can also include everything 
from a psychological operations broadcast to presence/deterrence operations.  In 
chapter 2, the implications of a minimal force necessary to perform these 
missions as it relates to the chosen architecture is examined.  
10. Timeframe:  2013-2014
While the problem statement does not specifically identify a timeframe for 
the problem, it does indicate that “current systems” will be used as a baseline.  
Since the current (2008) baseline is considered the starting point, it is assumed 
that the framers of the question are interested in how best to allocate request 
funds for the next Program Objective Memorandum (POM) cycle.  It is also 
assumed that in the event that congressional funding was needed to procure any 
large systems of high value in this system of systems, approximately five years 
would be needed.  As a result, the timeframe of 2013-2014 was selected.
If an earlier timeframe were chosen, then the selection of systems that 
could be procured designed or developed would be more limited.  Additionally, 
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the analysis would be targeted towards a year inside of the existing POM cycle 
as of the writing of this report.  Had the timeframe been later, then the accuracy 
and immediate utility of this analysis would be degraded as the probability for 
technology to have taken a greater advance (or failed to make an anticipated 
advance) would have been greater.
11. Location
The problem statement did not deliberately specify any particular region of 
the world.  As a result, several assumptions are made in order to scope the 
analysis of this project.  
a. Hotspots 
It is assumed that the place for which the system of systems will be 
operating is a political “hotspot” in that there is some form of political strife, 
insurgency, separatist movement or a rogue nation operating at the start of the 
problem.  This implies that the location will be someplace where there are people 
present and someplace in the world that is politically unstable in 2008, while also 
having the potential for instability in the years between 2013 and 2014.  
b. Globally Applicable
In later analysis, a specific region of the world will be defined as a 
scenario for the employment of the system of systems for MIO.  The location 
defined is a generic location.  There is nothing in the analysis that limits the 
applicability of the designed system of systems to just that specific area of the 
world.  The finished product described here will be intended to be globally 
applicable to all areas of the world where MIOs would be done.
12. Level of Force
The purpose of this paper is not to define the rules of engagement 
necessary to accomplish a specific mission in a specific scenario.  Rules of 
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engagement will generally be very permissive and be limited to not harming 
innocents or friendly units.  Disabling fire will be allowed.  None of the scenarios 
used here will require employment of destructive fire capabilities.
13. Level of Boarding
All levels of boarding, as defined by NTTP 3-07, will be considered in this 
analysis.  Whereas the typical response to an opposed boarding given the 2008 
baseline would be to request SOF support, it is assumed for this analysis that 
SOF will be unavailable and alternative methodologies for coercing the ship to be 
cooperative in the boarding will be employed.  Such strategies are developed in 
this report.
D. FUNCTIONS IN A MIO
There are eleven different major functional areas within the construct of a 
MIO.  They and the reasoning behind them are as follows:
1. To Provide Logistic Support
The need for a logistics functional area is abundantly clear from the 
problem statement.  The problem is set in an LBE.  Given the previous definition 
of LBE, it becomes readily apparent that in order for this system of systems to be 
functional, a logistics tail will be necessary.  The details of the logistics tail 
necessary to support this system of systems are detailed in chapter ten.
2. To Provide Information Superiority
There are two fundamental parts to providing for information superiority.  
The complete analysis of this function is included in chapter seven. 
a. To Collect Intelligence
The first part is the collection of intelligence.  In the case of this 
analysis, the collection of intelligence is centered on the maritime environment 
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with the greater emphasis on the microscopic piece.  The need to collect 
maritime intelligence is specified by the problem.  Additionally, macroscopic 
intelligence provides very little information with regards to determining whether or 
not a particular target vessel is smuggling elicit cargo.  As will be shown in this 
analysis, obtaining a priori knowledge of which contacts are smuggling elicit 
cargo greatly increases the effectiveness of the MIO.  This a priori knowledge 
cannot be obtained via macroscopic means within the confines of a logistically 
barren environment.   
b. To Communicate
The second fundamental part of providing information superiority 
relates to the communication linkages between friendly units and intelligence 
gatherers.  Information available in a national database needs to be accessible 
(and updated by) intelligence collectors operating in the LBE.  Tactical events 
that occur need to be communicated to the units conducting MIOs as they occur.  
Maintaining the links of communication to allow the system of systems to function 
in its capacity of doing MIO is an essential function.
3. Operations Management
As with any complex system of interoperating parts performing multiple 
simultaneous functions, there is a management function required.  This function 
will include things such as asset management, asset planning, contingencies 
development and ISR management.   
4. Maneuver
Actually making a transit in between an origin or set of initial conditions to 
a point where the MIO will be conducted requires that participating ships and 
aircraft actually make the transit.  As such, “maneuver” is a key functional area 
with regards to MIO.
16
5. Detain
The potential exists that a vessel targeted for MIO would not be allowed to 
enter a port facility, a country’s territorial waters or to be allowed to escape from 
the vessels implementing the MIO.  As such, a function of the system of systems 
to do MIO must be able to detain a vessel against that vessel’s will.
6. Disable
If a vessel is deemed of such quality and a substantial enough threat it 
may become necessary to render the vessel into such a state that it is no longer 
capable of continued transit under its own power.   
7. Board
For some senses of the definition of MIO, boarding is not required in order 
to interdict, as would be the case for a blockade.  However, if the target of a MIO 
were a specific cargo onboard the ship, then it becomes a requirement to get 
personnel onboard the target vessel in order to conduct such a search.  While 
the nature of the boarding may vary depending on the behavior of the target 
ship’s crew, the simple function of being able to place personnel on the target 
ship is required, in order to ensure successful interdiction when dealing with 
specific cargoes.   
8. Recover
If personnel are going to be placed onboard a targeted vessel, then there 
will be a requirement to remove these personnel at some point.  It is important to
consider the situation where one boarding team member is leaving at a time.  
This single threaded system would leave the last member of the boarding team in 




In between the boarding team’s arrival and departure at the target vessel, 
there will be a requirement for them to search the ship for the elicit cargoes 
described in the scoping section of this report.  It is likely that these cargoes will 
be hidden onboard the targeted vessel. 
10. Abort
To be able to abort from a MIO is a function the system has to undertake.  
Depending on the time that the decision to abort takes place, the implications 
change.  For instance, if the MIO is aborted just prior to the boarding team 
launching, then there are fewer implications.  
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II. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING OF A MIO
A. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING MANAGAMENT PLAN (SEMP)
1. Purpose
The purpose of including the SEMP in this report is to show interested 
readers the methodology for managing the process that led to the results detailed 
further in this report.  A fully disclosed methodology will help the reader to 
determine the credibility of claims later asserted in this report.  
The purpose of the SEMP is to show the methodology for managing the 
process that will lead to a project completed on schedule, on budget for all 
deliverables (as was the case for this project).  SEMPs supplement the details of 
the Project Plan (as required); provide particular focus on the technical plan of 
the project and the systems engineering processes to be used for the project; 
detail the engineering tasks; determine the technical challenges associated with 
the project; determine the risks associated with the tasks; determine the extent of 
stakeholder involvement and influence on the project work; describe the 
processes needed for requirement analysis; describe the design and architecture 
analysis and analysis of alternatives; identify the resources available for the 
completion of the project; outline the project organization, schedule, and 
resource commitments; and detail the communications, roles, and 
responsibilities, of project team members.
2. Project Objective
The primary objective of this project is to design a system of systems that 
does MIOs.  This is assumed to be the primary focus of SEA-13 as it is the first 
and most salient sentence in the project description.  As the designed system of 
systems is to be evaluated against the baseline, the implication is that the 
framers of the original question were looking for improvements to the current 
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baseline.  New systems can also be evaluated against the current baseline.  
However, given the 2013-2014 timeframe requirement, development of new 
systems is avoided in this analysis.  As such, beginning with the baseline and 
analyzing the various costs and benefits of different improvements are the means 
by which the primary objective will be accomplished.  All improvements identified 
in this report are believed to be either available at the time of its writing, or by 
2013-2014.  
Where an adequate improvement cannot be made, the area of technology 
that would need investment in order to grow will be identified as a secondary 
objective.
Lastly, an evaluation of different architectures will be considered.  
Systems architecture is the fundamental organization of the physical, 
informational, and logical entities of the elements that comprise the system. The 
relationships between the elements and entities, the arrangement of said 
elements and entities, and the associated rationales form a descriptive set of 
perspectives (or views) that characterize the system operations and 
effectiveness. 
All MIO improvements and alternative architectures identified are done 
under the scoping guidelines considered in chapter one.  Key scoping guidelines 
are as follows:
a. Must be a System of Systems
The final system will be a combination of interoperable systems.  
The systems contained within the finished product should not be centrally 
controlled, but be capable of having governance of the system changed when 
needed.
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b. A MIO Must be Performed
The completed system of systems must be able to conduct 
Maritime Interdictions (boardings), as well as be able to search a ship for 
contraband.  The system of systems should be able to intercept moving cargo at 
sea, with or without the consent of the target ship crew.
c. Logistically Barren
The rules set forth in chapter one must be adhered to with regards 
to the logistics, employment or operation of any given system.
d. Target Sets
Target sets are limited to guns, mortars, explosives, humans and 
animals, as well as narcotics.  Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are explicitly 
scoped out.
e. Maritime Intelligence Collection
 The finished system of systems must be able to collect intelligence 
across all scales.
f. Minimum Force Requirements
The requirements that a system is able to execute theater security, 
crisis response and law enforcement missions implies a minimum amount of 
force that the finished system of systems ought to be able to muster.  The 
requirement for the finished system of systems to be able to handle shaping and 
security missions reinforces the minimal force ideal.
g. Timeframe (2013-2014)
The reasoning for this timeline is described in chapter one.
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3. Organization/Team-Structure
The original functional decomposition (FD) of “to do a MIO” comprised of 
eleven functional areas.  Since the span of control for an average leader is five to 
seven people, it was highly desired to have no more than seven groups.  
Composition of each team was intended to be mostly homogenous with respect 
to the degree field of study of each area in order to facilitate the ease of 
scheduling a meeting.  However, it was also desired to have personnel who were 
well versed in system engineering processes in each team in order to help instill 
and reinforce the systems engineering process.
Team goals were focused on engineering the requirements to satisfy their 
respective pieces of the FD.  Wide latitude was given to each group in order to 
best ensure an optimal solution.
a. Initial Organization
Immediately following the assignment of the tasking, SEA-13 was 
split into four different groups.  One group was focused on analyzing all available 
open source information with regards to the tactics, techniques and procedures 
for MIOs as done by various countries around the world.  Another group was 
focused on analyzing the technologies employed for MIO for those countries.  A 
third group was focused on examining the works of past SEA projects.  A final 
group was the Executive Steering Group, whose focus was to design the way 
ahead following the completion of the work of the first three groups.  All four of 
the initial groups completed their tasking according to the plan and schedule.
b. Group Assignments
Individuals were assigned to groups based on three different 
criteria:  1) volunteerism, 2) curriculum and 3) country of citizenship.  It was 
desired to make each of the teams as diverse as possible by way of nationality in 
order to ensure that the views and values of represented cultures were included 
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in the final product.  Since the team functions closely mirrored some of the 
available curricula, it was desired to make each team homogenous with this 
respect.  As an example, the operations group was made almost entirely of 
operations research personnel.  All of the electrical engineering and information 
assurance personnel were assigned to the information superiority group.  The 
students from the systems engineering curriculum were assigned across most of 
the teams, which prevented groups from being completely homogenous.  
Individuals volunteering to be on a specific team were often given 
leadership positions.  In determining team leadership structure, volunteerism, 
enthusiasm, communication skill and willingness to debate (as a positive quality) 
were the primary factors considered.  Seniority was not a consideration.  
Volunteerism was the primary consideration.
The number of groups was calculated based on the idealized 
assumption that no one person should have a span of control exceeding seven 
people.  With forty-six personnel assigned to this project, seven teams of five to 
seven people generated the ideal teams for each functional area.  With eleven 
different functional areas identified, this meant that each team took cognizance 
over one to two different areas.  Other areas of the functional decomposition 
(such as ‘legal’ or ‘abort’) are considered by each of the teams themselves and 
were not placed under the cognizance of any one particular group.  Table 1
details the mapping between major functional areas and group designations.
In addition to the groups identified (by functions of a MIO) in Table 
1, there was a separate group responsible for modeling and simulation that 
contributed to all MIO functional groups.  This group was composed primarily of 
personnel from systems engineering, operations analysis and the “modeling, 
virtual environments and simulation” (MOVES) curriculum.
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Functional Areas Group Name Primary Curriculum
Logistics Logistics Systems Engineering
Information Superiority Information Superiority Electrical Engineering, Information Assurance
Operations Management Operations Management Operations Analysis
Maneuver Maneuver/Detain/Disable Physics, Mechanical Engineering
Detain Maneuver/Detain /Disable Physics, Mechanical Engineering
Disable Maneuver/Detain /Disable Physics, Mechanical Engineering
Board Board & Recover Systems Engineering, Physics, Mechanical Engineering 
Recover Board & Recover Systems Engineering, Physics, Mechanical Engineering
Search Search Systems Engineering, Physics
Legal all None
Abort all None
Table 1:  Functional decomposition and respective group assignments
c. Group Communications
Group leads met once per week at a time at which everyone’s 
schedules permitted.  A single required meeting once per week of group leads, 
followed by regular email and phone contact between group leads and the 
project lead were the principal mechanisms for working through the project.  At 
no point did it become necessary for SEA-13 to require specific work hours of all 
of their members.  There was a multitude of lateral communications between 
groups that are detailed here.  Major inter-group communication threads are 
detailed below.
Each student group met with their respective faculty advisor at least 
once a week.
CONOPS:  The first piece of communication between groups was 
the development of a MIO Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  The CONOPS 
document gave a realistic scenario, complete with campaign phases, which 
roughly approximated the kind of orders that a real world strike group might 
receive.  The CONOPS document provided a baseline starting point for which 
each of the other groups could begin working on engineering and analyzing 
refinements to each of their respective areas.
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Force list:  The forces employed in the CONOPS were a key point 
which the logistics group began to consider.  Since the intent of the logistics 
group was to calculate the logistics tail necessary to support the employment of a 
MIO package, this was a key point needed for that group to begin work.  
Search space/time parameters:  As a result of the early 
exploratory analysis done at the beginning of the project, it was quickly 
determined that the baseline for searching a ship was the manpower intensive 
employment of sailors that inspect ships using no sensor except the naked eye, 
aided only by a flashlight.  It has since been shown to be beneficial to make a 
significant improvement on this search approach.  It was determined that some 
form of technology could be added to aid in the searching process.  Determining 
the implications of such additions with regards to the speed with which a sailor 
could search a compartment with a given probability of detection was the reason 
for constructing a model representing the sailors searching a ship, which is 
detailed in chapter eleven.  The relationship between the size of a vessel, the 
capability to generate a probability of detection, the number of personnel 
operating sensor equipment and the available amount of time was a key 
parameter in developing both the search model, and was also a parameter for 
the larger Naval Simulation System (NSS) model4 described in chapter eleven.
Specific equipment:  Four of the seven teams in SEA-13 identified 
specific equipment that would be of value in conducting a better boarding 
operation.  All recommended equipment is presented in this report for 
consideration.  The potential exists for a given piece of equipment to require 
logistic support.  The logistics team was the principal recipient of information from 
four other teams (boarding/recovery, info superiority, search and 
intercept/detain/destroy) in order to ensure logistical support.
Equipment mass/density:  An objective of this report is also to 
identify the most effective mix of equipment for a team of a given size that is 
                                           
4 NSS is a modeling system developed by Lockheed Martin for showing a macroscopic view of Naval 
combat.  See chapter eleven for details.
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looking for an illicit cargo of a given type.  This equipment list has to take into 
account that all members of the boarding team must remain buoyant at all times, 
be able to climb a ladder for a given duration, and be able to effectively 
maneuver and fight while loaded.  The boarding/recovery and search teams 
collaborated to ensure that these requirements were met.
Unmanned vehicle specifications:  One area being modeled in 
the “NSS simulation” (described in chapter eleven) was the modeling of the effect 
on MIO if the quantity and quality of aircraft launched from the MIO platform were 
changed.  For instance, if a typical destroyer that deploys with two SH-60Bs on 
board, then determining the full impact of replacing one of the SH-60Bs with 
multiple smaller unmanned vehicles that have greater range, search, and 
endurance was done.
Modeling design:  There were a number of models built for this 
project whose size and complexity varied from simple queuing theory models up 
to elaborately complicated tactical simulations.  The modeling team was largely 
responsible for providing much of the manpower and expertise for the 
construction of these models.  Measures of effectiveness and performance, and 
parameters were produced as a product of the engineering and analysis done by 
each of the respective teams.  The three principal models utilized in this project 
are the over-arching NSS model (described in chapter eleven), the search model, 
the boarding/combat model and various other analytic models.
d. External Communications
Prior to the final presentation of the engineering/analysis done in 
this report, there were two mid-course reviews of the material.  Staff and faculty 
of the Naval Postgraduate School were in attendance and commented on the 
progress and development of the final product.  The first mid-course review was 
held twice (7 Feb and 8 Feb).  The second mid-course review was held on 10 
April.
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4. Systems Engineering Process
The systems engineering process employed was the domain process 
model (DPM).  The DPM is formulated for problem solving, but in its abstraction, 
focuses on prototyping trade studies to reach ahead to solutions that then 
become the drivers for more detailed analyses.  Areas of interest within a study 
are modularized into unique domains.  For instance, architectural analysis was a 
domain unto itself and the various functional areas were considered in greater 
The ultimate application of the DPM is to derive modules of functionality 
(activities and processes) that are independent of each other.  A module 
implements an indivisible function, having only one input and one output.  
Independence means that the function of the module is unaffected by the source 
of the input, the destination of its output, and the history of the module.  Modules 
must be separately testable and have uniform work content.  Such refinements 
are the signs of a robust process and design.  The application of DPM to SEA-13 
implies that modules of work should offer flexibility in changing the aggregate unit 
to improve performance (and therefore quality).  This flexibility is enhanced by 
dividing the tasks up into major functionalities.  The result is a change made to 
one module should have only local effects for each change to that module of 
work. 
As a result of the application of the DPM to SEA-13, the only major 
variable to change with regards to architectural analysis was the delivery 
platform.  Changing of the fundamental methods for accomplishing each of the 
functional areas (or domains) of SEA-13 was accomplished within each chapter 
of this report.




In a typical SEA project, a purpose of modeling and simulation is to 
determine the relative value and cost of a given architecture.  Here, modeling 
and simulation provide a more detailed refinement of the selected architecture.  
Each of the teams (excluding logistics) employed a top-down 
approach to their respective functional area of MIO.  Each group documented in 
this report their methodology and thought process that led them to a particular 
conclusion regarding a particular refinement.  After the completion of the 
analysis/engineering that led to a given refinement, either a trade study or a 
model was developed to show the relative merit of a given architecture.
The nature of a MIO causes some activities to occur independently 
of other activities, so a monolithic single model of all MIO related activities was 
not considered.  For instance, a boarding team will take some amount of time to 
secure a targeted ship.  The amount of time that it takes a boarding team to 
secure a ship is a relevant input into the NSS model (as is described in chapter 
eleven) that shows the macroscopic movement of MIO related assets, neutral 
ships and target ships.  However, the NSS model does not need to model the 
boarding team’s movements inside of the target vessel; it only needs to know 
how much time would be lost as this activity occurred and what the associated 
probabilities that more time would be lost as a result of an injury, fatality or 
finding. 
b. Constraints
No other guidance beyond the project statement was provided to 
SEA-13.  With forty-six members, an implied constraint was that the project 




The primary goal of this project is the generation of this report and the final 
stand-up presentation.  The report’s chapters and appendices will document the 
complete methodology, engineering and analysis done to generate the ideal 
system of systems to conduct maritime interdiction operations in a logistically 
barren environment.  The presentation will provide a summary of the report, 
highlighting specifics that are of interest and representative of the breadth and 
depth of the report.
7. Risk management 
Risks to schedule, performance, and quality were identified and managed.  
The major risks to consider with regards to completing the project and the 
mitigating steps are detailed below.
a. International Students Overloaded
Risk:  SEA-13 was done with a majority of students arriving from 
Singapore.  The project began simultaneously with their start of classes within a 
week of their arrival at NPS.  Each of the Singaporean students was required to 
take four to five classes in addition to being tasked with making a relevant 
contribution to the SEA-13 overall outcome.  
Likelihood:  Absolutely certain
Consequence:  Severe.  The impact of this course load on two-
thirds of the project team reduced the overall effectiveness of the team resulting 
in seemingly more ground covered with less detail.  Therefore the majority of 
students working on SEA-13 were already overloaded.  The Singaporeans and 
other international student members of SEA-13 made great contributions to the 
generation of this document; however it was done at great personal expense on 
their part, perhaps to the detriment of participating in the full learning experience 
offered by their other graduate-level courses.  The U.S. team members for the 
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most part have this project assigned during their last two quarters before 
graduation.
Mitigation:  Ensuring a heterogeneous mix of U.S. team members 
in the project groups.  This would allow a “lightly loaded” US student to pick up 
the load should any of the Singaporeans become overloaded.  Also, ensuring 
that all students are enrolled in a class with a time slot associated with it.  This 
would guarantee that teams would be able to meet on a regular basis.   
b. Potential Lack of Proper Skill Sets
Risk:  Students assigned to SEA-13 might lack the proper skill set 
necessary to conduct an analysis of a functional area.  For instance, none of the 
SEA-13 students knew how to run NSS (see modeling chapter) at the start of this 
project.  Although a student might be from a given degree field, that did not 
guarantee that the student has had all of the courses necessary nor had been 
exposed to all the relevant tools to function as an analyst in that field.
Likelihood: Moderate.  All of the systems engineering curriculum 
personnel were in the last quarter at the start of this project.  The majority of the 
membership of SEA-13 was well along their way.  Very few were missing the 
requisite course loadings.
Consequence:  Moderate, the greatest fear in this problem was 
that “you don’t know, what you don’t know”.  If a problem was unknown, or a 
flawed methodology employed, the experience of SEA-13 members may have 
been inadequate to identify the flaw.  At best, a resultant time delay could occur 
as extra time was taken to discover and correct mistakes.
Mitigation:  The ambitious and early start SEA-13 had allowed for 
a greater deal of observer insight into the methodologies presented.  Some of the 
final results were presented as early as the second IPR.  Additionally, faculty 
involvement in interpretation of the results was essential.
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c. Naval Simulation System
Risk:  The NSS system was developed by Lockheed Martin for use 
by the U.S. Government to facilitate exactly the kind of analysis done herein.  
However, the product is relatively new.  In early examination, NSS demonstrated 
very distinct instability problems.  Furthermore, not all of the features inside of 
NSS worked correctly or as “advertised”.  This required the modeling and 
simulation team to develop more creative solutions to implement the model.
Likelihood:  Certain.
Consequence:  Severe.  Failure to run the NSS model would result 
in no information regarding the value of surveillance assets, helicopters or varied 
force packages.  The queuing theory model would not be validated, and the 
amount of analysis that could be generated by SEA-13 would be severely limited.
Mitigation:  For the first portion of the project, concurrent 
development of an NSS counterpart model was done in MANA.  Though this 
model was a great deal more cumbersome than NSS with regards to 
workarounds, it might have been able to produce a result if the majority of SEA-
13 personnel were assigned to work on it at the last minute.  Furthermore, close 
and frequent involvement by Lockheed Martin personnel for training and 
technical assistance in configuration and operation of NSS helped to allow the 
product to run successfully.
8. Configuration Management
Configuration management of the document form of the final product was 
done using Microsoft’s SharePoint application.  The interim process reviews were 
managed by emailing segments of the PowerPoint to the team lead’s email 
account and manually tracking/consolidating the slides. 
With regards to computer models developed to answer specific questions 
about the MIO process, each individual group was responsible for management 
of these individual models.
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9. Verification and Validation plan
Verification of the results was done primarily by peer review, comparison 
of results from different models and briefing the NPS faculty.
10. Product and Process Reviews
Two process reviews were done with open invitations to the staff and 
faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School.  Soft copies of each of the two briefs 
were made available to outside entities such as OPNAV N86 and the CNO’s 
Strategic Studies Group.
11. Description of Deliverables
The principal deliverable generated by this effort was a document that 
describes in detail the analysis and engineering work carried out.  It was made 
sufficient enough in depth to allow a reader, who does not have an engineering 
degree to be able to formulate an opinion about the validity of the analysis 
conducted and to gain an appreciation of the results.  In the case where 
modeling and simulation was done (or any physical experiments), enough 
information was given to allow follow-on researchers to be able to replicate the 
team’s work.
12. Waivers
Classification levels were an issue.  This analysis could have been 
conducted inside a Coalition Enterprise Information Exchange System 
(CENTRIXS) or an ad hoc enclave that had been properly accredited to the 
requisite degree of classification for the nationalities of all involved personnel.  
This would have allowed a much greater analysis to be conducted.
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B. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS
1. Needs Analysis
As with any systems engineering process, the beginning rests with the 
real reason that this work was being considered.  MIO was being considered as 
there continues to be a legitimate deficiency in this area in the fleet at present 
day.
MIO is a supporting mission.  Whereas an activity like surface unit warfare 
might be done for the specific case of destroying enemy naval combatants, MIO 
is only done in support of a larger objective.  MIOs could be done in order to 
influence the political will of a government.  They could be done to strangle the 
supply lines of an insurgency.  For the purposes of this analysis, strangulation of 
the sea lines of supply utilized by insurgents was the principal target.  The ability 
to cut off an insurgent group’s use of the maritime environment for shipment of 
supplies allows the Navy to play a very significant role in future counter 
insurgency operations.
From 1990-2003, coalition Naval forces essentially blockaded Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq for the purpose of preventing his oil from reaching the open 
market in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions.  During this 
timeframe, MIOs were employed against the Iraqis to interdict this cargo.  As 
stated earlier, the MIO was not done for the sake of itself, but rather to influence 
the Hussein government in Iraq.
From 2003 to the writing of this report, coalition forces employed MIO in 
the Northern end of the Arabian Gulf, and off the Horn of Africa in order to 
interdict the maritime movement of insurgents and insurgent supplies.  Again, 
MIO was not done for its own sake, but rather to aide coalition forces ashore in 
their counter-insurgency efforts.  
Some of the cargoes targeted in this document continue to be of 
significant value to terrorist organizations.  Thus, it was reasonable to assume 
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that they will take measures to either hide or defend their cargo.  This implied 
that the safety of the boarding teams may very quickly become jeopardized 
should the crew of a targeted vessel choose to fight the boarding team rather 
than risk being captured.  Therefore, there was a very strong need to ensure the 
safety of boarding team members.  Should the need arise to place boarding team 
members in harms way, then there will be an obvious need to ensure that the 
boarding team has the best possible probability of survival and success.
Although the Arabian Gulf region provided a fertile base for which to 
derive plausible scenarios, analysis was intended to be generic to anywhere in 
the world.  Concepts developed in this report were applicable to any maritime 
region.  
2. Stakeholder Analysis
The process of a stakeholder analysis started with looking at all of the 
different items of value associated with a MIO from their initial assembly, to their 
disposal.  Entities involved with the creation, movement or disposal of an item of 
value were considered stakeholders.
As stated in the scoping section of Chapter One, targeted cargoes were 
limited to smuggled humans/animals, illicit narcotics and conventional weapons 
in the forms of guns, mortars and explosives.
a. Originators
Narcotics:  In South America, the cartels continue to be the most 
obvious generators of narcotics.  In evaluating southwest Asia, the Taliban 
remnants and tribal warlords still are the principal generators of opium and heroin 
for trade on the open market.  Both of these organizations have an obvious stake 
in ensuring that their products reach their end markets.
Weapons:  This project focused on the interdiction of arms 
intended for the enemies of the United States and its allies.  Principal generators 
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of such weaponry include countries like China, Russia, North Korea and Iran.  
The governments of these countries were stakeholders in this analysis.
Humans/animals:  Smuggling of humans refers to both movement 
of terrorist/insurgent personnel as well as people who are being involuntarily 
smuggled and people who are being smuggled in order to circumvent normal 
immigration pathways.  The people being smuggled themselves are obviously 
stakeholders in this analysis irrespective of their intentions.  Organizations that 
facilitate their transfer have a stake in ensuring that they arrive at their 
destination in order to get paid or to guarantee their good name should payment 
already have been given.  Such organizations might include various criminal 
organizations such as the Japanese Triads.
Investigation into the detection of smuggled animals was not 
required by any interested parties.  However, any technology employed in the 
detection of humans will also be able to detect animals.  This may be applicable 
for detecting the smuggling of endangered species.  Detection of animals is 
largely incidental, but not a focus area.
b. Mid-course movement
None of the targeted cargoes are restricted in their movement to 
only the maritime domain.  All of the targeted cargoes can be shipped via land 
routes, where geography permits, and by air cargo when geography does not 
permit.  A highly successful MIO campaign may cause an adversary to begin 
shipping illicit cargo via non-maritime routes.  This increase in the movement of 
illicit cargoes by non-maritime routes may cause an increase in the amount of 
illicit cargo smuggled through land and air routes.  Therefore the agencies 
responsible for border security in a respective region or airport security become a 
stakeholder.  Though none of these organizations would protest a more 
successful campaign, it is important to note that on a long enough timeline, an 
effective MIO may cause more materials to move via alternate routes.
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During the mid-course movement of illicit goods from source to 
destination, those responsible for the safety and transport of the illicit cargo are 
stakeholders.  Specifically, the crew of the target ship may be a stakeholder.  If 
the crew is aware of the nature of the cargo being smuggled, they are definitely a 
stakeholder.  If the crew is unaware, they are still a stakeholder.  In the event that 
coalition forces should interdict the illicit cargo, then the owners of the illicit cargo 
may seek retribution against the target crew’s interest or life.
c. Consumers
In the case of smuggled narcotics, a limited supply entering the 
destination country may place the distributors of such narcotics in a position of 
being unable to meet their customer’s demand.  This will cause a rise in the 
“street value” of narcotics, a rise in crime as addicted customers have to resort to 
other means to obtain the wealth necessary to make a purchase of narcotics, 
and potential opportunities for competing narcotic traffickers who had not been 
interdicted to grow their operations.
For the case of the tools of insurgency, the primary stakeholder is 
the recipient of such weaponry.  As long as an insurgent organization is able to 
continuously resupply via a sea route, then whatever organization they are 
fighting will have a difficult time ending the insurgency.  In the event that the 
necessary supplies needed to continue an insurgency are interdicted, then an 
insurgency’s options on how to continue their fight will become somewhat limited.
In all of the above cases, the supplier is a stakeholder again due to 
the adverse effects that MIOs have on the users of insurgency supplies and 
narcotics.  Should a country like China be supplying arms to an insurgency, and 
that insurgency fails due to the interdiction of said armaments, then a country like 
China will be unable to exert their influence.   
If a vessel is non-compliant with the MIO process, they may choose 
to either oppose the boarding team through employment of violent force, or they 
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may choose to attempt to run away from coalition forces.  Depending on the 
perceived threat, national/coalition willpower, and the rules of engagement, it 
may be necessary to disable that particular vessel.  In disabling the vessel, it 
may be necessary to ensure that a country in the region either take custody of 
the vessel or be willing to assist in repairs.
Lastly, should a given vessel be deemed too deeply embroiled in 
illegal activities, it may be seized and the crew detained.  At this point, it will be 
likely that the captured vessel will need to be moved to a friendly country in the 
region.  If no such country exists (and insufficient willpower exists to sink the 
captured vessel), then it will need to be moved out of the area to a friendly 
country.  This friendly country becomes a stakeholder as they are now 
responsible for the disposal of the vessel.
d. Ubiquitous Stakeholders
At all points in the movement of targeted cargoes, the US 
government and its allies are stakeholders.  The very creation of narcotics is 
generally a detriment to governments worldwide.  The very creation of the tools 
of an insurgency for shipment into a hostile area creates work necessary to 
interdict said cargoes.  
During the interdiction of illicit cargoes, there is a clear ‘transfer of 
value’ that occurs as a coalition Navy takes custody of the illicit cargo.  
Finally, should the illicit cargo be successfully interdicted, then 
there exists a very good chance of second order effects occurring in the 
destination country.  These second order effects potentially impact the United 
States and its allies.  For instance, failure of an insurgency to resupply may 
increase the probability that an insurgency will collapse.  As the collapse of most 
insurgencies is considered highly desirable, the United States and its allies 




The full functional analysis of all the pieces of “to MIO” is included in 
Appendix A.
4. Requirements Analysis
Individual requirements for each of the major functional pieces are 
contained throughout. 
5. Architectural Analysis
This section will define the various qualitative measures of architectures.  
Section C of this report will analyze the degree to which one measure is more 
important than another.  It will also describe four basic architectures and 
generate a relative score for each of them.  This section will also identify the 
finalized selected architecture.
For the different criteria identified below, a given weight from 0 to 10 is 
assigned.  Table 2 details the relative weights for each of the evaluation criteria.
Effectiveness 10









Table 2:  Relative weights for architectural evaluation criteria
a. Architectural Criteria
Effectiveness:  While the term “effectiveness” denotes a lengthy 
discussion regarding Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs), such discussion 
exceeds the scope of this section of the document.  MOEs for individual portions 
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of the system of systems are divided throughout the upcoming chapters.  
However, the degree to which a system will reliably be able to determine which 
ship to target for a MIO and be able to locate hidden cargoes without the consent 
of the target ship’s crew is a criterion worthy of general consideration in 
architectural evaluation. 
Effectiveness is given the highest priority for the simple reason that 
the fundamental reason for doing a MIO in the first place was to accomplish a 
given mission.  Other factors could potentially intervene.  However, if an 
architecture is believed to be unable to even accomplish a mission, then it should 
be removed from consideration.  If ability to be effective at accomplishing a 
mission is deemed inferior, then the other alternative should still be considered.  
However, a significant combination of other factors with less weight will need to 
be able to override a lack of effectiveness to compensate.
Crisis Response Capability: As also required by the project 
statement, the designed system of systems must be able to respond to regional 
crisis.  It is assumed that the system of systems would need to be able to 
respond at somewhere from a minimum participatory capacity to something less 
than the general size of Operation Unified Assistance.  That operation was done 
with multiple coalition vessels, the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group and 
both the USS Bonhomme Richard (BHR) ESG.  The BHR ESG was later 
replaced with the USS Essex and USS Fort McHenry.
Crisis Response capability is a more subjective term than 
“effectiveness” and can be defined to mean many things.  As a result, it has been 
given less priority than overall perceived effectiveness.  However, crisis is 
naturally an opportunity in waiting.  There are numerous advantages with regards 
to being able to respond to crisis, such as humanitarian disaster.  Entire regions 
that may have been previously deemed “staunchly anti-American” can be 
convinced to be “pro-American” or at least tolerant in a matter of time if the 
United States correctly positions assets that are flexible enough to respond to 
different kinds of crisis.  Because of the massive fringe benefit in being able to 
40
seize an opportunity (i.e. respond to a crisis), ability to handle a diverse array of 
circumstances is of high priority.  Furthermore, the project statement requires 
that any system of systems developed here be capable of responding to regional 
and theater crisis.
Logistic Independence:  The project requires that the developed 
system of systems be able to operate in a logistically barren environment.  
Consequently, the ability of a system to continue functioning as external logistic 
support is removed is a key factor in rating one architectural alternative over 
another. 
As is required by the project statement, any developed architecture 
must be able to operate completely without the support of a region of interest.  If 
an architecture requires excessive quantities of supplies and/or personnel to 
operate, then it should receive a lower score.  Logistic Independence is given a 
higher weight as it is a requirement of the project mission statement, however it 
is of less importance than being able to accomplish a mission or seize on an 
opportunity.  The employed system of systems is not being employed to 
demonstrate its logistic independence, as it is there to accomplish a mission that 
extends beyond the maritime domain.  Inability to accomplish that mission 
negates the necessity of the architecture, regardless of how easily supplied it is.
Survivability:  Given the definition of logistically barren, it is a 
logical conclusion that the area in which the MIOs are to be conducted is 
distinctly unfriendly to a coalition presence.  As a general consequence, it can 
reasonably be concluded that hostile forces may attack coalition assets 
performing the MIO.  For instance, pirates may attack the boarding team while 
they are on another ship.  Alternatively, a foreign power may choose to interfere 
with the conduct of the MIO.  It is assumed that the designed system of systems 
ought to be able to withstand such hostile interference.
Implicit in the requirement for the system to be able to operate in a 
logistically barren environment is that the environment is generally unfriendly.  
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Either foreign powers, terrorists, pirates and potentially even excessive anti-
American sentiment can result in potentially severe damage to an employed 
architecture.  The employed architecture should be able to either survive the 
anticipated levels of violence, or it should be able to perform corrective 
maintenance on itself.  
Climate Independence:  Since nothing about the project statement 
allows for constraints to be placed on the environment, it can be concluded that 
the system of systems should be able to operate with equal ability in both day 
and night.  Furthermore, in looking at all of the potential “hot-spots” of the world, 
they are all capable of receiving foul weather in the form of either typhoons, 
shamals, high sea-state and/or cold weather.  
If an architecture is limited in its ability to perform at night, then 
other criteria will suffer.  Though it might be reasonably effective on average 
when operating and able to respond to a crisis or be logistically independent, if it 
is periodically impeded due to weather, then its overall utility is diminished.  
Climate independence is given a priority, but not as high as the aforementioned 
architectural evaluation criteria.
Relative Footprint:  No part of the US Navy is exclusively devoted 
to MIO as of the writing of this report.  It is the opinion of the authors that the 
design and construction of a ship specifically to do MIO is a radical step that is 
not necessary.  Instead, the preferred approach is to examine modifications to 
existing platforms to allow them to be more effective to do MIOs.  Minimization of 
the relative “footprint” on each of the utilized platforms is a highly desirable 
quality for the designed system of systems.
It is likely that any employed architecture will require an alteration to 
an existing platform.  The degree that an alteration is required to a given platform 
likely diminishes that platform’s ability to perform other functions.  However, if the 
mission is important enough to undertake, it is important enough to undertake it 
correctly.  The relative footprint imposed by the architecture on existing systems 
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is important enough to utilize it as a criterion for distinguishing between 
alternatives, but in terms of the more mission-centric criteria, it is of less 
importance.
Risk:  Different degrees of technological sophistication are required 
to implement the different architectures described in section C of this chapter.  
Two basic categories of risk will be considered here.  The risk to the personnel 
charged with operating the system of systems and the risk that a given system 
will not be technologically feasible are both considered.
Obviously, a system which has a low risk of failure in its 
development and does not place any humans at risk is more desirable than a 
system which fails to accomplish these tasks.  However, there is a certain degree 
of risk inherent in conducting a MIO in the first place.  If the risk of doing a MIO 
were truly greater than the benefits, then the MIO mission would never be 
ordered in the first place.  Therefore, risk posed to humans and risk of 
developmental failure are given a lower weight.
Stealth:  The more a system of systems can conduct MIOs without 
alerting or interfering with the target population, the more intelligence it will be 
able to generate while also minimizing risk to the operators of the MIO system.  
Furthermore, a stealthier system exposes the boarding teams to less risk as they 
would have an element of surprise.  Stealth is also good in the sense that an 
unsuspecting smuggler may not take as great of precautions in concealing illicit 
cargo prior to a boarding team’s arrival.  In these regards, a stealthier MIO 
system of systems is more desirable.  
However, it is also noteworthy that a stealthy MIO system does little 
to deter a shipper of illicit cargo.  There is also a possibility that the target of a 
stealthy MIO may react violently, causing boarding team members to be placed 
at risk.  In these regards, stealth is outwardly undesirable.
Lastly, MIO is defined internationally as being an inherently legal 
action.  Inherently legal actions that have the credibility and backing of a body of 
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nations like NATO or the United Nations generally do not require stealthy 
practices.  Because of the lack of an explicit requirement for stealth, and 
potentially undesirable effects of stealth, stealth is given a very low score.  
Stealth is still considered desirable due to the fact that publicity concerns about 
the MIO and its deterrent value can be overcome by public affairs action should 
that be a requirement. 
Mobility:  The term “logistically barren” implies that the location for 
which MIOs will be conducted is not in close proximity to any coalition partners.  
Thus, the system of systems will need to be able to move to this location.  
Therefore, the system should have adequate mobility to be able to reach such a 
destination in a time-span short enough to allow a difference to be made.
As a logistically barren environment is defined as one where there 
is no logistic support in the environment, and friendly/allied countries provide 
logistic support, one can very quickly deduce that the logistically barren 
environment is an operationally significant distance away from anyplace friendly.  
Since the finished architecture will originate someplace friendly, then there is an 
obvious need for the architecture to be able to move on its own.  However, the 
time required to make such a transit is not specified in the problem statement.  
As such, mobility is given a very low score, but is still included for completeness.  
It is also worth noting that an immobile system should not be considered in this 
analysis due to the imposed transit requirement.
Four architectures are considered here.  They are ESG based MIO 
(which is essentially the baseline), the submarine launched MIO, heli-borne MIO, 
and the non-logistically barren MIO.
Cost:  As with any other decision alternative, fiscal realities may 
prohibit realization of a given system.  Due to the lack of mention of financial 
considerations in the project statement, cost will be considered, but not to any 
significant degree of analysis.
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As stated before, if the MIO mission is worth doing, then it is worth 
funding to the appropriate degree.  The appropriate degree needs to be a degree 
that allows it to accomplish its function.  As such, the above criteria are given 
greater consideration.
b. Selected Architecture
The selected architecture, as described in section C, is the 
Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) based architecture.  
This ‘surface based’ architecture will employ small surface craft to 
transport boarding teams equipped with an appropriate set of equipment to 
search the target ship in the most expeditious and effective manner possible.  
The boarding team will have the equipment and tactics necessary to conduct 
boardings independent of the level of opposition.  This boarding team will be 
supported by a number of UAVs that are capable of rendering disabling fire 
against a non-cooperative target vessel, as well as being able to conduct ISR 
over a large area.  The relative merit of coalition forces providing various ISR 
assets of different capabilities will be evaluated.
6. Design Optimization
With the baseline architecture established, there are a number of areas 
that can be refined.  These major areas of refinement mirror the six major 
functional areas of “to do a MIO” that are discussed in chapter one.  For each of 
the parts of the MIO system, they will be optimized to varying applicable criteria.
For instance, the current baseline (as will be discussed in chapter six) is 
primarily sailors manually searching through the cargo holds of suspect vessels.  
Employment of other sensors that can detect explosive residues will greatly 
improve the effectiveness of such search teams.  This refinement increases the 
overall effectiveness of the overall MIO package.
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The individual functional areas each detail their own individual refinements 
in each of their respective chapters.
7. Validation
Validation of the final engineered product is done first internally by 
implementing various refinements inside computer models that simulate various 
pieces of the MIO process.  The relative degree to which an engineered 
improvement generates an improvement in the MOEs of a model will be 
documented herein.
Validation of results will also be accomplished by the Delphi method (i.e., 
discussing the final materials with stakeholders, the NPS faculty, and invited 
guests on the 5th of June, 2008).  Alterations and refinements to the report will be 
made as necessary following this out-briefing and follow-on working groups.
Participating stakeholders have also been provided with draft copies of the 
report and given ample opportunity to comment.  Any irresolvable objections by 
them have been documented in this report. 
Lastly, a copy of this report is posted on the internet and made available 
for review/comment by any interested parties.
8. Verification
Verification, or the establishment of the truth and correspondence 
between a product and its specification, can only be done as refinements 
suggested herein are fielded by operational forces.  Surveys of boarding teams, 
ship’s captains, and operational staffs should help to determine the effectiveness 
of individual refinements suggested.  Furthermore, many of the members of SEA-
13 have had either direct experience on boarding teams or managing MIOs at a 
staff level (in the case of the student project lead).
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9. System Operational Use
The system employed will never be one hundred percent effective.  In 
general, the probabilities of interdicting a targeted cargo that may or may not 
exist on a ship that is not identified in advance are small.  The technology and 
techniques developed in this document are designed to improve these odds; 
however, it is important to note that no MIO will ever be “air-tight” to a specific 
type of cargo as long as vessels are allowed to transit. 
10. System Retirement and Disposal, Updates
The individual chapters of this paper will document the retirement, 
disposal and updates of the technologies identified in each of their respective 
areas. 
C. ARCHITECTURAL ANALYSIS
1. Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) based architecture
An expeditionary strike group consists of a three ship amphibious ready 
group (an LHD, LPD and LSD class ship), one or more cruisers or destroyers, a 
supporting logistics tail, and a submarine (in some cases).  For the purpose of 
this analysis, the submarine will not be considered as it is likely that the 
submarine will be treated as a national asset and will be unavailable for the 
performance of MIO related functions.
a. Benefits
As a generality, ESGs are very well understood in terms of their 
flexibility and adaptability.  They can do a wide range of missions and are 
generally well suited to all tasks that are in the “lower ends of warfare”.   
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b. Drawbacks
ESGs are large and bulky requiring many ships to be effective.  
They have a high maintenance and operation cost.  However, this cost is 
generally well understood and offset by its multi-mission capability set.
c. Scoring
Effectiveness – 10:  Of the architectures considered here, the 
ESG architecture is able to handle the greatest number of boarding teams, 
personnel and supporting assets.  It has the greatest amount of firepower and 
the greatest ability to support a boarding team without having to refuel.  It also 
has a good ability to handle confiscated material.  
Crisis Response Capability - 10:  ESGs have been employed for 
crisis response in the past.  The Bonhomme Richard ESG and later the Essex 
ESG were instrumental (beyond the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group) in the 
efforts of Operation Unified Assistance to relieve the inhabitants of Sumatera 
from the damage inflicted by the 2004 Tsunami.  The Essex ESG was later 
employed in relieving the inhabitants of a Leyte Gulf village following a mud-slide 
that covered an entire town.  No other architectural concept presented here has 
the proven track record of ESGs in responding to actual/real-world crisis.  
Logistic Independence -8:  ESGs still require a logistics tail to 
support them.  However, this process is fairly well understood with a wealth of 
experience already available.  Once supplied, ESGs are likely able to operate for 
extended periods of time without refueling.
Survivability - 7:  Depending on the composition of forces, ESGs 
lack the kind of the stand off weaponry necessary to survive a full attack by a 
near-peer competitor.  They also do not possess an organic mine-warfare 
capability.  However, in the 2013-2014 timeframe, the ESGs could have an 
adequate force protection capability, to include a fully fielded Close in Weapons 
System, block 1B.  ESGs also possess numerous Marine Corps assets such as 
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the AH-1 Cobra that can easily neutralize any small threats to the strike group.  
Furthermore, ESG’s also carry hundreds of Marines, many of which will have 
already been trained to conduct MIOs. 
Relative Footprint - 10:  ESGs have a lot of area in them for 
handling everything from UAVs to miscellaneous cargo.  Of all the ship classes 
employed by the U.S. Navy, the amphibious ships of the ESG have the greatest 
available area for handling modifications relative to their size.  
Climate Independence – 10:  ESGs can operate in a wide range 
of sea states and climate conditions.  High sea states and typhoons will prohibit 
an ESG’s conduct of operations.  However, these conditions will also cause the 
targeted vessels (particularly if the discussion centers around a vessel that is 
even less resilient) to divert first.
Risk - 10:  As ESGs are a well developed technology, their risk 
with regards to feasibility is very small.  Furthermore, as ESGs do have a great 
surface lift capacity as well as a vertical lift capability, medical evacuations are 
relatively easy to accomplish by a variety of means.  ESGs also have an inherent 
hospital capability organic to the LHD.
Cost - 8:  ESGs are a sunk cost.  The US government has already 
purchased a number of these and continues to employ them for a variety of 
purposes.  Although their maintenance and operational costs are not 
inexpensive, it is important to note that this too is likely a sunk cost.  Dispatching 
an ESG to a troubled spot in the world has added benefits besides being able to 
conduct MIOs. 
Mobility - 10:  ESGs are intensely mobile.  They are a proven 
technology and routinely deploy from San Diego, Sasebo and Norfolk to areas as 
far away as the Persian Gulf.
Stealth – 2:  Only a vastly technologically inferior entity could miss 
the presence of an ESG.  Their size and composition make them easy to locate 
using even the crudest of surveillance techniques. 
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2. Submarine Enabled MIO
As it was desired to develop radically different architectures to evaluate 
MIO, varying the principal delivery mechanism for moving the MIO package into 
the logistically barren theater of interest is the primarily altered variable between 
considered architectural alternatives.  Submarine delivery of a MIO package into 
a theater poses a number of advantages in terms of stealth.  However, in other 
areas, the submarine based MIO has difficulties.  In terms of defensive 
capabilities, a surface vessel is engineered to be on the surface.  A submarine 
does not have this advantage once surfaced.  As such, it is assumed in this 
analysis that in order to do MIOs, a submarine must be able to conduct the 
interdiction without surfacing. 
Furthermore, if a boarding team where to suddenly appear in the vicinity of 
a target vessel, it would be a strong indication of a submarine being in the area.  
However, the exact location will still be unknown, and the submarine will still be 
defended from the target ship by virtue of its depth.  
The basic idea behind a submarine enabled MIO is to operate in theater to 
deliver boarding teams onto target vessels.  While not always the case, boarding 
teams will need to be able to launch while the submarine is submerged in order 
to preserve the stealth aspect of the submarine.  Almost every submarine 
launched boarding team will surprise the target vessel.  This will require the 
design and construction of a MIO vehicle capable of launching and docking from 
a submarine.  
This will also require the submarine to launch UAVs when submerged in 
order to provide overhead ISR and large area surveillance.  The same UAVs will 
need to be able to maintain a radio communications link with a satellite equipped 
with a blue green laser that can talk to the submarine.  This will allow the 
submarine to use UAVs as an ISR asset, or potentially a fire support asset for the 
boarding team.  
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a. Benefits
Submarines, particularly nuclear ones, have great mobility, stealth 
and endurance.  They can stay at sea for months on end without degrading their 
operational capability.  They are also generally independent of their logistic 
pipeline with the exception of disposal of captured illicit cargoes.
b. Drawbacks
Communications with any relevant link from both a tactically 
sufficient speed and depth will remain a problem for the submarine community 
for many years to come.  Although blue-green lasers have produced some minor 
results with regards to communications with submarines, this technology has not 
matured to fruition.  In order for the architecture to work, it is assumed that this 
technological challenge has been overcome.  Surface wire antennas could 
potentially allow for line of sight communications linkages with a UAV depending 
on the speed and depth of the submarine and design of the antenna.
UAV launches from a submerged submarine open up a variety of 
different challenges in both the design and construction of the submarine as well 
as the UAV.  Such a UAV will likely be inordinately expensive and complicated 
with a high failure rate as it would need to be able to both fly at tactically relevant 
altitudes and speed while also being able to submerge in order to rejoin with the 
submarine.  Alternatively, the UAVs could be disposable such that recovery 
would no longer be a requirement.  
Communications between the boarding team and the submerged 
submarine will be very difficult.  The boarding team will have to rely on satellite 
communications in order to reach back to the submarine.  In the event that a 
target crew becomes violent, the submarine may be unaware of this event, or 
unable to respond as the time necessary to send reinforcements will be 
prohibitive.  
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Lastly, MIO is not a primary mission area of submarines in the US 
Navy, nor is it likely that it will be a mission area by the timeframe identified for 
the scope of this project.  It is very improbable that a submarine would be 
assigned a MIO mission as it will likely receive tasking of higher priorities. 
c. Scoring
Effectiveness – 2:  A submarine MIO force cannot act as an 
effective deterrent if any potential suppliers are unaware of its presence.  
Launching and recovery of a boarding team will likely be greatly more 
complicated than it would be for surface combatants, which will result in fewer 
MIOs being done.  While the submarine may be more effective in specific 
scenarios where stealth is paramount, a submarine based approach would be of 
little value given the average type of MIO conducted at the time of the writing of 
this report.
Crisis Response Capability - 1:  With the exception of a
significant Naval incursion by a foreign power, the ability of a submarine to 
respond to a crisis is somewhat limited.
Logistic Independence - 5:  Although a submarine can operate for 
months on end in the traditional roles of submarines, it cannot conduct an 
underway replenishment with the same degree of efficiency as surface 
combatants.  The resupply of things like small boat fuel will be prohibitively 
difficult for a submarine.  As resupply will be important (given a submarines 
relatively limited storage space), a submarine is not given a very high score for 
logistics independence.  
Survivability - 10:  Given the relative technological sophistication 
of modern submarines and their relatively high degree of stealth, the probability 
that an adversary would be able to render a submarine inoperable from its MIO 
mission is the smallest for all of the architectures considered here. 
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Relative Footprint - 0:  The number and extent of modifications 
required to a submarine to allow it to efficiently perform a MIO mission would be 
greatly prohibitive.  Additionally, alterations to the exterior of a submarine require 
a great deal more engineering than do alterations to the exterior of a ship as 
these alterations have to be able so survive without compromising the hull while 
operating at tactically significant speeds and depths.
Climate Independence – 10:  Submarines can operate in any 
condition and sea state.  If done at sufficient depth, the launching and recovery of 
a boarding vessel of some form should also be equally unaffected.  Boarding a 
target ship in high seas will be equally difficult. 
Risk - 1:  The complexity involved in launching and recovering at 
depth, conducting communications with the boarding team and surveillance 
assets, and the communication linkage between a submerged submarine 
operating at speed and depth are prohibitive.  
Cost - 1:  Relative to the other architectures considered here, the 
cost of the modifications to the submarine, and the cost of specialized boarding 
craft and UAV’s that are capable of launch/recovery at speed and depth will be 
greatly prohibitive. 
Mobility - 10:  Submarines can traverse a large ocean with equal 
ease to other platforms.
Stealth – 10:  Submarines are the stealthiest of platforms. 
3. HVBSS based MIO
This architecture assumes the availability of a ship capable of handling a 
large number of helicopters, such as a CVN or LHD/A.  Even an LPD can handle 
a significant number of helicopters.  It is assumed that rules of engagements are 
sufficient to allow a helicopter to engage in fire support of a distressed boarding 
team.  It is also assumed that the main platform can be out of visual range from 
the target vessel.
53
The basic premise is that a ship with a multitude of helicopters and more 
boarding teams enters an area and searches merchant ships for targeted illicit 
cargo.  Boarding team members will rappel out of the helicopter onto the target 
vessel along with all of their search equipment and proceed to search the target 
ship.  Following the completion of the search, the boarding team will then need to 
return to their ship of origin.  Assuming they did not bring a surface craft of 
sufficient range to transit back (and also assuming the target merchant vessel will 
not assist in the transit back to the originating ship), then the helicopter will be 
required to move the boarding team back.
Communications with the boarding team will be very difficult in this 
environment.  Though a helicopter could act as a relay, the probabilities that it 
would be of sufficient altitude to perform this function are improbable.  In order to 
ensure that communications with the boarding team remain constant, a 
dedicated airborne relay will be required.  Alternatively, the boarding teams will 
need a satellite communications capability should an airborne relay not be 
available.
a. Benefits
The principal advantage to HVBSS based MIO is that the MIO can 
be done independent of sea state, at greater ranges, and on multiple targets.  
Opposed boardings done from a helicopter are also safer, as there is no
requirement for boarding team members to physically jump between craft or to 
climb high freeboards starting at sea level.  
The relative speed at which a boarding team can move from the 
parent ship to the target ship may give some advantage in the event that the 
target ship is capable of great speeds.  
The larger number of helicopters required to carry multiple boarding 
teams will provide additional de facto ISR assets.
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b. Drawbacks
The consequence of a failing helicopter could be potentially severe.  
Additionally, conducting MIOs at night from a helicopter will be very dangerous.  
Rappelling out of a helicopter poses a number of severe risks to the boarding 
team members.
In the event that an adversary should choose to attack the boarding 
team while they are onboard a target vessel, helicopters alone may be an 
insufficient response/deterrent to prevent this from happening.  A vessel like a 
DDG is much more suited for this task.
c. Scoring
Effectiveness – 7:  An HVBSS-centric architecture can conduct a 
potentially larger volume of MIOs than a surface centric approach.  However, the 
high likelihood of failure of at least one part in the HVBSS process as well as the 
time taken to mitigate the ensuing consequences will likely degrade the 
effectiveness of an HVBSS based architecture very quickly.  
Crisis Response Capability - 8:  While an  HVBSS-centric 
architecture has a lift capacity comparable to an ESG, it is incapable of 
responding to a crisis perpetrated by a foreign power.
Logistic Independence -7:  The greatly increased reliance of 
helicopters on logistic support requires a larger number of spare parts to keep 
them running. 
Survivability - 6:  Helicopters are an inadequate stand-off weapon 
as it relates to surface unit warfare.  If the task force were to be pursued by a 
near peer competitor, it would have a reduced probability of survival relative to 
that of a surface unit centric MIO force.  However, as the term ‘survivability’ 
relates to the probability that the boarding team will survive, the increased 
number of helicopters will offer some degree of close air support capability.
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Relative Footprint - 7:  The helicopters employed will need to be 
more specialized for rapid egress of the boarding team as well as a more 
expeditious means of recovery than is currently employed.
Climate Independence – 9:  Helicopters require correct winds to 
recover onboard the launching ship.
Risk - 4:  While less risky than a submarine launched MIO, 
rappelling out of a moving helicopter onto a moving ship that is potentially loaded 
with hostile adversaries poses an inherently large risk to the boarding team 
members.  
Cost - 9:  As stated earlier, aircraft are generally more expensive to 
operate than surface vessels such as the rigid hull inflatable boats.  However, 
when compared to the overall cost of operating a complete ESG, a pure 
helicopter centric approach is a single ship and offers some financial advantages.
Mobility - 10:  As with the submarine and surface ships, a 
helicopter carrier is equally capable of making an expeditious transit across a 
large ocean.
Stealth – 4:  While the presence of the helicopter carrier may be 
generally known to potential targets in a given region, the approach speed at 
which the helicopter approaches the target ship may allow some amount of 
surprise of the target ship.  As stated in the stealth section for the submarine 
based MIO, this is not always advantageous.
4. Non-Logistically Barren
The requirement that the designed MIO system be able to operate in a 
place devoid of logistic support directly necessitated the requirement for some 
kind of launching platform that could survive in a hostile territory for an extended 
period of time.  Although outside the scope of the problem, it is an interesting 
exercise to consider totally alternative mechanisms for implementing MIOs 
should this restriction not have been placed.
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If infinite resources were available inside of a given region, ships are not 
entirely necessary.  Small craft can operate from a shore facility at substantially 
reduced cost than that of a DDG.  Additionally, aircraft based on land can provide 
a credible fire support deterrent towards hostile nations that may intervene in a 
MIO as well as to the crew of a target ship.  
If available, a port facility would be a more ideal place from which to 
conduct a MIO.  If the target ship could be persuaded to pull into a port, then 
moving large volumes of search equipment, as well as large volumes of 
personnel who are local to the region to conduct the search, all become trivial 
matters.  Should it not be desired to have a target vessel pull into a port, then 
swarms of small boats loaded with locally hired contractors could do a very 
effective MIO.
a. Benefits
The scalability of this approach is limited only to the amount of 
financial capital available.  There is no upper limit to how big an operation can 
be.  This would allow for the largest volumes of MIOs to be done.
This approach prevents the perception of a large U.S. presence as 
the preponderance of the personnel conducting the MIO would be locally hired 
contractors.  Depending on the area in which this was done, this could be greatly 
advantageous as a linguistic capability is now available that might not be 
available to U.S. personnel.
b. Drawbacks
This approach assumes that land based aircraft will be a credible 
deterrent to ships who may either disobey the directions of small craft operating 
in a channel.  It also assumes the presence of a land base from which large 
volumes of small craft can operate.  This system is totally incapable conducting 
MIOs away from major port facilities.
57
c. Scoring
Effectiveness – 9:  Given all the assumptions are true, no other 
system can generate as many MIOs as this system can.  However, it is subject to 
the integrity of the personnel conducting the MIO.  They could potentially be in 
league with whatever entity is the originator of the illicit cargo (i.e. Al Qaeda).  
Crisis Response Capability - 0:  This approach has no U.S. 
presence.  It essentially is the quintessential outsourcing of a MIO capability.
Logistic Independence - 0:  This system fundamentally violates 
the notion of logistically barren. 
Survivability - 5:  Personnel are entirely at the mercy of the host 
nation.  However, a potentially greater amount of firepower can be mustered from 
land.  Land based targets are also more difficult to hit than sea based targets.   
Relative Footprint - 10:  This approach requires no modifications 
to any existing platforms.
Climate Independence – 4:  This system can only operate in 
conditions that allow the launching and recovery of small boats.
Risk - 6:  The loyalty and integrity of the contracted boarding team 
members could potentially be very embarrassing for the United States and its 
Allies on a long enough timeline.  
Cost - 0:  The fundamental principal of this system is that a land 
base with tactical fighter support, and large quantities of hired personnel are 
available.  Logistic support is not assumed to be given freely from the host 
country.
Mobility - 0:  This system has no ability to transit any operationally 
sized body of water.
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Stealth – 0:  The presence of such a force in a host country will 
likely generate a lot of jobs for the local populace.  It will be heavily advertised 
and very difficult for any intelligence service of any complexity to miss.
5. Architectural Scores
The following table details the scores assigned, their weighted values, and 
the overall score for each of the four architectures identified above.
Weight ESG Submarine HVBSS NLB
Effectiveness 10 10 2 7 9
Crisis Response Capability 9 10 1 8 0
Logistic Independence 8 8 5 7 0
Survivability 7.5 7 10 6 5
Relative Footprint 7 10 0 7 10
Climate Independence 6 10 10 9 4
Risk 5.5 10 1 4 6
Cost 5 8 1 9 0
Mobility 3 10 10 10 0
Stealth 2 2 10 4 0
Weighted Score 9.0 4.2 7.1 4.0
Table 3:  Weighted scores for alternative architectures
As can plainly be seen from Table 3, the proposed surface-centric ESG 
based architecture is the optimum architecture for consideration.  Other 
architectural alternatives are useful only in an academic study and are of such a 




The development of realistic scenarios has a two-fold purpose for the 
project.  First it gives a basis to build the simulations around, or it builds the 
boundaries of our problem to test various different systems versus the current 
standard systems.  Second it provides a chance to research current operations 
and develop the standard for the next set of solutions.  
Our group first decided on an approach to decide the key aspects in 
defining MIO from a parameter approach.  A Causal Loop Diagram shown below 
as Figure 1, to describe these features graphically.  We separated the key 
parameters into four categories: Equipment Capabilities, Hostile Ship 
Characteristics, Environmental Factors, and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 
(TTPs).  In Equipment Capabilities we highlighted the friendly characteristics and 
how the task of identification is critical to the boarding units.  The difference 
between Detection and Classification is critical when choosing a specific target, 
where detection is the process of finding "a ship," and classification is the 
process of finding "the ship."  After classification, the ability to intercept a target 
avoiding capture is also an important operational consideration, but it is also 
dependent on the hostile ship.  The next major area is the hostile or target ship, it 
has a dramatic effect on the Operations as well as its disposition to passive and 
active defense measures.  Environmental Factors of the Area of Operations 
(AOR) and the Traffic density are the next driving considerations.  These factors 
affect the force structure and force size and feedback into the TTPs.  The TTPs 
are the local variables to the commander once everything is in place.  With all 
these factors and considerations described, our group started the task of 
Scenario Development.  These scenarios take into account each factor and the 
critical framing structure which describes the “box” or the scenario bounds.  
Using these ideals, we decided to use realistic scenarios to support current 
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Figure 1:  Causal Loop Diagram for Scenario Development
In planning a realistic operation, our group went to the source of U.S 
military planning doctrine (Joint Pub 5).  These scenarios were designed based 
on the force structure planned in 2013.  The scenarios follow a MIO campaign in 
an Area of Operations (AOR) from the initial stages through Phase 2 in the Joint 
Publication 5.  The following sections will layout the initial set of assumptions and 
how our team planned the operations based on these assumptions. 
B. INTRODUCTION TO COMBINED OPERATIONS
In Joint Publication Five5, the Phases of Operations are broken down into 
five distinct phases for operations.  The phases take the operations form the first
                                           
5 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff., Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning, Washington D.C., Joint 
publication 5-00.1, 2002
61
forces on scene until the eventually turn over to a civilian government or Non-
government Organization, which goes well beyond the scope of our analysis.  
The previous discussion in chapter one describes how we chose to focus on the 
first three phases, the following is an expansion of those ideas.  The group 
focused on the following phases for the simple reason of the logistically barren 
consideration in the problem statement.  Beyond Phase 2, a significant force 
structure and logistics pipeline is required to maintain the force, which eliminates 
that portion of the problem statement.  Since the project focuses on logistically 
barren operations, the decision was made to focus at the initial stages of a 
Maritime Security Campaign.  The post-Phase 2 operations would also probably 
include a blockade of ports and significant relaxation of the Rules of Engagement 
(ROE) and definition of hostile targets.  This combined with wording in the Joint 
Publication which requires the establishment of logistics hubs by the end of 
Phase 2.  This critical planning objective caused our group to develop the first 
three phases for the project scenarios. 
Using this as a guide the operations management group established a 
Concept of Operation (CONOPS) for each phase and a general CONOPS for 
any MIO campaign.  A summary of the CONOPS states that we intend to 
conduct Maritime Intercept Operations around the globe with zero friendly losses.  
The CONOPS details the enemy and friendly centers of gravity and gives insight 
into the organization structure required to fight.  The CONOPS focuses on 
perceived results since the actual measurement of smuggled cargo is impossible 
to verify, but other critical factors can influence the operations.  The CONOPS is 
designed for flexibility with the following scenarios built off the general CONOPS.  
The major goal of the operations is to conduct effective MIO operations 
anywhere at any time. 
The actual CONOPS is located in Appendix C; the following paragraphs 
describe the scenarios with respect to the three Phases each having a 
corresponding scenario. Although the phases would be planned in a sequential 
manner, for this project each phase is its own independent event.  Instead of 
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setting probable time length for the scenario events, we chose to think of each as 
separate event with its own problems and solutions.  This caused the creation of 
three separate scenarios with differing force structure, objectives, and test 
variables.  Each phase is independent to define clear modeling problems to focus 
on certain solutions and critical factors.  For example the Phase 0 scenario 
focuses on specific targets and specific search units rather than search time for 
the boarding party.  The Operations Management group also looked at how the 
operations would progress through each phase.  By doing this we highlighted 
various events or "trigger states" that would cause a commander to request the 
additional or reduction in force structure to transition the operation from one 
phase to another.  It is important to remember that each phase is independent 
and does not necessarily have to be completed sequentially or in a forward 
direction.  The commander may decide the operation has reverted to a previous 
phase or the objectives of the campaign were met or are now irrelevant. The 
CONOPS gives detailed information on Commander’s Intent and how we plan to 
organize the operations for success.
C. BACKGROUND
With the increasing use of global shipping lanes and the ability of criminal 
and terrorist organizations to possibly project power through the shipments of 
illicit materials, global navies are now required to protect and patrol this valuable 
asset.  In the last 10 years three major maritime incidents, the French M/V 
Limburg in the Bar-el-Mendeb, the attacks on Iraqi Oil Platforms in the Northern 
Arabian Gulf, and the Piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia stress the need for 
navies to take a proactive stance in areas to deter terrorist and criminal 
organizations from disrupting or exploiting the shipping lanes.  Although Maritime 
Interdiction Operations are conducted at sea we are cognizant that many of the 
primary effects are ashore directed at the groups and organizations using the 
busy shipping lanes to disguise their illicit cargoes.  Using MIO as a deterrent to 
these organizations is a way navies can protect their trade interests, critical 
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shipping lanes, and their citizens from disruptive groups.  Looking at the previous 
recent examples and the increasing threat, MIO are now an important piece in 
the current struggle to protect national interests and the global economy. 
This new mission area while difficult can be the focus of major operation 
just as Anti-Submarine, Strike, and Air Warfare have been in the past.  This 
means that navies need to be ready to deploy and project power into busy 
shipping lanes to protect the interests of their nations.  Our scenarios are focused 
on how we think a coalition including the U.S. Navy would establish a MIO 
campaign in a busy shipping lane to intercept targets of interest labeled “Red” 
shipping.  This scenario is purely fictional, and purely the creation of the authors 
and any similarities to current plans or operations is purely coincidental.  The 
countries and assets represented are simply representative platforms and do not 
have the full capabilities of the actual platforms.  
D. SCENARIO SETUP
For our scenarios we chose a fictional map based on a part of the world 
where there is relatively low shipping traffic.  The map of the Area of Operations 
is shown in Figure 2.  The area is bordered by major shipping lanes and five 
major countries/groups.  The shipping lanes are critical choke points and have 
arrival/ departure rate of approximately one ship every five minutes, which is a 
very dense traffic pattern similar to the Straits of Malacca.  There is also heavy 
regional and coastal traffic with over one-thousand smaller vessels present at 
any time.  The large amount of traffic also tends to attract pirates and petty 











Figure 2:  Map of Scenario Region
1. Political Background
The area is surrounded by five major political players who each have an 
interest in the region, and differing abilities to project naval power into the 
shipping lanes.  
a. Country Purple
Country Purple is a non-allied country who does not have a major 
economic stake in the straits.  They depend mostly on the ocean for a source of 
internal needs and do not have a major shipping industry.  The do not oppose the 
operations in the straits but will not send units to support it either.  Their units will 
continue to do anti-piracy patrols, fisheries enforcement, and other normal coast 
guard activities, which may encompass MIO in the form of custom inspections.  
These MIO will not be helpful to our operation since Country Purple will not report 
details of the boardings.  Also some local officials may not be under the control of 
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the central government and conduct MIO operations for local or monetary 
benefit.
b. Country White
Country White is a small island nation located at one entrance to 
the straits.  Country White relies on the straits for a high percentage of its 
economy and has the busiest port along the straits.  It is very friendly to the 
ongoing operations and will support the coalition if the threat is substantiated.  
Country White has a modern military with significant ISR and AEW assets that 
could be useful to the operations. 
c. Country Green
Country Green is a large nation along the Eastern Region of the 
shipping lanes and has been a perennial ally of the United States.  Country 
Green has a major stake in the shipping lanes both economically and politically.  
U.S. and Country Green units often participate in regional exercises and the U.S. 
has air and ground units deployed in-country almost year round, while naval 
vessels make routine port visits during the year.  Country Green is friendly to the 
U.S. and will support any operations in the area.  
d. Country Yellow
Country Yellow is a large nation who sometimes views U.S. actions 
in the region as “interference.”  Country Yellow is currently experiencing a violent 
internal war and a separatist group has seized part of the country and continues 
to try and overthrow the current government.  Country Yellow is completely 
involved with keeping the population safe and will not support any operations that 
do not directly benefit the current government.  Country Yellow is distracted and 
will not oppose any operations but requires U.S. / coalition forces to respect its 
sovereignty.
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e. Separatist Group (Bedrock Island)
 The Separatist Group in the area has seized a large country 
Yellow offshore island, Bedrock Island, and has set-up an ad-hoc government.  
The separatist group wants to expand its political control in to Country Yellow as 
well as the greater region.  Its leadership has broadcast its intentions to use 
shipping lanes, terrorism, and other disruptive operations to achieve their goals.  
The Separatist group is also supported by outside countries and its primary 
source of material is from the sea.  The goal of the operation is to prevent the 
Separatist Group from influencing the politics and security of the region through 
the shipping lanes, and to interdict supplies being moved to the separatist group. 
2. Scenario Story Line
The impetus to conduct a large scale MIO campaign is caused by the 
Separatist Group seizing the island from Country Yellow.  The Separatist are 
using this island as a base of operations with a goal of instilling their beliefs into 
all the regional countries.  They see the economic influence of “Western” 
Countries as bad influence for the region.  They are using the shipping lanes to 
send out supplies to splinter groups in the region and to receive supplies from 
sympathetic groups/governments from outside the region.  U.S. intelligence 
predicts that initially the group will use regional and international carriers to move 
supplies through the region. 
U.S. intelligence has collected information on several splinter groups in 
Country Purple and Country White that have increased activity.  These groups 
have new weapons and money to recruit for their organizations.  Since no air 
traffic or ground traffic with sufficient capacity has left the separatist island, 
intelligence has concluded the sea lanes must be the source of the new 
equipment in the region.  Also Country Yellow State News reports and state 
department sources have the separatists using state-of-the-art equipment built in 
foreign countries.  This equipment is being used to maintain the separatist group 
dominance of Yellow forces, and is not produced locally to the region.  
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Sympathetic countries outside the region are shipping supplies, weapons, and 
personnel to the island against regional and international regulations.  Country 
Green and White intelligence have noticed an increase of traffic through the 
shipping lanes destined for Yellow and Separatist ports.  Also there has been an 
increased number of containers intercepted at large regional port hubs with 
incorrect contents and documents suggesting smuggling of dangerous cargoes 
to the region.  
This information has caused regional government groups to appeal to the 
United Nations and Allied countries (including the U.S.) to assist in preventing 
dangerous cargoes from entering or leaving the area.  Also with increased 
number of targets and lucrative cargoes, pirate attacks have increased including 
attempted attacks on U.S. flagged vessels.  The President of the United States 
with the support of the regional governments has deployed the Bon Homme 
Richard Expeditionary Strike Group to the region to protect U.S. and allied 
shipping interest in the region. 
3. Area of Operations Assumptions
The U.S. - Country Green relationship is a long-standing allied relationship 
that will allow U.S. units to use Country Green as a logistic depot.  Although the 
government of Country Green will not initially actively support the operation, it will 
allow supplies and logistic ships to use seaports and airports for the units in 
theater.  Country Green is approximately a twenty hour flight from major U.S. 
West Coast cities (Los Angles, San Francisco, etc) and a fifteen hour flight to 
Honolulu.  Country Green is also approximately a ten hour flight from the largest 
forward deployed logistic hub.  The U.S. has detached an Expeditionary Strike 
Group (ESG) to the area and it is supported by a typical logistic ship detachment.  
A T-AO (Navy Oiler), T-AFS (Naval Supplies Ship), and T-AE (Ammunition Ship) 
are present in the area and will re-supply the ships as part of normal operating 
procedures for deployed Strike Groups.  
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4. MIO Targets
As part of the operation the U.S. units will be searching for four main 
cargoes on the vessels: Weapons, Explosives, Drugs, and Human Traffic to and 
from Bedrock Island.  Weapons will be defined as guns, mortars, and other 
conventional weapons, while explosives will be material such as C-4, Mines, and 
Improvised Explosive Devices (IED).  Each vessel in the AOR will be put into one 
of six classes found in Table 4 below.
Class Size Typical Vessels
I < 300 
Tons
Trawler, Fishing Dhows, Tugs & Tows, small Cargo Ships 
II < 300 
Tons
Passenger Ferries, Car Ferries
III > 300 
Tons
General Cargo, Cargo Dhows, Small Coastal Traffic
IV > 300 
Tons
Ore, Bulk, Oil Carriers,  Large Tug and Tows
V > 300 
Tons
Passenger Ferries, Cruise Ships, Roll-on Roll-off Ships (RO-
RO)
VI >300 Tons Container Ships, Large Container Barges
Table 4:  Ship Classification Categories
5. Blue Forces
The Blue Forces currently on-scene is a U.S. ESG which includes a Large 
Deck Amphibious ship (LHA/D), Landing Ship Dock (LSD), Landing Platform 
Dock (LPD), three Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG), and a Guided Missile 
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Cruiser (CG).  All platforms have three Visit Board Search and Seizure (VBSS) 
Teams with the exception of the LHA/D which has four teams.  All ships except 
one DDG have two SH-60R helicopters onboard and two small Rigid Hull 
Inflatable Boats (RHIBs) to deliver the VBSS team to the target.  In addition our 
group will test the benefits of substituting the SH-60R and one RHIB with UAV 
detachments and USV detachments.  Currently the UAV detachments will be 
three Vertical Take-off UAVs (VTUAVs) with an expected sortie of two per 
mission and one USV which will be force multiplier, but limit the ships to one 
RHIB to conduct boardings.  This replacement of SH-60s and one RHIB is known 
as the MIO Mission Package and will replace the normal load of two RHIBs and 
two SH-60 Seahawk helicopters.  The MIO mission package is the standing force 
for all scenarios; allies will add forces and some forces will not be utilized in the 
operations in all phases.  A detailed look at the model variables and definition is
further discussed in chapter eleven.  Our title for the campaign is OPERATION 
ACADEMIC FURY, and full detail of the planning, mission areas and 
commanders’ guidance can be found in the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) 
document located in Appendix C.
E. PHASE 0: SHAPING THE MARITIME ENVIRONMENT
Phase zero is the initial phase of the operation with limited force and 
objectives.  The trigger states to establish the operation or campaign are very 
limited.  The major purpose of the initial phase of the operation is area 
familiarization and establishing a presence.  The initial MIO are to establish the 
predicted threat and protect U.S. shipping in enforcement of international 
sanctions on the Separatist Group, giving the legal foundation to the operations.  
Phase zero is the starting point and an operation that could be conducted 
anywhere in the world with a small force and heavy traffic. 
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1. Phase 0: Trigger Stats
To establish this type of operation, increase in port security or IMO reports 
on smuggling in an area or intelligence on shipping containers being used as 
smuggling medium.  Also any pirate or criminal attacks on U.S. or allied flagged 
vessels in the region would cause an immediate response from the Navy.  Lastly 
any increased abnormal shipping traffic activity, for instance not using AIS 
transmitters, refusing to acknowledge VTS, or merchant vessels changing flags 
in the region would demonstrate illegal shipping activity in the region.  These 
previous events would cause local governments or a regional cooperation group 
to enforce stricter monitoring and enforcement of maritime law.  Any of these 
would result in the U.S. ESG deploying to the region to deter further unlawful or 
de-stabilizing activities and to protect U.S. flagged vessels and U.S. economic 
and shipping interest in the region.
2. Scenario 0: Overview
Scenario 0 is the first scenario used for modeling and simulation and is a 
search and board problem in a busy shipping lane.  For this scenario the U.S. 
ESG is on-scene to the South conducting operations and has detached a 
Surface Action Group (SAG) to the north to monitor the shipping lanes.  This blue 
force SAG will be two U.S. DDGs with Helicopters or UAVs operating 
independently in the shipping lanes to find a targeted cargo ship.  The target ship 
will have a known identity from an intelligence report, or the DDGs/ Aircraft will 
know the target by a visual scan.  The target will be a compliant boarding since 
most large registered cargo ship will stop due to insurance concerns, and 
probably have no knowledge of the illicit cargo.  A U.S. P-3 detachment will also 
be available from Country Green to assist in the search for the target ship.  On 
the map in Figure 2, the operation will be conducted in Named Area of Interest 
(NAI) Grove which is approximately 200nm x 200 nm.  Different caveats and 
scenario test plan will be discussed in the Model and Simulation Section.
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F. PHASE 1: DETERENCE OPERATIONS
Phase one is the second phase operations designed to project power 
against both the large commercial shipping in the normal lanes as well as the 
smaller coastal traffic .  Phase one is a fundamental shift in tactics that relies on 
quantity of boardings rather than quality of targets in the previous scenario.  The 
increased mission also increases the basic unit of force to an U.S. ESG instead 
of just a SAG with additional allied ships and aircraft joining the operation.  The 
operations will be conducted in NAI Cannery which approximately 300 x 500 nm 
box in the southern part of the map (Figure 2).  This phase will be a scenario for 
modeling and simulation. 
1. Phase 1: Trigger States
As stated in the introduction, no expected time is planned to transition 
between phases; instead each phase is evaluated as a separate operation with 
its own goals and force structure.  Some circumstances could cause an enemy to 
move from large container ships to smaller cargo/coastal ships include the 
following:  First the increase in port security or port security alerts through the 
IMO insurance agents.  Increased pirate activity reported in the area may be a 
sign there are easy lucrative smaller targets in the coastal shipping lanes.  Any 
success in the previous phase may cause the enemy to change tactics and try to 
disperse its shipments into smaller more plentiful coastal craft.  Another example 
is more definitive action from regional or global security organizations for 
example the United Nations or ASEAN.  Any of these could cause a shift in 
tactics which the Allied naval force must be ready to counter. 
2. Scenario 1 Overview
This is the second scenario for Modeling and Simulation, and it will have 
increased force structure and target set.  There is also a more obvious role of the 
allies in actual boarding units in the scenario.  The entire U.S. ESG will be 
available and up to two coalition ships for a total of six Boarding Assets to 
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participate in operations.  All ships have either the MIO Package or helicopter 
assets depending on the test object for the scenario.  Also an Airborne Early 
Warning Aircraft (AEW) will be available for a long range link relay to maintain 
the contact picture while search assets continue to search.  The targets will be 
high density coastal craft with cargo dhow properties, relatively slow and smaller 
craft which will take less time to board.  The density will be in excess of the 
boarding ship’s capability with a fixed percentage of Red traffic intermixed-with 
neutral traffic.  Red and Neutral traffic cannot be determined before a boarding 
team is sent to board the target.  Country Green will supply the base for the MPA 
(P-3C Orion) and one boarding ship modeled as an Oliver Hazard Perry Class 
frigate.  Country White will supply the base for the AEW aircraft and one Corvette 
modeled after the Royal Singaporean Navy’s Formidable Class.  The objective of 
the scenario is to board all white and red targets in the twenty-four hour time 
period.   
G. PHASE 2: SEIZE THE INITIATIVE
Phase two operations are designed to impose the will of the allied forces 
in the area of operations, and to increase operational tempo of the operations to 
stop the Separatist group from spreading through the region.  Phase two is a 
continuation of Phase one, but with new threats in the area.  The change in red 
from compliant to non-compliant to hostile, as allied forces begin to interdict large 
amounts of cargo.  Also the possibilities of Waterborne Improvised Explosive 
Devices (WBIEDs) are also introduced in this phase.  Also by the end of Phase 
two in actual operation, a variety of military branches (Air Force, Army, Marines) 
would also be involved, with the potential for large scale military interdiction and 
strikes.  Scenarios will not be built for beyond phase one since the operations are 
no longer considered “logistically barren” in practicality.  Phase two is described 
for the purposes of completeness and to fully evaluate the performance of the 
system of systems of in transition to non-logistically barren phases of operation.
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1. Phase 2: Trigger States
As was the case in the previous phase, no expected time is planned to 
transition between phases; instead each Phase is evaluated as a separate 
operation with its own goals and force structure.  Phase two marks a different 
strategy for the Separatist Group as they move to more offensive tactics to break 
the MIO operations and the trigger states will also be more distinct.  First would 
be the number of craft who are no longer “compliant” in dealing with the Allied 
force or the number moving at night.  Also an increased number of “go-fast” 
boats or smuggling craft that have short range but high speed crossing the MIO 
operations area.  Also as before, if the allied MIO operations are successful, then 
the enemy will change tactics to avoid the course of action.  With the introduction 
of WBIEDs MIO forces will have to take greater care in choosing targets and 
maintaining proper military posture to avoid casualties.  The increased role of a 
regional or national group (U.N. or ASEAN) could also prompt different action 
from both sides.  These trigger states are a guide for the tactics shift in both 
sides for the next phase of operations.
2. Scenario 2 Overview
This scenario was not chosen for Modeling and Simulation due to the 
lowered priority of less logistically barren scenarios.  Instead the greatest focus 
was on the compliant / non-compliant boarding scenarios in Phase 0 and 1, 
instead of the opposed boarding scenarios in Phase 2.  Planned information can 
be found in the CONOPS in the APPENDIX and Scenario Power Point Slides. 
H. CONCLUSIONS
By using actual U.S. planning documents for a MIO Campaign, a degree 
of realism is inserted into the scenarios.  Using the given timeline of 2013-2014 
and our guidance recommendation could effect deployments immediately since 
no “new” units were modeled.  These scenarios are also representative of current 
MIO operation including the Horn of Africa, Straits of Malacca, and Gulf Guinea 
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operations.  The Modeling and Simulation Section will detail the test plan and 
points of departure from these baseline scenarios for further studies. 
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IV. OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION TO OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
Operations Management is the critical function in operations planning and 
execution.  The previous section of Scenario development was just one of the 
many functions for the Operations Management Group.  Our role covered the 
entire spectrum of operations from development of low-resolution combat 
models, mathematical approximations, and developing the planning 
consideration for a campaign staff.  The group is comprised entirely of military 
officers: two from the Singaporean Army, one from the Singaporean Air Force, 
one from the Israeli Army, and two from the U.S. Navy.  Our wide range of 
background and operational experience made us keenly aware of the breadth of 
planning and operational considerations for large operations.  
We focused on three major areas, low resolution model development for 
priming a large simulation, creating MIO contingency plans, and development of 
scenarios/ CONOPS.  The low resolution development was focused in two areas: 
creating a mathematical queuing theory model, and simulation with base 
scenario in the MANA language.  The development of contingencies was to plan 
for events that we were unable model and to identify areas that require study 
beyond the scope of our project.  The development of scenarios and the 
CONOPS can be found in the previous chapter.
B. MAP AWARE NON-UNIFORM AUTOMATA (MANA) SIMULATION 
1. Overview
A Low Resolution model was created to provide a general understanding 
of the effectiveness of a force package in conducting Maritime Interdiction 
Operations (MIO).  The Low Resolution model only focused on current force 
structure to validate the current systems and to provide a point to diverge.  By 
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building this scenario we could validate the "base" scenario from the previous 
chapter.  These results were critical in testing the feasibility of scenario force 
structure and current operations today.  An agent based simulation program, 
MANA (Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata) was employed for this low resolution 
model.  MANA was chosen due to the versatility of the language and the ease of 
development of simple scenarios to test assumptions.  The agent based 
simulation is also good for gaining insight into the initial assumptions, and the 
development of the scenario test plan.  Although its lack of detail and data 
outputs eventually drove the group to choose a different simulation system.
2. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION
The scenario was based on Phase 1 and involved the searching and 
boarding of ships in the NAI Cannery, a 300 x 500 nm area.  The search is 
carried out in 3 sub-regions equally divided in the area of operation.  100 
compliant ships are randomly distributed in the entire area traveling to their 
destination either to the east or west.  Ten ships are non-friendly: ships that are 
targeted to be searched and seized for illegal cargo, these 10 represent 10% of 
the total traffic in the NAI. 
The Reds’ objective is to pass through the narrow channel from east to 
west.  The Blues’ objective is to intercept the Reds before they reach their 
objectives.  The Red forces need to be boarded and searched before they can be 
determined if they are friendly or non-friendly.  The force configuration is 2 
intercept ships and an Aerial Search Vehicle (ASV) per MIO box.  Figure 3 below 
shows an initial setup of the model in MANA.
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Figure 3: MANA Display of Low-Resolution Model Setup
3. KEY MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions are made in the creation of the model.  The 2 
main categories of the assumptions are for Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 
(TTPs) and Equipment capabilities detailed as follows:
a. Red Vessels Behavior
The red vessels are assumed to pass through the channel at a rate 















b. Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
Since the scenario size is 300nm x 500nm and the 
vessels travel at 20nm/hr, the Red vessels will be able to reach their 
objective within 10-15 hours.  After the Red vessels reach their 
objectives, the Blue intercept ships are considered to have failed in 
their objective to interdict the Red vessels.
The search pattern here employed is the spiral search pattern.  The 
Aerial Search Vehicle (ASV) will spiral out from the center of its position outwards 
to search for vessels to board.  Upon detection of a vessel, the ASV will deviate 
from its search path and track the vessel until it is boarded by an intercept ship.  
This spiraling search pattern is done within the boundaries of the MIO box.  The 
spiral search pattern was chosen for its effectiveness and simplicity to model.  
Aircraft have a significant speed advantage over the Red craft and the spiral 
search is effective in this case.
All ships that come within the intercept ship range or are tracked by 
the ASV will be boarded.  Regardless of size and tonnage, it is assumed that it 
will take the boarding teams three hours to board and search the vessels.
c. Equipment Capabilities
The aerial search vehicle is capable of detecting and classifying 
with certainty (Probability of detection and classification = 1.0) up to a maximum 
distance of 6nm.  Aerial search vehicle has endurance of 3 hours and takes 15 
minutes for refuel.  It is assumed that the intercept ships are able to operate for 
more than 24 hours.  Hence with the scenario being run for durations of 24 hours 
only, there is no need for the refuel of the intercept ships.  All vessels (friendly, 
non-friendly and intercept ships) travel at 20nm per hour and the aerial search 
vehicles travel at 200nm per hour.
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3. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
   Interception is completed when the intercept ship successfully boards
and searches the red vessel after the red vessel has been tracked by the ASV.  
The probability of intercept is measured by .
4. RESULTS
A total of 30 runs were made to ascertain the probability of intercept.  
From the results we can see that for such a force package, the probability of 
intercept is less than 50%.  The average probability of intercept is 0.41 with a 
standard deviation of 0.198
C. DISCRETE EVENT SIMULATION
The Discrete Event Simulation or Queuing Theory model is the most 
flexible model developed by the team.  It focused on two-area search asset 
utilization and search asset prediction for target excess environment.  The 
utilization model focuses on how assets are utilized in a 24 hour period, and how 
much "idle" time the units have during the operation.  The second model is to test 
the effect of a search asset on target excess environment, which can help predict 
the loss of units due to operating in a logistically barren environment.  The DES 
program was chosen due to the ease of changing variables and output flexibility.  
The SIMKIT JAVA add-on is specifically designed for real-time simulation, and 
the queuing theory model is similar to many validated customer service models. 
1. Utilization Model Overview
A Queuing model was created to provide a general understanding of the 
requirements of the force package in conducting Maritime Interdiction Operation 
(MIO).  This first model attempts to describe how a force can board a certain 
percentage of traffic, for example the Phase 0 scenarios.  A DES (Discrete Event 
Simulation) program, SIMKIT is employed for this low resolution model.
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2. Scenario Description
The scenario involved the arrival and boarding of ships in a fixed area of 
operations on a particular 24 hours interval.  Ships arrive to the designated area 
of operations randomly at various rates.  Ten percent of the ships in the area are 
targeted to be searched for illegal cargo.  The objective is to assess the minimum 
required number of boarding teams to support the MIO.
Figure 4: Event Graph of Ship Server
3. Key Model Assumptions
The following assumptions are made in the creation of the model.  The 
two main categories of the assumptions are for Tactics, Techniques and 
Procedures (TTPs) and Equipment capabilities detailed as follows:
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a. Ship Arrival
 Ship arrival is assumed to follow Poisson distribution with mean of 
24, which is consistent with the arrivals through busy shipping lanes.  The data 
was estimated from VTS reports at Port Kelang in the Straits of Malacca6.
b. Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
The simulation is based on a 24 hour period.  The traveling time 
from target ship to target ship is included in board and search time.  Ships that 
arrive within the area of operations are boarded randomly with 10% probability.  
Regardless of size and tonnage, it is assumed that it will take the boarding teams 
three hours to search the vessels, inclusive of travel time to another ship if 
boardings occur successively.
4. Measures of Effectiveness
a. Average Utilization Rate
Average utilization is defined as the average percent of time the 
boarding assets or servers are busy per server.  That is, the average number of 
busy servers over the time specified divided by the number of servers.  The ideal 
average utilization rate is approximately 1.0 where the minimum number of 
servers is fully utilized. 
b. Number of Ships Served
The ideal number of ships served is 10% of all the ships that 
arrived (chosen randomly).
                                           
6 KLANG VTS report, Government of Malaysia, 2007.
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5. Results
A total of 50 runs was made to ascertain the average utilization rate and 
number of ships served, to provide a convergence point within the Central Limit 
Theorem.  From the results in Figure 5, we can see that for one boarding asset, 
the average utilization rate is approximately 90%.  The average percentage of 
ships is 15%.  For two boarding assets, the average utilization rate is 
approximately 75%.  The average percentage of ships is 28%.
Figure 5: Output of Utilization for Boarding Assets
D. ASSET PREDICTION DISCRETE EVENT SIMULATION
1. Prediction Model Overview
A Queuing model was created to provide a general understanding of the 
requirements of the force package in conducting Maritime Interdiction Operations
(MIO).  The Queuing model also provided estimates of loss of forces in the MIO 










asset.  This model parallels Phase 1 scenarios with a target excess and a 
varying number of boarding assets.  A DES (Discrete Event Simulation) program, 
SIMKIT is employed for this low resolution model.  
2. Scenario Description
The scenario involved the arrival and boarding of ships in a fixed area of 
operations on a particular 24 hour interval.  Ships arrive to the designated area
randomly and at various rates.  This model holds the arrival rate and expected 
search time constant and looks at the effects of adding and subtracting a 
boarding asset.
3. Key Model Assumptions
The following assumptions are made in the creation of the model.  The 
two main categories of assumptions are Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 
(TTPs) and Equipment capabilities.
a. Ship Arrival
Ship arrival is assumed to follow Poisson distribution with mean of 
1 ship every 7 minutes, which based on the Port KLANG VTS.
b. Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
As in all previous models 24 hours is the standard time for 
operations.  In this model the boarding time is held constant to three hours, as 
the average time to search a Cargo Dhow.
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4. Measures of Effectiveness
a. Number of Ships Served
The number of ships served by number of assets available is the 
key measure of effectiveness to show the commander an approximate upper 
bound on total boarding operations during that 24 hour period.
5. Results
The results are shown in the figure below, highlighting the average 
number of units boarded averaged over one hundred runs of the queuing model.  
The model shows an almost linear response to vessels boarded as a function of 
search assets.  The additional line in the figure is the simulation data from the 
Naval Ship Simulation language to be discussed in detail later.  The data 
supports the chapter eleven NSS data and by adjusting the search time to actual 
operational times, this model can give good approximations to the total boardings 
by a force.  This model is best used in a "target excess" case where the boarding 
assets do not spend a significant amount of time transiting between targets.  In 
the larger scenarios where the traffic has differing transit times, another 
mathematical model should be used but was not created for this project.  This 
model does approximate the loss of assets on the mission which is critical in the 
logistically barren environment.  
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Figure 6: Total Boardings with Varying Search Assets
E. CONTINGENCY OVERVIEW
To complement the MIO concept of operations analysis, a list of 
contingencies has been gathered.  Although the scenarios presented below were 
not directly analyzed under the modeling portion of the project, we found it 
necessary to consider them and the contingencies to deal with them.  These 
contingencies represent the boundaries and the rare cases of the problem and 
help define inherent difficulties in Maritime Intercept Operations.  This chapter 
may form the basis for further exploration or modeling and simulation in future 
work.
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Each contingency is presented with its scenario and the measure taken to 
mitigate or respond to the situation.  The scenarios considered were:
1. Law of the sea violation.
2. Coalition Shifts
3. Unexpected technological threat
4. A/C down / Stranded boarding team
5. Over- success
6. Boarding crew captured
7. Inheritance of Prize Ship




1. Law of the Sea Violation
Although the CONOPS were planned under the constraints of the U.N. 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), it may be possible to present a situation where one of 
our forces violates international law.  This may happen from a navigation 
mistake, where a unit finds itself in territorial waters instead of international 
waters, or by a bad decision made by an individual unit commander.  A violation 
of the UNCLOS or any international law could be catastrophic to the mission, 
causing delays or causing conflict between coastal nations.  This contingency 
requires coordination across the coalition units and amongst unit commanders to 
execute with precision. 
To mitigate this situation, Commanders must be thoroughly briefed and 
aware of the political situation and sensitivities in their environment.  A quick and 
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reliable link to Washington and Coalition / Allied Departments of State must be 
supported both technically and by procedures, to allow for a quick and efficient 
high-level response.  Also special consideration must be paid to regional states 
and their sovereignty.  Close cooperation between the various Departments of 
State and regional countries to mitigate and promulgate the latest information on 
the sovereign territory of the countries in the Area of Operation (AO).  Also 
individual unit commanders, aircraft commanders and Boarding Team Officers 
must understand the UNCLOS and how it applies to the region.  Commanders 
should spend time and effort during and before operations to train lower level 
commanders on the UNCLOS and their operational responsibility.  It is not 
enough for only the higher echelon of command to understand these rules since 
they directly affect commanders, boarding team officers, and pilots during 
operations.
2. Coalition Shifts
During an especially long MIO operation, the size and composition of the 
coalition force may vary dramatically.  Subject to political stress and interests 
coalition members may choose to increase, reduce or withdraw the force entirely. 
To mitigate coalition shifts, the coalition force must be built in the most 
modular and interchangeable manner possible.  This implies consistent VBSS 
training for all coalition nations and similar equipment to complete the mission.  
Furthermore, it is undesirable to rely solely on one coalition member for a 
particular capability or skill - for example the ability to execute Opposed 
Boardings.  Also each coalition should have the same UNCLOS responsibilities 
and collective Rules of Engagement to allow the overall commander to utilize 
standard operating procedures and responses.  The overall commander must be 
responsible for promulgating the correct ROE, UNCLOS guidance, and Pre-
Planned Responses (PPRs) to coalition units.  Training is also critical to 
successful completion of coalition operations to keep individual units as standard 
as possible to afford the commander a degree of flexibility.
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3. Unexpected Technological Threat
Experience shows that even when dealing with asymmetrically “weak” 
adversaries, the other side may surprise by choosing to use high end technology 
weapons.  Consider the use of GPS or communications jammers or Anti-Ship 
Cruise Missiles (ASCM) during MIO operations (see “Hanit” C-802 ASCM 
Lebanon incident), and the surprising results to a "superior" force. 
To mitigate such an event, proper investment in intelligence must be 
made, and the task force should be equipped with proper counter measures.  
Also all assets need to be familiar with PPRs to quickly deal with emerging 
threats.  Lastly the operational commander must develop a coalition information 
sharing network, so all participating units understand the threat and the best way 
to neutralize it. 
4. Aircraft Down or Stranded Boarding Team
During the course of normal operations in the air and at sea we may lose 
a vessel or aircraft due to malfunction or enemy action.  It is always the 
originating unit's responsibility to recover its aircraft or boarding team, but other 
coalition units may be used to help search for and recover critical assets.  All 
commanders need to be prepared to assist any friendly units in distress with 
current operating forces without creating a dedicated reserve.   
For the operational commander a loss of an asset can affect operations in 
two ways; first the loss of the immediate asset and its crew, secondly the loss of 
production during the intercept operations.  The commander must be prepared to 
reposition units and assets to prevent the enemy from exploiting the recovery 
situation, if assets are out of their normal MIO positions.  If hostile actions are 
found to be the cause, the commander also must be able to respond to continue 
operations and to protect friendly assets in the area who are not capable of self-
defense.  All units in the operation always maintain the inherent right of Self-
Defense and the protection of subordinate small boats and aircraft.  
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5. Over Success of MIO operations
The main objective of MIO operations is to interdict the transport of illegal 
weapons, materiel or people. However, based on the experiences of former 
boarding team members who were interviewed as part of this study, the majority 
of boarding and searching missions will end with little recovered contraband.  A 
small minority of missions will end with the discovery of some illegal materials or 
people.  Regardless, every unit in the operation should have some ability to 
detain a few personnel and small amounts of cargo that will be recovered in the 
normal course of operations.   
The situation where a boarding mission leads to the unexpected find of a 
very large amount of illegal weapons or people is another case for the 
commander's consideration.  In such an event it may be unreasonable for the 
boarding team to simply seize the materials and leave the vessel, due the weight 
or quantity of the seizure.  Therefore, a reporting procedure and a procedure for 
returning the vessel to a cooperative port where local law enforcement will take 
over must be established.  This may require the mother ship to escort the target 
or provide a prize crew to transport the ship to the proper authority. 
6. Boarding Team Capture
A boarding crew falling into the hands of the enemy is an unwanted 
situation which may lead to ransom demands and hostage situations.  To reduce 
the risk of such events, deterrence should be achieved through training of the 
boarding team in specific combat scenarios and the presence of the mother ship 
(within line of sight and small arms range) with appropriate crew-serve or small 
arms weapons ready.  The use of aircraft to cover the boarding team when the 
mother ship cannot observe the entire ship should be a standard operating 
procedure.  The first priority of the mother ship and organic air assets will be to 
protect the boarding team and be prepared to recover the team at any time.  The 
capture of a boarding team will be dangerous as well as politically and publicly 
embarrassing for those coalition assets.  An example of this hazard is the case of 
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the British Boarding Team captured by Iranian units in the Northern Arabian Gulf 
in 2005.  Boarding teams should be trained to avoid capture and defend 
themselves, as is within their inherent right of self-defense.  
7. Inheritance of Prize Ship
In some cases units may be required to take possession of or escort a 
target vessel.  A vessel could require escort if it has an unusually large amount of 
contraband or target cargo onboard, or if allied units disable the target vessel 
during the approach phase of the boarding operations.  The commander must 
work with regional partners to use local assets to tow and assist the damaged 
vessel, or direct the boarding asset to send a prize crew to take possession of 
the vessel and take it to the nearest friendly port.  The commander should expect 
all criminals and cargo to be handled by local authorities of either the flag country 
or local country.  If a local country refuses to take the ship it can be transported 
to the boarding country or destroyed with the permission of the flag state or 
owner.  Numerous previous cases of operations off the coast of Somalia can be 
used as a template for future operations, where criminals were returned to local 
authorities for trial and prosecution.  The commander must prepare the boarding 
units to hold prisoners and seized cargo until suitable transportation can be found 
to a local country for prosecution.  Boarding assets should have a pre-designated 
holding area onboard - whether a formal brig or makeshift shelter – to hold the 
suspects until the detainees can be transferred to proper authorities.  This will 
require significant cooperation with the U.N. / regional authority and the 
Department of State of the boarding vessel.  These agreements should be in 
place before or at the beginning of the campaign to prevent political and military 
embarrassment for coalition nations participating in the Operation. 
8. Mission Abort
A need to abort the mission due to new intelligence, unacceptable risk to 
the boarding crew, supporting air assets, or mother ship may happen at any point 
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in the mission.  It is essential to have continuous connectivity to the boarding 
team, a clear understanding of who has the authority to abort a mission at all 
levels, and clearly defined abort criteria.  The ability to disseminate the cause for 
the mission abort should be sent to all other coalition units to prevent undue risk 
to other boarding teams.  The individual commanders will always retain Go/No-
go criteria for conducting boarding operations.  If the commander is 
uncomfortable with his/her unit’s ability to board a suspect vessel, they should 
contact the overall commander so an appropriate unit can be vectored to 
support.  All coalition units will always retain the right to abort a mission to protect 
their command and organic assets.   
9. Medical Evacuation
A forceful boarding may naturally lead to injury or loss of life.  The task 
force must therefore have appropriate evacuation vehicles and medical support.  
Either an organic medical detachment or friendly local country should be 
established for a triage center.  Since maritime operations are inherently 
dangerous, most ships have some variety of medical facilities.  If the facilities are 
unable to handle the specific casualty or volume of causalities, then the 
commander can route the casualties to the regional medical center.  If there is no 
shore services available the casualty center could also be on a larger asset like a 
U.S. LHD/A which has hospital capabilities or a local medical center within airlift 
distance.  Friendly medical causalities will be a high priority for the commander’s 
airlift assets.
10. Direct Attack
The CONOPS generally assumes the initiative to engage vessels is the 
primary mission of the coalition force; however, the enemy may use offensive 
tactics and attack the MIO task force.  The attacks against Iraq’s Al Basrah and 
Khawr Al Amaya Oil Terminals (ABOT and KAAOT) in 2004 provide an example 
of how the enemy can use MIO operations for offensive tactics.  During this 
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operation suspected Al-Qaeda terrorist used a fishing dhow to draw a U.S. 
boarding team away from the patrol craft and then detonated the dhow as the 
boarding team approached close aboard.  At the time of the explosion high 
speed boats attacked both terminals simultaneously.  Although the small boats 
did not reach the goal, it proved the ability of terrorist organization to plan and 
execute maritime attacks with WBIEDs.  The use of the WBIEDs on boarding 
teams can create a distraction and a conflict for the unit commanders.  Although 
the attacks in Iraq were unsuccessful, these scenarios are unsettling for the unit 
commander who must choose between his/her boarding team and the protected 
asset. 
To mitigate such future events, a high level of readiness must be kept by 
the task force, intelligence efforts must be made to discover and foil such 
attempts in advance, and PPRs should be created to allow a quick and effective 
response.  It may be beneficial to explore through modeling and simulation 
different procedures and techniques for boarding with respect to the possibility of 
a bombing or attack during the actual boarding. 
G. CREATING A COMMON OPERATING PICTURE
The other major function of an operations management group is building a 
Common Operating Picture (COP) for coalition units and commander to route the 
proper assets to conduct the mission.  The development of a communications 
network for the quick dissemination of orders, intelligence, and reports is not an 
easy task, but a task that has been accomplished in the past.  The use of 
systems such as CENTRIX (Combined Enterprise Regional Information 
Exchange), which allow allied forces to have a dedicated computer network with 
both voice and data communication is critical for conducting operations.  Our 
group has decided to exploit current technologies such as CENTRIX which has a 
proven record in exercises and operations around the world, instead of creating 
new complex large scale communication networks.  The problem of 
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communications between mother ship and boarding teams will be discussed in 
greater detail in later chapters.
H. LAW OF THE SEA AND MARITIME INTERCEPT OPERATIONS
The Law of the Sea is based on the Third United Nations (UN) Conference 
on the Law of the Sea in 1982 Law and it was eventually signed by 120 countries 
(the U.S. has signed but it the treaty has not been ratified by Senate).  The Law 
of the Sea establishes a few key concerns for the enforcement of Maritime 
Interdiction Operations (MIO):
Territorial Sea: Is the ocean extending 12 nautical miles (nm) from the 
coastal baselines (defined by the treaty), where a country has sovereignty 
over the sea and air.  (UNCLOS, Article 1)
Transit Passage: Is the straits which are used for international navigation 
between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and 
another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.  (UNCLOS, 
Article 38-45)
1. Right of Visit
In the UNCLOS a vessel identified as a warship has the right to visit 
another ship and verify its flag and documents.  Further a warship has the right to 
conduct a boarding and search for the following considerations: 
Right of Visit (Warships) (UNCLOS Article 110)
1. the ship is engaged in piracy
2. the ship is engaged in the slave trade
3. the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag 
State of the warship has jurisdiction.
4. the ship is without nationality
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5. Though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship 
is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship.
a. Piracy (UNCLOS Article 101)
Piracy is an international crime consisting of illegal acts of violence, 
detention or depredation committed for private ends by the crew or passengers 
of a private ship or aircraft in or over international waters against another ship or 
aircraft or persons and property on board.
b. Slave Trade (UNCLOS Article 99) 
The Slave Trade is strictly forbidden on the high seas by the 
UNCLOS, and any slave seeking refuge is automatically free on the high seas 
regardless the flag of the vessel providing refuge.
c. Unauthorized Broadcasts (UNCLOS Article 109)
Unauthorized broadcasting involves the transmission of radio or TV 
signals from a ship intended for receipt by the general public, contrary to 
international regulation. 
d. Vessels without Nationality (UNCLOS Article 110)
Vessels which are not explicitly registered to one particular state 
are considered state-less and fall under the jurisdiction of all states.  Stateless 
vessels may be boarded in international waters are subject to all law 
enforcement regulations.
2. Limitations on Law Enforcement in International Waters
Although UNCLOS allows warships to search the ship if the documents or 
ship's crew arouses suspicion, this does not give warships the right to seize crew 
or cargo without permission of the Flag State except in circumstances provided in 
the UNCLOS.  Besides the above mentioned reason to board and detain ship, 
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the shipment of illegal narcotics is also specifically mentioned as probable cause 
to seize a ship under UNCLOS.  This limits the scope of MIO without 
international sanctions or resolutions allowing for the boarding and seizures of 
ships in a particular area.  Since the transportation of weapons and explosives is 
not inherently illegal on the high seas, for effective MIO for these cargo types a 
firmer legal ground will need to be established.  Cooperation with international 
governments and organizations is critical to the legal conduct on MIO operations. 
3. Other Legal Consideration 
a. Piracy
As previously discussed busy international shipping lanes will attract 
pirates, since the lanes provide targets and camouflage for the pirate crafts.  
Piracy under international law is applicable only on the High Seas, outside of 
territorial seas and transit passage waters.  Since a ship outside of the high seas 
(international waters) is committing criminal crimes not covered in UNCLOS, but 
criminal acts against the State controlling the water.  This legal statement 
provides a need for international cooperation from all littoral states since MIO are 
conducted in and around territorial seas, and transit passage waters.  The benefit 
to declaring craft as pirates allows any coalition warship to seize the craft and 
prosecute the crew and vessel under its laws.  The difficulty for warships is to 
establish the crew and/or craft are engaged in piracy. 
b. Hot Pursuit
Warships do retain the right of Hot Pursuit under Article 111, but hot 
pursuit ends if the target ship enters the territorial sea of its State or a third Party 
State.  Any State can prosecute the target ship but a pursing ship must get 
consent from the flag State or the Third Party State to continue pursuit.  Hot 
pursuit also ends if the ship or aircraft loses the ability to track/see the vessel 
being pursued.  The track can be maintained electronically but must the tracking 
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ship must have continuous coverage.  This severely limits the ability of warships 
in littoral waters to chase and catch ships without complete participation of 
surrounding states and large sensor network.
3. Conclusions
The legal problems of MIO operations cannot be understated, if we hope 
to seize cargo, coalition forces must have some cooperation from coastal States 
in the region to maintain pursuit and limit the ports of refuge for target ships.  The 
necessity to keep all “targets” in track is a key factor is creating a large and 
robust sensor and communication system that will allow coalition countries to 
continually maintain contact on target vessels.  There is also no convention to 
stop vessels suspected of carrying WMDs or terrorist supplies without 
cooperation from the Flagged Country on the High Seas.  This factor makes it 
critical that a commander has the ability to contact host nations or the applicable 
State Department quickly to conduct effective MIO operations.  Lastly the ability 
of the coalition countries to operate within the bounds of the Law of the Sea is 
critical in establishing credibility with the international community.  The illegal 
seizures of crew and cargo, even if the cargo is dangerous, will not help future 
operations since the UNCLOS requires that the sea remain free.  The Law of the 
Sea makes MIO more difficult but conducting legal operations will enhance the 
coalition credibility.  Credible operations, legal seizures of cargo, and prosecution 
of criminals will act as further deterrence to people who try to exploit the 




Although the term “Maritime Interdiction Operations” (MIO) is mostly 
restricted to use by the United States and several close allies, the missions and 
means to accomplish interdictions in the maritime domain are not limited to those 
countries.  As previously defined, MIO covers a broad range of missions to 
include everything between sanctions to blockades.  While the make-up of each 
mission is fundamentally the same, the world’s stability can change at a given 
moment forcing the mission of a particular asset to be refocused to respond.
Based on the number and type of assets available, a mission planner can 
address the current focus and adapt his forces to address the shift in missions.  
Chapter V. is focused on boarding the target vessel.
Understanding the objectives of the mission as well as the capabilities and 
limitations of the targeted vessel is an important top-level consideration in 
planning a MIO.  The MIO concept is broad ranging and can present complex 
scenarios that could prove to be economically inconvenient, culturally 
antagonistic, and even deadly if the risk is miscalculated and appropriate 
mitigating actions are not taken. 
As discussed in the CONOPS, boarding teams must be able to conduct 
simple boarding missions of compliant vessels and also be ready to confront an 
opposed target should the scenario present itself. In considering all levels of 
boarding missions, we found there are certain force platforms and countries 
incapable of handling certain types of MIOs.  One of the reasons is these 
platforms cannot support the tools necessary to conduct such missions.
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B. PHASE SHAPING
While defining the parameters of MIO missions, boarding a target vessel is 
not always required in order to interdict a vessel.  A vessel could satisfactorily 
pass the initial verbal query via bridge to bridge radio and be cleared to proceed.  
If a vessel is thought to be carrying illicit cargo, the interdicting force may be 
required to put personnel onboard to conduct a search.  The nature and scope of 
the boarding will vary depending on the level of compliance of the suspect vessel 
– these boardings designated by the Phase level.
During Phase Zero and Phase One, US forces will provide the leadership 
and guidelines in conducting all MIO missions in a US specific Area of Operation 
(AOR), assuming there is no fundamental change in the US’ military policy in the 
timeframe of interest.  When Phase Two is being conducted, the option to 
incorporate Allied Forces into the overall operation becomes available.  
The inclusion of Allied Forces into Phase Two Operations generates a 
need to thoroughly understand allied assets to facilitate the buildup of different 
force structures best suited to handle MIO missions.  The characteristics that 
each asset contributes to MIO missions can be evaluated and compared through 
a pair wise comparison using an optimizing Excel model.  This model was based 
on a fixed set of variables that results in an optimal mixture of assets and force 
packages that were made up of both US and foreign ships.
In order to create a realistic force structure, we investigated multiple 
classes of ships to determine which mixes could be used in various types of MIO 
missions.  This analysis is designed to accurately reflect the vast differences in 
ship classes used throughout the world today.  The purpose of looking at many 
classes of ships was to avoid the exclusion of a MIO capable platform that could 
prove viable in joint operations.
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C. SCOPE OF PAIR-WISE COMPARISON
The scope for this analysis was narrowed to countries currently engaged 
in some form of MIO missions, as well as countries that would “most-likely-assist” 
in a combined mission.  The following seventeen nations (NATO members and 
several Allies from the Asian region) were chosen for evaluation:
Canada Portugal Spain
Australia Greece United States




One hundred and eight different MIO capable ship platforms were 
considered and evaluated.  The individual platforms were ranked and sorted in 
order to show relative capabilities between the assets which can then be 
translated into optimal force packages to address the mission at hand.
D. PAIR-WISE COMPARISON CHARACTERISTICS
To fairly assess each country’s MIO assets, a set of characteristics that 
contribute to each type of mission were identified and weighted according to the 
assets’ overall contribution to conduct MIOs.  The resulting score was a 
subjective rating of the overall effectiveness in contributing to MIO missions.  The
minimum score was one and the maximum score for each characteristic was 10.  
This rating determined the weight each characteristic would have in the model as 
each ship was evaluated.  When added together, the percentages of each 
attribute summed to 100% of the weighting criteria. 
In order to define a set of characteristics that apply to the boarding 
process it was essential to look at the key components of the boarding process.  
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These components were taken from the functional decomposition of the term ‘To 
Board’, located in Appendix B.  Should there be a MIO mission that is tailored to 
requirements that differ from that assumed for this report; the weights can be 
modified to reflect the appropriate change of importance.  The “overall 
effectiveness” of a ship was defined as the ships’ ability and proficiency to 
perform the following 10 tasks:
1. Possession of disabling organic armaments 
2. Crew number that sufficiently supports the boarding process while 
maintaining ship operations
3. Number of equally effective boarding teams available 
4. Capability to accelerate from dead in the water to full speed in order to 
pursue non-compliant vessels and to respond with emergency support to 
the boarding team(s)
5. An ability to attain and maintain the maximum speed 
6. Number of helicopter and their capabilities
7. Type of helicopters that can land on the asset’s flight deck
8. Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB or small boat equivalent) capabilities
9. Unmanned Arial Vehicle capable (UAV)
10. Unmanned Surface Vehicle capable (USV)
Each of these categories was given a subjective weight based on a poll of 
subject matter experts working on this report.  The weights are meaningless in 
terms of a quantifiable linkage to a real world number, however they are 
reflective of the importance assigned by the analysts creating this document.  
The general logic and reasoning behind each of the criteria weights are assigned 
below. 
The first characteristic chosen was organic firepower provided by the 
mother ship of the boarding team.  A ship’s weapon can provide a deterrence 
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that helps to ensure the boarded ship remains compliant throughout the boarding 
process.  Furthermore, the ship’s organic weapons provide a deterrence against 
outside factors that may attack the boarding team.  Since the organic weapon 
may or may not have a direct effect on the boarding itself, the weight of this 
characteristic was given 5 out of the possible 10.  This score resulted in giving 
organic firepower an overall weight of 6% in the model.
The second characteristic evaluated was the number of the crew of each 
ship.  The number of crew generates a potential pool to create additional 
boarding teams leaving a higher importance in the boarding process.  If a ship 
complement is 45 personnel,  the ability to comprise two properly trained and 
physically fit boarding teams while maintaining properly manned watch stations in 
day to day operations is not as practical as choosing from a crew of 100 or 200 
sailors.  This characteristic does not take into account the ability of a ship to carry 
an additional complement of personnel who solely deal with MIO.  The results of 
this aspect would only further cater to the larger vessels as they maintain a 
greater ability to host such detachments.  Due to the direct effect on the boarding 
process; this characteristic was given 9 out of the possible 10.  This score 
resulted in giving crew size an overall weight of 12% in the model.
The third characteristic evaluated was the number of boarding teams each 
ship can maintain.  The greater number of boarding teams a ship can maintain,
the more consecutive MIOs can be performed.  This approach addresses issues 
such as crew rest, crew replacement in the event of a personnel casualty, and 
the ability to search larger vessels if called to do so.  Although two boarding 
teams are sufficient to conduct boarding operations on a vessel less than 300 
tons, substantially larger vessels still need to be considered.  The number of 
teams available at any given time for a MIO mission provides flexibility to the MIO 
mission planner so its weight was considered to be higher in the scale.  Again 
due to the direct effect on the boarding process, this characteristic was given a 9 
out of the possible 10.  This score gave the number of boarding teams each ship 
could maintain an overall weight of 12% in the model.
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The fourth and fifth characteristics pertained to the speed of the mother 
ship.  If the suspect ship decided to risk making an escape from the area to avoid 
being detained, the mother ship would need to intercept the fleeing ship.  Speed 
is also important if the mother ship must quickly come close to the boarded ship 
to provide emergency support to the boarding team.  These two scenarios 
established a need to evaluate the number of engines as well as the propulsive 
output of each asset, given that the U.S. Navy operates in a logistically barren 
environment.  Since speed plays a higher support role for MIO, it scored an 8 of 
10 resulting in an overall weight of 10% in the model.  The overall speed of the 
asset and total number of engines were assigned an overall weight of 6% apiece
in the model.  
The sixth characteristic evaluated was the total number of helicopters and 
their capabilities available to each ship.  This characteristic directly affects a 
ship’s ability to conduct vital parts of MIO missions, from surveillance to providing 
support in both search and rescue missions as well as providing cover for 
boarding teams that are embarking and disembarking from the suspect vessel.  
Another aspect of platforms that carry helicopters is the additional capability of 
making an airborne insertion and extraction of boarding teams.  Although the 
Helicopter Visit Board Search and Seizure (HVBSS) capability is rarely 
conducted, it is a capability that cannot be ignored as there is a probability that 
an HVBSS may be required.  With this in mind, each additional helicopter 
increases capabilities in the amount of area under surveillance, hostile force 
identification, and the ability to maintain an air presence in the event of helicopter 
unavailability (e.g., maintenance).  The characteristic of the number of 
helicopters focuses on the overall carrying capacity of helicopters. A 
consideration that adds to the importance of a platform’s helicopter capability is
the ability to provide fuel and maintenance to “visiting” aircraft from other ships.  
The characteristic of the number of helicopters scored 8 out of a possible 10 
resulting in an overall weight of 10% in the model.
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The seventh characteristic is the type of helicopter that can be supported 
and is on board each ship.  Certain helicopter platforms provide other than MIO 
mission capability but add flexibility in the types of support for the boarding 
process.  The ability to carry and maintain a multiple mission capable helicopter 
received a 7 out of a possible 10, resulting in an overall weight of 9% in the 
model.
The eighth characteristic in the boarding process is the number of Rigid 
Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIB’s) organic to the mother ship. This characteristic 
directly affects MIO missions based on the number of teams in RHIBs a ship can 
have in the water at any given time.  The total number of RHIB’s carried by a 
platform influences the amount of equipment and boarding teams that can be 
transported in one movement.  Similar in weight to the number of boarding 
teams, the number of RHIB’s also scored 9 out of a possible 10 for a total weight 
of 12% in the model.
The final two characteristics examined were for capabilities for 
accommodating Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAVs) and Unmanned Surface 
Vehicles (USVs).  These traits carried the same weighted.  The measure 
considered was whether or not the platform could carry and employ the capability 
in the future vice if the platform currently maintained this capability.  This 
determination is based on on whether the platform could support the landing of a 
helicopter onboard, and separately, if it could carry and launch a small boat.  The 
unmanned vehicle capability is being considered by the Navy for unmanned 
aircraft and surface vessels.  Both of these characteristics were weighted a 9 out 
of a possible 10.  Both characteristics accounted for a total of 24% of the total 
weight in the model, 12% for USV capability and 12% for UAVs.
The combined breakdown of characteristics as a percentage of 
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Figure 7:  Percentage Breakdown of Importance
E. RESULTS OF PAIR-WISE COMPARISON
The complete results from the pair-wise comparison of all ships are 
provided in Appendix D.  The top ten contenders, arrived by this method, are 
shown in Table 5.  The multi-million dollar Tarawa Class LHA, which can carry a 
small city and provide enough logistic support to complete any MIO mission, 
shows up at the top of the results.  This creates a need to measure the platforms 
against each other without using cost as a baseline.   
The factors studied in this pair-wise comparison are not exhaustive nor 
universally complete.  They are representative of the most general conditions of 
doing a MIO as is derived in the scoping of this project detailed in chapter one.  
Different MIO missions are impacted by factors other than listed in this analysis 
that can drastically sway a platforms ability to utilize its capability.  An example of 
not being able to use capability is displayed in Figure 8.  This photo depicts the 
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Essex Expeditionary Strike Group participating in an exercise with the Philippine 
Navy in early 2006 which operated with the two smaller San Juan class Frigates.  
From Table 6, the San Juan class came to have the lowest rating in the 
comparison model.  However, in the event that a MIO was necessary, only the 
San Juan class ships would likely be able to conduct that operation legally in 
Philippine territorial waters.  The San Juan class scenario depicts the fact that 
the perceived perfect fit to a scenario will not always be the proper asset needed 
for mission success.
Single Ship Results 1-10
Tarawa class (LHA) 9.05
LHA 6 class 9.01
Wasp class (LHD) 8.95
Ticonderoga class cruisers (US) 8.88
Arleigh Burke class (US) 8.88
Keelung (Kidd) class (Taiwan) 8.85
Spruance class (US) 8.82
San Antonio class 8.74
Austin class (LPD) 8.56
De la Penne (Italy) 8.53
Table 5:  Single Top 10 Ship Results
Single Ship Results 99 -108
Roussen (Super Vita) class (Greece) 2.47
Larkana (Pakistan) 2.29
Jalalat (Pakistan) 2.23
Auk class (Philippines) 2.21
Sea wolf class (Fast Attack Craft) (Singapore) 2.17
Rafael Protector Unmanned Surface Vehicles (Singapore) 2.17
Rajshahi (Town class) (Pakistan) 2.05
Tomas Batilo (Sea Dolphin) class (Philippines) 1.79
Cyclone class (Coastal Patrol ship) (Philippines) 1.67
San Juan Class (Philippines) 1.29
Table 6:  Single Bottom 10 Ship Results
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Figure 8:  USS Essex ESG with San Juan Class Ships
F. OPTIMIZATION OF FORCE STRUCTURES THROUGH
CHARACTERISTICS
While attempting to compare US forces with that of ally nations, three of 
the ten characteristics were selected for each force package scenario.  The three
characteristics listed below allowed a common metric to be evaluated across 
different force structures and MIO missions:
-The size of the crew (Manpower)
-The number of helicopters deployed 
-The number of RHIBs for boarding.
1. Baseline Force Package Composition 
Excel’s solver was run several times to find optimum force packages from 
a set of constraints that will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. Each run
was based on one factor that remained constant in order to provide results that 
could be compared with a baseline.
In an effort to build hypothetical coalition force packages, three separate
US Expeditionary Strike Group force packages were created and used as a 
baseline for comparison.  The purpose for using three separate force packages is 
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to represent different Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) force compositions.  MIO 
can be conducted with a variety of assets; however this analysis only looked at 
common force packages as they pertain to the US military at the time of the 
writing of this report.  The assets that best support this type of scenario are the 
US ESGs as they maintain an ability to carry out extended independent 
operations and can provide a comprehensive logistics support chain.  An ESG 
has many compositions as its base structure consists of a three ship Amphibious 
Readiness Group (ARG) with a two to three ship addition that provides support in 
the form of, but not limited to any of the following: cruisers (CG), destroyers 
(DDG), and frigates (FFG).  The compositions of each ESG will be determined 
from what missions will be performed during an underway period and what 
assets will be available for use by the date of said underway.  
Force Package 1 consisted of:
-1 Tarawa class LHA (Landing Helicopter Assault)
-1 Whidbey Island class LSD (Dock Landing Ship)
-1 Austin class LPD (Amphibious Transport Dock)
-1 Ticonderoga class CG (Guided Missile Cruiser)
-1 Arleigh Burke class DDG (Guided Missile Destroyer)
Force Package 1’s characteristics consisted of the following:
-4143 personnel underway on 6 ships
-31 helicopters
-17 RHIBs 
Force Package 2 consisted of:
-1 Wasp class LHD (Landing Helicopter Dock)
-1 Whidbey Island class LSD
-1 Austin class LPD
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-1 Oliver Hazard Perry FFG (Guided Missile Frigate)
-2 Arleigh Burke class DDG
Force Package 2’s characteristics consisted of the following:
-4218 personnel underway on 6 ships
-31 helicopters
-17 RHIBs
Force Package 3 consisted of:
-1 Wasp class LHD
-1 Whidbey Island class LSD
-1 Austin class LPD
-1 Oliver Hazard Perry FFG
-1 Arleigh Burke class DDG
Force Package 3’s characteristics consisted of the following:
-3856 personnel underway on 5 ships
-29 helicopters
-15 RHIBs
2. Force Package Effectiveness
The effectiveness of each force package was determined for comparison 
against the Excel solver’s results.  The comparable score is used to provide a 
weighted value that can be used to determine if the alternative results are either 
better or worse than the baseline force packages.  The effectiveness scores of 
the force packages were:
Force Package 1: 86.4% (average); 5.18 (comparable score)
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Force Package 2: 86.2% (average); 5.17 (comparable score)
Force Package 3: 85.7% (average); 4.29 (comparable score)
Further breakdown of results can be found in Appendices E, F, and G.
Once the effectiveness of the each baseline force package was 
determined, it was discovered solver would then comprise force packages that 
were unrealistic so several constraints were placed on the model.  One constraint 
that was placed on the model was that Excel was not able to select more than 2 
of any certain class type of ships.  This provided a more realistic result and a 
more diverse mixture of ships.  Another limiting factor that was imposed onto the 
model was that during the analysis of the variables of the number of helicopters 
and RHIB’s, platforms that did not have either capability were removed from the 
selection pool.  This eliminated the unfair advantage that Excel would select 
these platforms since it did not affect the overall “cost” restriction of limiting the 
number of helicopters and RHIBS available.  
Another restriction that was placed on the model during each scenario 
was that the selection of platforms was limited to no more than 10 ships.  The 
scenario was run for 6 ships, 8 ships, 10 ships, and 12 ships.  It was found that 
the effectiveness was not significantly altered nor did the force composition 
change dramatically from the predetermined baselines.  A 10 ship constraint was 
the next number of ships chosen and showed a more significant difference in 
terms of both effectiveness and ship composition.  A 10 ship package was 
chosen for further analysis because it allows for the creation of two 5 ship 
Surface Action Groups (SAGs), which would present a more manageable 
command and control structure during the operation.
The sum effectiveness of each package’s run (or comparable score) 
shows how much effectiveness is brought to the MIO area from each package.  
The comparable scores allow each result to be normalized for an equal 
comparison to each other.  With the restriction that all mother ships must be with 
8 nautical miles of the boarded ship during a boarding, the higher the comparable 
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score the more desirable the package is.  The higher score allows more ships to 
operate in an area which in turn allows for more boardings to be conducted at 
any given moment.  
G. FORCE PACKAGE MODEL RESULTS
1. Manpower Scenario 
During the first scenario, Excel Optimizer was limited to the maximum 
personnel per force package for each run.  The results from the first run provided 
an alternative force package of 78 ships with a total crew size of 4143 and an 
effectiveness average of 46.1%.  The reason that the average effectiveness 
decreased while the amount of ships increased was due to Excel’s selection of 
ships.  Excel chose the ships with low effectiveness because it was able to add 
more ships to the total count while still remaining with the restraint of 4143 
personnel.  Although the result may appear that the original force package 
performed better, the comparable score for the alternative was 6.9 times better.  
The comparable score for force package 1 was 5.18 (.864 effectiveness * 6 ships 
= 5.18) while the comparable score for the alternative force package was 35.96 
(.461 effectiveness * 78 ships = 35.96).  This result shows that the alternative 
force package 1 is almost 6 times a better selection.  With more ships in a given 
area, MIO boarding operations effectiveness can be increased.  When the 10 
ship selection constraint was placed on the model, the resulting average 
effectiveness was 87.1%.  The comparable score achieved was 8.71, which
performed 1.7 times better than the baseline effectiveness.
The second and third run produced similar results when the personnel 
limit was set to 4218 and 3856, respectfully, with only a few exceptions.  During 
the second run the recommended alternative force package contained 81 ships 
while the third run’s alternative force package consisted of 75 ships.  Alternative 
force package 2 scored a 44.8% average effectiveness while alternative force 
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package 3 had average effectiveness of 45.6%.  When the comparable scores of 
the alternative force packages were weighted against the baselines, the 
alternative packages performed close to 7 times better.  Once the 10 ship 
constraint was placed on run two, the resulting average effectiveness was 87.5% 
and received a comparable score of 8.75, which again performed 1.7 times more 
effective than the baseline package.
Although the 6 ship baseline’s average effectiveness was higher then the 
78 ship alternative and the 10 ship configuration but by looking at the sum of the 
effectiveness each package presents, an equal comparison can be achieved.  In 
this arena, the 78 ship alternative excels over both the 6 and 10 configurations 
because there are more ships operating in a MIO area.  The similar results 
occurred during the second and third run of the model which coincides with the 
results of the first run although the force packages of alternative 2 and 3 were 
different.  This trend in the results continues in each run and alternative force 
package configuration.
Figure 9:  Effectiveness with Manpower
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Figure 10:  Improvement over Baseline
Figure 11:  Effectiveness with Manpower
113
Figure 12:  Improvement over Baseline
2. Helicopter Scenario 
The second scenario that was created for the model was to find an 
alternative force package using the number of helicopters that are provided by 
each baseline package.  Once again, the comparison results were consolidated 
since baseline package 1 and 2 contained a combined number of 31 helicopters 
and baseline package 3 held 29 helicopters.  The result of the model’s 
optimization was an alternative force package of 31 ships for both the first and 
second run; the third run resulted in a package of 29 ships.  The average 
effectiveness for the alternative force package was 82.2% and a comparable 
score of 25.48 for runs one and two.  The third run received an average 
effectiveness of 82.4% and comparable score of 23.9.  The comparable score 
shows that the alternative force package compared to baseline package 1 and 2 
was almost 5 times more effective then the baseline package and 5.6 times 
better then baseline package 3.  The result of the 10 ships constraint force 
package was an average effectiveness of 87.2% and a comparable score of 8.72 
which was 1.7 times as effective as baseline package 1 and 2.  When alternative 
force package 3 was constrained to 10 ships, the resulting effectiveness was 
85.1% which produced a comparable score (8.51), almost twice as better as the 
baseline package. 
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Figure 13:  Effectiveness using Helicopters
Figure 14:  Improvement over Baseline
3. Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat Scenario 
The third scenario limited the model by the number of RHIBS that were 
provided by each baseline package.  As before, the number of RHIBS that were 
115
available for baseline package 1 and 2 were identical (17 RHIBS) resulting in the 
exact alternative force package.  The alternative force package of 17 ships 
received an average effectiveness of 81.7% and a comparable score of 13.89.  
The outcome of the model produced alternative force package that was over 2.6 
times more effective then baseline package 1 or 2.  Once the 10 ship constraint 
was placed onto the model run, the result was an alternative force package with 
an average effectiveness of 87.3% and a comparable score that was 1.7 times 
(8.73) more effective.  During the third run of the model, the limiting factor was 
changed to 15 RHIBS, which was the normal load out of baseline package 3.  
The resulting alternative force package was 15 ships with an average 
effectiveness of 82% and a comparable score of 12.3 which is almost 3 times 
more effective then the baseline package.  During the model run with a 10 ship 
constraint, the resulting alternative force package had an average effectiveness 
of 86.3% and a comparable score of 8.63 which was a little over twice as 
effective as the baseline package.
Figure 15:  Effectiveness with RHIB's
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Figure 16:  Improvement over Baseline
H. RESULTS AND MODEL CONCLUSION
The results from all of the scenarios’ runs indicate the alternative force 
packages resulted in a more effective MIO structure than the current baseline of 
5 and 6 ship ESG composed of US LHAs, LPDs, LSDs, DDGs, CGs and FFGs.  
By analyzing the different variables and factors that are associated with each 
class of ship, the Excel Optimizer showed that given more ships operating within 
a certain area, a more thorough MIO operation can be conducted while not losing 
assets’ time patrolling on station.  With the limiting visual range constraint to the 
boarded ship, at any given time there can only be (at most) 6 boardings occurring 
at any moment given the baseline packages, while the alternative force packages 
allows for a substantial amount of boarding operations depending on the 
configuration used.    
Another result from the Excel Optimizer model was to show that of all the 
platforms viewed, a high-ranked lone American ship was more effective then any 
other lone allied country’s ship.  This shows that if only the weighing factors, that 
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were used at the beginning of the model, were analyzed almost any US ship can 
out-perform the MIO capabilities of an allied force.  Ultimately the proper force 
package that would be recommended depends on the over arching MIO mission
and the allied force assets.  If the goal is to conduct as many MIO boardings as 
possible given a certain volume of shipping traffic, any alternative force package 
that was created from the model could be utilized depending on which limiting 
factors are used (manpower, helicopters or RHIB’s).  If the goal is to have a 
limited number of ships conducting MIOs that are unobtrusive and result in 
minimal delays, then either the original baseline force package or the 10 ship 
alternative would be ideal.  Another reason that the 10 ship configuration was 
more ideal then the more ship intensive alternative packages, was because of 
the logistical chain that would be needed to support the ships.  As defined in 
Chapter 1, section C, paragraph 4, the area of operation is logistically barren 
which would not allow the robust alternative packages to efficiently operate 
without large logistical chains in place.  The reason that fewer ships operating in 
an area would be ideal is not only the logistical barren aspect but also the sear 
congestion that would occur in a small operating box packed with many allied 
ships.  The only limiting factor in determining an ideal force package would be 
the goal trying to be achieved.  If the MIO mission was to conduct a boarding on 
every ship passing through an area then the only realistic force package would 
be to a more robust package then the one presently being used.  If the mission is 
to conduct a random amount of boardings or intel only boardings, then the 
present day package or the 10 ship package can be made use of.
I. HELICOPTER VISIT BOARD SEARCH AND SEIZURE
HVBSS is a MIO mission capability with which many people are 
unfamiliar.  The HVBSS mission is generally passed over due to the equipment 
needed to perform this mission, familiarity of the methods of insertion and 
extraction, and the physical capabilities of the boarding team members.  Not 
every boarding team member is capable of this method of boarding and this 
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places one more constraint on the pool of manpower a mission planner can draw 
from to form the desired boarding and support teams.  The HVBSS mission is 
only being taught in boarding schools to specific teams.  It is not a capability 
inherent to all VBSS teams which is why it would put another constraint on the 
pool of people to be drawn.  It is a characteristic that is under accounted for due 
to the fact not all boarding teams have this capability.  The capability was 
accounted for in terms of the helicopter capabilities. Another key factor that 
affects current boarding team capabilities is the boarding team needs to function 
independently from the mother ship if they become cut off from all 
communications for tactically significant length of time.  Previously, HVBSS 
capabilities were limited to the Special Operations Forces of the various services 
due to their expertise and ability to carry out mission objectives independently 
and are now slowly being integrated into HVBSS teams throughout the fleet.
HVBSS based MIO offers several advantages over waterborne MIO.  
HVBSS can be conducted independent of sea state, at greater ranges, and may 
support operations on multiple targets.  An opposed boarding conducted from a 
helicopter can be considered more safe than a waterborne MIO as there is no 
requirement for boarding team members to physically jump between vessels or 
to climb high freeboards starting from sea level.  However, during an HVBSS 
there are more ways in which to lose the entire team based on aircraft failure or 
the aircraft’s susceptibility to small arms fire and anti-aircraft weapons than 
waterborne operations.  HVBSS’s are still safer than waterborne MIOs in level 
four boarding conditions as the helo has the ability to apply suppressing fire 
against the target ship’s crew before, during and after the boarding team rappels 
on to the target ship without requiring a risky jump (which may be one boarding 
team member a time) or a slow climb up a high freeboard.   
The relative speed for which a boarding team can move from the parent 
ship to the target ship may give some advantage to HVBSS in the event that the 
target ship is capable of great speeds.  When there is a requirement to carry 
multiple boarding teams additional helicopters will be needed.  The use of 
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multiple helicopters will provide additional de facto ISR assets.  One asset 
examined in the force structure portion was the Jeanne de Arc Helicopter carrier 
from France.  This asset was weighted highly in this area and could provide 
adequate support in the form of number of helicopters as well as the logistics to 
sustain a helicopter force.
The basic premise behind conducting an HVBSS is a ship with a multitude 
of helicopters and boarding teams enters an area and searches merchant ships 
for illicit cargo.  Boarding team members with all of their search equipment will 
repel out of the helicopter onto the target vessel and proceed to search the target 
ship.  Following the completion of the search, the boarding team will need to 
return to the parent ship.  Assuming the target vessel does not assist in the 
transit back to the originating ship, the helicopter will be required to move the 
boarding team to the mother ship.
Communications within the boarding team will be very difficult in the 
HVBSS environment (without having the parent ship near by).  Though a 
helicopter can be used as a relay, the probability it would be at a sufficient
altitude to perform this function is improbable and may result in intermittent and 
unreliable connection.  In order to ensure that communications with the boarding 
team remain constant, a dedicated airborne relay may be required.  Alternatively, 
the boarding teams could potentially relay messages through a communications 
satellite should an airborne relay not be available.  The situation where the 
parent ship would not be within line of sight refers to situations where helicopters 
are being used to do MIO’s with multiple boarding teams on multiple 
geographically dispersed targets.
 The HVBSS capability is being explored and perfected by boarding teams 
during current naval exercises.  HVBSS-1 is an example of such a team.  It was 
stood up in February of 2007 as part of the Navy Expeditionary Combat 
Command and conducted training in the USS Abraham Lincoln Strike Group’s 
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(CVN 72, CSG-9) Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMTUEX).7  At least three 
equivalently trained and equipped teams are expected to be stood up and 
stationed on each coast of the U.S. which makes this capability more of a 
commonplace asset by 2013 vice once solely reserved for the SOF. 
J. RECOVERY
Recovery of the boarding team will occur when the search of the target 
vessel has been completed to the satisfaction of the boarding officer’s and a 
higher authority clears the vessel to proceed, or if the mission is aborted.  At any 
time during the boarding process the mother ship or fellow boarding teams may 
determine that it is necessary to exit the suspect vessel.
Prior to making the recovery of the boarding team one key assumption is 
made and it places the boarding team in a very vulnerable position.  The crew of 
the boarded vessel, whether compliant or non-compliant prior to boarding, has 
been pacified and poses no threat to the boarding team during the team’s 
extraction and recovery.  These assumptions will hold true for future MIO 
operations, because it is expected that commanders will not needlessly expose 
boarding teams to excessive risk.  In many cases where there is blatant hostility 
and weapons’ fire from a target vessel, the mission would most likely be 
transferred to a special operations team to execute.    
During the actual recovery process it is expected that weapons from a 
supporting helicopter or supporting RHIB will provide protection and covering fire 
if necessary for the boarding team members as they depart the vessel.  The 
recovery process leaves some members of the boarding team in an extremely 
vulnerable position.  This is the one instance a boarding team member has his 
back to the vessel’s occupants.  As long as there is a deterrent force present the 
vessel’s occupants may not be tempted to inflict hard force on the exiting team 
                                           
7 ‘‘Unexpected Company’ arrives for COMTUEX’ by MC3 James Evans on November 2, 2007.  Last 




member.  The supporting helicopter or RHIB may be too distant to provide a 
rapid deterrent response to an attack on the last departing team member.  It is 
recommended that future projects consider the development of a deterrent 
system such as a small, hovering UAV that could be positioned closely to the 
point of exit.
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After boarding and securing the suspect vessel, the next step, which is 
also the objective of many Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIOs), is to search 
the ship for illicit cargos.  This function is conducted by the sweep team of the 
boarding team.
As mentioned earlier, four types of illicit cargos that are targeted, i.e., 
smuggled humans/animals, illicit narcotics, firearms like guns and mortars, and 
explosives.  It is very likely that the cargoes will be hidden.
1.  Aim
The aim of this chapter is to study how one can find and identify targeted 
cargos more effectively.  Effectiveness is increased by cutting down search time 
and increasing the probability of detection.  Since the solution needs to be fielded 
by 2013-2014 timeframe, any search equipment proposed need to be based on
current technology.
B.  APPROACH
The approach adopted for the study was based mainly on Systems 
Engineering Methodology.  The problem was first identified and studied.  Types 
of cargos to be searched were identified while constraints were placed upon 
possible solutions.  A functional decomposition of “to search the suspect vessel” 
was performed in order to understand what functions are required for the search.  
With the functional breakdown, measurements of effectiveness (MOE) were next 
identified in order to determine how well the recommendations were as 
compared to what is being used now.
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A market survey of commercially available products was conducted to 
identify possible technologies and equipment that can be used to search for the 
targeted cargos.  The effectiveness of each type of equipment was then 
measured in computer models.  The equipment set that improves over the 
current practices is recommended.
The study concludes with a recommendation regarding MIO effecting 
technologies worthy of further investigation. 
C. CURRENT PRACTICE OF SEARCH
Before a set of recommendations can be derived, a better understanding 
of the current baseline is required.  The baseline used for this study is the current 
methodology employed at the time of the writing of this report.
Currently, once the suspect vessel is boarded and secured, the boarding 
team will be split into a security team and a sweep team as has been 
predetermined...  The Boarding Officer will determine the type of search or 
sweep to be conducted based upon previous intelligence, inspection of the 
suspect vessel’s documentation, and OPTASK guidance8.  Under orders of the 
Boarding Officer, the sweep team will then sweep the ship and its cargos 
visually.  Equipment used by the sweep team includes bolt cutters, wire cutters, 
pry bar, sounding tape, thief sampler, inspection mirror and flashlight.  The 
primary mean of detecting, identifying and classifying any targeted cargo is 
through the searchers’ eyes.  In order to find a hidden targeted cargo, the sweep 
team usually will need to open a suspected container by using a pry bar or cutter.  
The entire search process is inefficient and usually takes a long time, exposing 
the boarding team to danger for an extended amount of time.
                                           
8 “NTTP 3-07.11 Maritime Interdiction Operations”, E.d. Nov 2003, published by U.S. Navy.
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D. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND CONSTRAINTS
The baseline for comparison is the current practice of search.  The 
targeted cargo can be classified broadly into four categories:
1. Smuggled humans or animals
2. Illicit narcotics
3. Firearms (e.g.  guns and mortars)
4. Explosives
Constraints identified for the study include:
1. Cargos are hidden.
2. As most, if not all, ships are made mainly of metal, the sensing 
equipment used to search the ships need to either “see” through 
walls or detect traces of the targeted cargo outside the walls.
3. The chosen equipment, ideally, has to be able to be brought 
onboard the suspect vessel.  Therefore the equipment cannot be 
too bulky nor too heavy.  If it is to be “piggy-backed” by the 
boarding team, it should be twenty lbs or less.
E. FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSITION
The function of “To search the suspect vessel” was decomposed into its 
sub-functions for us to understand what is required for the search.  The functional 
decomposition is as shown in Table 7.
6.0   To search the suspect vessel
6.1 Determine search methodology (exhaustive, random or targeted)
6.2  Determine search target set (weapons, narcotics, people, etc)
6.3  Determine needed asset mix to search a ship
6.3.1     Determine number of people needed
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6.3.2     Determine amount of time given to search
6.4  Transport search equipment to or from the parent ship and 
suspect vessel
6.5  Search the ship
6.5.1     Detect suspected target cargo
6.5.2     Identify targeted cargo
6.5.3     Classify targeted cargo
Table 7:  Functional Decomposition of "To search the ship"
As can be seen in Table 7, to search the suspect vessel requires the 
search methodology to be determined first, followed by determining the target 
set.  Knowing beforehand the likely target the sweep team will be looking for will 
help to determine the type of equipment the team will be bringing onboard the 
suspect vessel.  This is followed by determining the needed asset mix to search 
the ship and transporting these assets to the suspect vessel.  The function of 
transporting the equipment to and from the parent ship and suspect vessels 
places constraints on the sensor equipment that can be used.  These pieces of 
equipment need to be easily transportable (i.e. not too heavy, nor too bulky).  
Considerations should also be made on what to do should the equipment fall 
overboard during transportation.  Lastly, the actual searching the ship function is 
conducted once all search equipment has been brought onboard the secured 
suspect vessel.
Functions 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3.2 are dependant on the intelligence provided 
before the search.  Function 6.3.2 may even be modified as the search 
progresses on the suspect vessel.  Function 6.3.1 is limited by the boarding team 
size, while function 6.4 is performed by the boarding team.  This chapter focuses 
on the remainder – searching the suspect vessel.
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F. IDENTIFYING THE TECHNOLOGIES AND EQUIPMENT
In order to recommend possible solutions to increase the search 
effectiveness over the current search method, a search for technologies that can 
be implemented to detect and identify the targeted cargos was conducted among 
existing industries.  A list of technologies is identified.  These technologies are 
studied more in depth to identify their 1) limitations, 2) feasibility to be used 
search a suspect vessel, and 3) whether equipment exists.
These technologies are then classified into 1) technologies that are 
implementable currently, and 2) technologies that are implementable in the not 
too distant future.  Technologies that are implementable currently will have 
existing equipment that can be explored to improve the search effectiveness.  
These pieces of equipment were identified and their performances were modeled 
to measure the effectiveness they bring about as compared to current practices 
(baseline).
There are technologies that show great potential in improving the 
effectiveness of search, but due to various reasons, are foreseen not to produce 
any equipment by 2013-2014 that are suitable for MIO.  That being said, it is still 
recommended that these technologies be monitored for future products that will 
become suitable for MIO.  These technologies are classified and listed as 
“technologies that are implementable in the not too distant future”.
1. Baseline Technology
a.  Human Eye
(1)  Technology:  The human eye is the baseline sensor for 
this study.  It is the oldest visual sensor a human being has.  The human eye 
accommodates to changing lighting conditions and focuses light rays originating 
from various distances from the eye.  When all of the components of the eye 
function properly, the eye takes in light reflected from the object that it is looking 
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at.  This light is then converted to impulses and conveyed to the brain where an
image is perceived.  This is known as detecting the object.  The image is then 
compared against either images in the brain’s memory bank or information that 
the searcher is holding to identify and classify the object.
(2)  Limitations:  Remarkable the human eye may be, there 
are limitations that impact the search results.  Most important of all is that the 
human eye is not able to see through walls.  Containers will need to be selected 
and opened to see the contents within.  This action usually requires a lot of time.
(3)  Feasibility for Shipboard Use:  Without doubts, human 
eyes are definitely feasible for shipboard use.
(4)  Existing Products:  The human eyes, brain and 
implementation through communications and motor functions as a system is the 
existing baseline.  One of the biggest advantages of this baseline is that every 
ship crew has a pair of working eyes.  This means that if need arises and when 
possible, more pairs of eyes can be recruited to form the sweep team so as to 
shorten the search duration.
2. Technology Implementable Currently
These are technologies that can be implemented currently and there are
existing equipment that implement these technologies.  These technologies will 
be discussed in detail, and existing products will be listed for consideration.
a. Ion Mobility Spectrometry
Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS) is a proven and currently used 
search technology that can handle the demands of the maritime environment as 
shown by its US Coast Guard use.9  Current IMS systems are able to detect and 
                                           
9 Sul, Chih-Wu, Steve Rigdon, Tim Noble, Mike Donahue, Corey Ranslem, “Operational assessment 
of a handheld ion mobility spectrometry Instrument,” http://ijims.ansci.de/pdf/4/1/Su_IJIMS_4_2001_1-
11.pdf, 17 April 2008.
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identify numerous explosives, narcotics, and chemicals.  These qualities make it 
a good candidate for use in MIO operations.
(1)  Technology:  Ion Mobility Spectrometry detects and 
identifies trace amounts of substances down to the nanogram in size.  The trace 
amounts are left behind when explosives or narcotics are packed into containers 
or handled by people.  Swabs are used to collect trace particles from various 
surfaces such as walls, doors, handles, and people.  The surface being 
inspected is swabbed once and the swab then carefully encapsulated in a plastic 
glove worn by the user until user is ready to analyze the swab.10  The swab is 
then placed in the spectrometer for analysis.  The traces are ionized using Ni63
or Am241.11  The ions are then gated into a drift tube.  An electric field in the drift 
tube causes the ions to drift towards a collector electrode, which emits an electric 
signal when struck by the ions.12  An example of the drift tube can be seen in 
Figure 17.  
                                           
10 Jeremiah W. Rekow, GM3 USCG, Ionscan Manager USCG PACTACLET, 17 April 2008.
11 Ibid.
12  Martinak, David, Andreas Rudolph, “Explosives Detection Using An Ion Mobility Spectrometer 
for Airport Security”, http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel3/4941/13616/00626268.pdf?arnumber=626268, 17 
April 2008.
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Figure 17:  Ion Mobility Spectrometry Drift Tube13
Each ion generates a unique signal when making contact 
with the collector electrode at the end of the drift tube.  The mobility (K) and the 
electric field (E) in the drift tube are related to the particle’s drift velocity (vd) 
through the equation vd = K x E.  The drift velocity calculated based on the 
measurements made at the collector is compared against known values of 
compounds to determine the species of the trace.14
(2)  Limitations:  The Operating limitations specified by 
manufacturers of different models that perform ion mobility spectrometry are an 
operating temperature of 32°F to 113°F or 104°F, depending on the model and, 
an operating humidity of 5% to 95% non-condensing.15  Other limitations include 
the need for a clean swab for every sample.  There is also the limitation of the 
battery life or electrical source depending on the model used.
                                           
13 Smiths Detection, “Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS),” 
http://www.smithsdetection.com/eng/286.php, 17 April 2008.
14 Smiths Detection, “Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS),” 
http://www.smithsdetection.com/eng/286.php, 17 April 2008.
15 Thermo Electron Corporation, “EGIS Defender” 
http://www.envimet.com/pdfs/EGIS%20Defender%20Brochure.pdf, 17 April 2008.
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(3)  Feasibility for Shipboard Use: This technology is very 
feasible for shipboard use.  It is currently used by the U.S. Coast Guard in the 
form of the IonScan 400 and the Sabre 4000.16  The Coast Guard even has 
training centers in the U.S. that train search operators in the use of the 
technology.17  No other limitations should limit this technology from being used 
aboard ship and being fully employed in MIOs.
The IonScan 400 weighs 47 lbs but is small (15.5 x 13.5 x 
13”) and comes in a carrying case that allows the boarding team to hoist the 
equipment onto the suspect vessel easily.  The Sabre 4000 weighs 7 lbs and 
comes with a shoulder strap that allows the boarding team to bring equipment 
onboard the suspect vessel easily.
(4) Existing Products: There are several existing products 
that have been used since 1990, when the company Barringer, now Smiths 
Detection, introduced the IonScan.18  The IonScan is a plugged in table top ion
mobility spectrometer.  It is also comparable to the competing EGIS Defender 
Explosives Trace Detection (ETD) system, which is manufactured by Thermo 
Electron Corporation.  The IonScan is a staple at airport security checkpoints 
around the world, where it is used mainly for explosives detection.  
The Sabre 4000 from Smiths Detection is, however, the best 
suited for shipboard use and can be seen in Figure 18.  Its small portable size 
and weight at 14.5” long and 7lbs with 4 hour battery make the Sabre 4000 a 
truly mobile search device.  This allows the search team to easily move about the 
ship while being able to analyze samples without leaving the area being 
searched.  The Sabre 4000 can complete a full analysis of the sample in less 
than 20 seconds.19
                                           
16 Sul, Chih-Wu, Steve Rigdon, Tim Noble, Mike Donahue, Corey Ranslem, “Operational assessment 
of a handheld ion mobility spectrometry Instrument,” http://ijims.ansci.de/pdf/4/1/Su_IJIMS_4_2001_1-
11.pdf, 17 April 2008.
17 Jeremiah W. Rekow, GM3 USCG, Ionscan Manager USCG PACTACLET,  17 April 2008.
18 Jeremiah W. Rekow, GM3 USCG, Ionscan Manager USCG PACTACLET,  17 April 2008.
19 Smiths Detection, “SABRE 4000,” http://www.smithsdetection.com/eng/1523.php, 17 April 2008.
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Figure 18: Sabre 400020
The Sabre 4000 is capable of detecting numerous trace 
elements.  It can detect the explosives RDX, PETN, TNT, Semtex, TATP, NG, 
Ammonium Nitrate and others.  It can detect the narcotics Cocaine, Heroin, THC, 
Methamphetamine and others.  It also can detect chemical warfare agents such 
as the nerve and blister agents Tabun, Sarin, Soman, Cyclosarin, Agent VX and 
VX, Nitrogen Mustard 3 and others.  It even can detect the toxic industrial 
chemicals Hydrogen Cyanide (HCN), Phosgene, SO2, NH3 and others.21
Below are some examples of existing IMS Products in Table 
8.
Manufacturer Smiths Detection Smiths Detection Thermo Electron Corp
Product IonScan 500 Sabre 4000 EGIS Defender
Easily Portable No Yes No
Drug Detection Yes Yes Yes
Explosive Detection Yes Yes Yes
Power Source 115V Plug Battery 115V Plug
Table 8:  IMS Products
                                           
20 Smiths Detection, “SABRE 4000,” http://www.smithsdetection.com/eng/1523.php, 17 April 2008.
21 Ibid.
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(5) Logistics Requirements for IMS: The pieces of equipment 
listed above mostly require minimum maintenance.  None of them require any 
scheduled maintenance.  However, consumables such as swabs and gloves for 
the operators need to be procured in order to support the long duration of 
operations.
(6) Summary: Table 9 provides a summary of key 
characteristic of the IMS.
Sensing Technique Ion Mobility Spectrometry
Max Effective Sensing 
Range
Limited by ions present in swab.  Currently, the practice is 
to take sample swabs at 50 ft interval.
Max Search Lifespan 4 hours (dependant on battery life span).
Probability of Detection 95%
Existing Product IonScan 400, Sabre 4000 and EGIS Defender
Table 9:  Key Characteristics of the IMS
b. Dogs
(1)  Technology:  Dogs, in general, have a sense of smell 
about one hundred thousands times stronger than a human being’s22.  It has 
been estimated that a single search dog can achieve what twenty human 
searchers can do.  Besides their strength in smell sensing for drugs, explosives 
and chemical agents, dogs' superior hearing (dogs can hear four times the 
distance humans can23) and night vision also enhanced their search capabilities 
for human and animals.  
                                           
22 Facts about Tracking, American Kennel Club, 
http://www.akc.org/press_center/facts_stats.cfm?page=12, 28 May 2008.




There are numerous ways to employ dogs for search 
operations.  Knowing the search type will allow the best use of the type of search 
dogs.  While most dogs are capable of all types of searches, they are usually 
trained to specialize in one area.  The main types of work the dogs can do are 
generally categorized as airscent and trailing.  
Airscent refers to search dogs that use airscenting 
techniques to search for the required items.  Airscent dogs will ignore ground 
scent and will follow and locate people or items by catching the "hot" scent of 
people or items in the wind.  This technique is highly effective for large area 
searches.  The probability of detection depends greatly on the conditions of the 
air.  The dogs can also pre-scent on the item that they should be searching 
before setting off for the search.
Another technique will be trailing or tracking search.  This 
refers to the use of ground based scent in order to find the required item or 
human.  This is usually utilized in human searches as scent is left behind by 
people walking.  As the name suggests, the dogs will trail this scent until where 
the final spot of the search item is.  
Dogs have been widely used for search operations for drugs, 
explosives and human or animals.  The main advantage of using dogs for search 
operations is that it has been proven effective.  
(2)  Limitations:  As in all kind of ‘sensors’, a ‘living sensor’ 
(dog) has its own limitations too.  The following are some limitations and 
disadvantages of a search dog in such operations.
While mechanical and electrical related sensors will have 
power limitations, a dog’s stamina for a search is around thirty minutes before it 
reaches fatigue.  As such, if a longer search is required, the canine has to be 
replaced by another dog.
Unlike test proven equipment, search dogs require a long 
period of training.  It was estimated that it takes about six hundred hours of 
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training for a dog to be field ready24.  This presents a constant cost (both 
monetary and time) of training before they can be fielded.  
As the search operations may last for ninety days, logistics 
requirements of dogs’ food, waste disposal and a well-ventilated space for rest 
and sleep are of utmost importance.
It is important that the search dogs do not bring any form of 
diseases or contamination from suspect vessels to the mother ship.  One way to 
prevent this is to have flea bath for the dogs after every search.
While it is not a well-documented fact that dogs get seasick 
on board a ship, many believe that search dogs can be trained to overcome them 
over time and training2526.  This will contribute to part of the training of a search 
dog for maritime operations especially for long-haul operations.
In general a search dog can search for almost anything, but 
they are usually trained in area of specialty (for instance, Heroin dog, Cannabis 
dog, Cocaine Dog Explosive A dog, Explosive B dog, etc).  As such, this may 
require a large fleet of specialty dogs for different type of search.
Dogs cannot be used for stand-off search operation as the 
sensing distance of dogs are limited as well as dependant on the air conditions.  
(See Table 10 for the Probability of Detection).
Probability of Detection Based on Air Stability Class and Distance
from the Source by the Dog Alone
Air Stability
Class 100m 50m 25m 12.5m
A (0.025) 5% 50% 75% 87%
B (0.050) 10% 55% 77% 89%
C (0.100) 35% 67% 86% 93%
                                           
24 SAR Dog Training, “http://people.howstuffworks.com/sar-dog4.htm”, 28 May 2008.
25 Overcoming Motion Sickness in Dogs, “http://ezinearticles.com/?Overcoming-Motion-Sickness-in-
Dogs&id=287359”, 28 May 2008.
26 How to Travel Safely With Dogs, “http://www.thepetcenter.com/gen/travdog.html”, 28 May 2008.
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D (0.250) 80% 90% 95% 97%
E (0.400) 90% 95% 97% 99%
F (1.000) 95% 97% 99% 99%
Table 10:  Probability of Detection by Dogs27
(3)  Feasibility for Shipboard Use:  Other than the issue of 
seasickness, dogs are definitely feasible for shipboard operations.  Currently in 
some countries dogs have already been used by the coast guards for search 
operations28
Dogs can be heavy.  For example, the average weight a 
Beagle is between 22 and 25 lbs29 while a German Shepherd can weigh 
between 75 and 95 lbs30.  This means that the dogs cannot be “piggy backed” 
onto the suspect vessel by the boarding team.  However, the dogs can still be 
hoisted onto the vessel using harness attached to them.  Figure 19 shows 
pictures of some of the harness currently used.  
Figure 19:  Available Harness to hoist Dogs31.
                                           
27 Probability of Detection for Search Dogs or How Long is Your Shadow?, Hatch Graham, 
“http://www.sar-dog.org.nz/pdf/SAR-DOG_PoD.pdf”, 28 May 2008.
28 Coast Guard Goes to Dogs for Bomb, Drug Searches, “http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-
524129/Coast-Guard-goes-to-dogs.html”, 28 May 2008.
29 Beagles, http://www.dogbreedinfo.com/beagle.htm, 18 May 2008.
30 German Shepherd Dogs, http://www.hoflin.com/BR/German%20Shepherd%20Dogs, 18 May 2008.
31 http://www.handicappedpets.com/acc/supsuit/index.html
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(4)  Existing Products:  As mentioned earlier, coast guards 
have been utilizing dogs for searches and it has been a well-known fact that dogs 
are widely used in Search and Rescue (SAR) operations with impressive results.  
Different dogs possess different level of sensitivity.  While some maybe better 
than the other, generally the following are popular choices for their size, 
intelligence, good listening skills, non-aggressive personality and a strong desire 
to retrieve something.  German Shepherds, Labrador, Golden Retrievers, 
Bloodhounds, Beagles and Border Collies are generally common choice.  Some 
smaller breeds have been successfully used by law enforcement and border 
security agents and these should be further investigated for possible use.
(5)  Logistics Requirements for dogs:  Having dogs onboard 
a naval ship will require special logistics to be catered for them.  There is a need 
to either deploy a veterinarian onboard to provide medical care for dogs or train 
the onboard medical doctor basic animal medical care too.  There is also a 
constant threat of dogs contracting virus or getting infested with fleas from 
suspect vessels that they searched.  These virus or fleas may subsequently 
contaminate the mother ship.  One way to reduce this threat is to shower the 
dogs after every operation.
(6)  Summary:  Table 11 provides a summary of key 
characteristic of the dogs.
Sensing Technique Airscenting and trailing
Max Effective Sensing 
Range
12.5 - 100m
Max Search Lifespan 30 mins
Probability of Detection 5 - 99% depending on air conditions
Existing Product German Shepherds, Labrador, Golden Retrievers, 
Bloodhounds, Beagles and Border Collies
Table 11:  Key Characteristics of Dogs
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3. Technology Implementable In Not Too Distant Future
These are technologies that show great potential in improving the 
effectiveness of search.  However, existing equipment that uses these 
technologies are not suitable for MIO.  These technologies, however, should be 
monitored for products that eventually will be suitable for MIO.
a. X-Ray
(1)  Technology:  Transmission X-rays penetrate the object 
under examination, revealing fine details, such as wires and other bomb 
components.  Transmission X-ray images result when these X-rays pass through 
an object, and are absorbed rather than scattered.  When viewed on a 
transmission monitor, these X-rays create a "shadowgram" image, similar to the 
result of a medical X-ray exam.  "Shadowgram" images are generally high 
resolution, and result from the X-ray beam being absorbed by objects of varying 
densities.  By comparison, a Z Backscatter image captures data from X-ray 
photons that are scattered from the object undergoing inspection.  This primary 
scattering effect is known as "Compton Scattering”.  X-ray photons scatter 
differently when they encounter different types of materials.  Compton scattering 
is material-dependent.
(2)  Limitations:  The main limitations of x-ray machines are 
the weight and bulkiness of the equipment.  To allow the search team to carry out 
search onboard the target ship, portability is a key requirement.  The weight and 
bulkiness of current available equipment in the market does not allow the 
equipment to be readily portable by the search team.  
(3)  Feasibility for Shipboard Use:  For container and 
personnel searching, the existing equipments need to be carried onboard the 
target ship.  The weight (~680kg for personnel x-ray machine and ~3000kg for 
container x-ray machine) of the equipment makes it infeasible to be brought 
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onboard the target ship.  A more portable system with better penetrating 
capability is required.  
(4)  Existing Products:  Existing equipment can be classified 
into (1) X-ray for personnel search, and (2) X-ray for cargo search.
Personnel search:  AS&E's SmartCheck32 system is an 
effective way to screen for contraband and threats hidden under a person's 
clothing.  Its capability goes beyond that of metal detectors because it 
simultaneously detects both metallic and non-metallic objects, such as guns and 
knives, plastic and liquid explosives, composite weapons, drugs and other hidden 
threats and contraband.  And its Z Backscatter image gives the operator a 
display of where the threat or contraband is hidden, thus eliminating the need for 
intrusive and time-consuming pat-down and strip searches.  It is easy to use and 
depending on the operating mode, the system requires only one or two 
operators.  The SmartCheck system is safe for all individuals and complies with 
all applicable U.S. personnel scanning regulations.  An optional privacy filter 
protects the privacy of screened persons and still effectively displays threats.
Figure 20: AS&E's Smartcheck System
                                           
32 AS&E’s Smart Check, http://www.as-e.com/products_solutions/smart_check.asp
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Cargo Search: AS&E's Cargo and Vehicle inspection 
systems33 are engineered to provide security personnel with an effective means 
of detection without disrupting the flow of commerce.
AS&E’s X-ray inspection systems that can detect a multitude 
of threats and contraband, including:
-Drugs 
-Human Beings 
-Plastic Weapons and Explosives, including car and truck 
bombs 
-Radioactive Threats, including nuclear devices and dirty 
bombs 
-Smuggled goods, such as alcohol, tobacco products, and 
other legal goods smuggled to evade duties (trade fraud) 
-Weapons or other inorganic threats, including metal 
weapons and shielding to conceal radioactive materials 
These systems can inspect cars, vans, and trucks, as well 
as palletized cargo, and air and sea cargo containers.  
                                           
33 AS&E’s cargocheck, http://www.as-e.com/products_solutions/cargo_vehicle_inspection.asp,
17 April 2008.
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Figure 21: AS&E's Cargocheck System
b. Millimeter Wave
(1) Technology:  Millimeter-waves (MMW) are 
electromagnetic radiation that ranges with wavelengths from 10 millimeters to 1 
millimeter in the electromagnetic spectrum, locating between the microwave and 
infrared.  Their corresponding frequencies are from 30 GHz to 300 GHz.  Due to 
this high frequency of MMW as well as their propagation characteristics, it is 
ideally suited for use in screening and imaging applications.
MMW works by radiating electromagnetic waves out to a 
target so as to generate an image based on the energy reflected from the target 
and the atmosphere.  For example, MMW technologies are being used to detect 
guns concealed underneath clothing by the detection of the contrast between the 
warmer human body and the apparently cooler metal weapon.
The use of MMW technology is safe as it radiates out 
harmless waves to the environment therefore people are not exposed to any 
form of radiation.
(2)  Limitations:  There are two key limitations to the usage 
of MMW.  The first limitation is the problem in detection from high stand off 
distance and the second limitation is that MMW is not able to penetrate through 
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metal materials.  Not being able to penetrate through metal materials proved a 
big setback for this technology to be used onboard of a ship as most modern ship 
are made of metal thus limiting the search capabilities.  By using metal material 
(e.g.  aluminum foils) to wrap over drugs or explosives is another issue to the 
search capabilities of this technology.
(3)  Feasibility for Shipboard Use:  It is still possible to be 
used on ship but limiting the search capabilities to older ship (e.g.  dhows) that 
are mostly constructed out of wooden materials.
 (4)  Existing Products :  One of the possible products is 
the ST150 (Outdoor High Resolution Imaging) from Sago Systems.
Figure 22:  ST15034
The ST150 passive millimeter-wave imager is a stand-off 
unit designed for outdoor perimeter and check-point security screening of suicide 
vests, bombs, guns, knives and other suspicious objects.  The radiation-free 
system can be camouflaged to provide covert screening at a distance before 
entering a confined area or it can be located at a checkpoint.  ST150 allows for 
remote security personnel to be situated at a safe distance immediately viewing 
the images from a command center over a standard wi-fi interface to a laptop 
computer.  This allows authorities to isolate the threat from a distance and help 
prevent planned attacks.  ST150 has been tested and evaluated by the U.S.  
                                           
34 Sago Systems, “ST150,” http://www.sagosystems.com/Pages%20Folder/Products/products.html, 
17 April 2008.
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Government35.  It is an excellent complementary security solution for 
courthouses, cruise ships, corporations, airports, visitor attractions, and many 
other locations.36  
3. Summary of Technology
The technologies can be summarized as Table 12:
Human Eyes IMS Dogs X-ray MMW
Human or  
Animals




Firearms x x x




 Portable   Proven
  Portable





Limitations  Cannot see 









  Need Traces
  Seasick





  Not easily 
portable
  Human 
exposed to 
radiation
 Unable to 
see through 
metal.  
Table 12:  Summary of Technology
Both the Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS) and dogs are available now.  
Together these two technologies allow us to search for smuggled human or 
animals, illicit narcotics, and explosives.  These technologies cover three of the
four targeted cargos.  As for firearms, because current x-ray and millimeter wave 
equipment do not offer feasible solution, human eyes are still needed for the 
search.
                                           
35 Sago Systems, “ST150,” http://www.sagosystems.com/Pages%20Folder/Products/products.html, 17 
April 2008.
36 Sago Systems, “ST150,” http://www.sagosystems.com/Pages%20Folder/Products/products.html, 17 
April 2008.
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4. Technology Implementable But Not Studied
There are technologies or existing equipment that are being used but not 
studied due to resource constraints and also limited potential of the equipment.  
These are presented here for further discussion outside this study.
a. Borescope / Fibrescope / Videoscope
A Borescope is an optical device consisting of a rigid or flexible 
tube with an eyepiece on one end, an objective lens on the other linked together 
by a relay optical system in between.  The optical system is usually surrounded 
by optical fibers used for illumination of the remote object and a rigid or flexible 
protective outer sheath.  The remote object is illuminated and an internal image 
formed by the objective lens is relayed to the eyepiece which magnifies the 
internal image and presents it to the viewer's eye.
Variations to the Borescope are Fibrescope and Videoscope.  
Fiberscopes use coherent image fiberoptics to relay the image to one's eye 
through an eyepiece while a Videoscope is an advanced type of Borescope that 
houses a very small Charge Coupled Device (CCD) chip embedded into the tip of 
the scope.  The video image is relayed from the distal tip and focusable lens 
assembly back to the display via internal wiring.  The image quality of a
videoscope is superior to a fiberscope and could be compared to that of a high-
end Video Camcorder.
Being narrow (a Videoscopes are normally 10 mm or less in 
diameter), compact and highly portable, the scopes are used for inspection work 
where the area to be inspected is inaccessible by other means.  However in 
order to see what is hidden inside a container, openings are needed to put the 
scopes in.  The scopes will be useless if there is no opening.  If there is a need to 
“see” what is hidden inside a container, it may be faster to use a Borescope than 
to physically open a container and search within, but it is believed that this
improvement over the baseline technology is limited and is much lesser than if 
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either IMS or dogs are used.  Therefore, Boresecope and similar kinds were not 
explored further.
b. Infrared Sensors
Infrared sensors, such as Forward Looking InfraRed (FLIR), or an 
infrared camera, are devices that form images using infrared radiation, similar to 
common cameras that form images using visible light.  Instead of the 450 – 750 
nm range of the visible light camera, infrared cameras operate in wavelengths as 
long as 14,000 nm (14 µm).  All objects emit a certain amount of black body
radiation as a function of their temperatures.  An infrared sensor can detect this 
radiation in a way similar to how an ordinary camera does with visible light.
This technology looks attractive initially as the operator may be able 
to detect a warm body hidden inside a container when he senses that a container 
is hotter than other nearby container.  However, this technology has its limitation.  
In the hot day, say in the Straits of Hormuz, where temperature in the day can be 
as high as 111 oF, a container will be emitting more radiation than the body it 
contained, the container with the hidden warm body will therefore be seen to be 
as hot as the surrounding containers.  In summary, Infrared sensor will work only 
if there is thermal difference between the container and its surrounding 
containers.  Due to this limitation, the focus of the study was placed elsewhere.
G. MODEL
Both the Ion Mobility Spectrometry and dogs are recommended as 
possible solutions to improving search.  In order to measure how effective these 
solutions are, the equipment was modeled so as to measure the effectiveness of 
sensors used for searching a suspect vessel with an area to be searched of
approximately 250 m2.  Both an exhaustive and a random search model were 
used to bound the results.  The exhaustive model would identify the upper bound 
of performance based upon an ideal search situation while the random search 
would model near worst case search situation and performance and 
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performance.  The MOEs are 1) Time to search the entire suspect vessel, 2) the 
Probability of Detection (Pd) achieved in a given search time of two hours, and 3) 
the time taken to search the vessel in order to achieve a required Pd.  The 
results were compared with the effectiveness of searching using the unaided 
human eyes (baseline case).
1. Model Description
A benchmark was given based on past real operations experiences 
estimated two hours for an approximately 1,000 GT cargo ship and four hours for 
large super container ships.  Estimates of the performance of various sensors 
were estimated based upon real data from various sources that was used to fit 
the simplified model.  Most sensors provide probabilities of detection or at least 
very good estimates of them.  However, false alarm rates (FAR) were not 
available with only one sensor’s FAR being found.  Because of the lack of data of 
FAR, they were not taken into consideration in the models.  It is realized that 
false alarms would degrade search time in the real world by requiring time to 
verify that each false alarm was indeed a false alarm and not a true positive.
Two spreadsheet models were created.  The first was an exhaustive 
search model and the other a random search model.  The exhaustive search 
model is based upon equation (9.1) 37 while the random search model is based 
upon equation (9.2)38.  These models assume that the lateral range curve is 
general and that the sensor has a probability of detection of 1.  The models were 
run for each sensor until the cumulative detection probability (CDP) reached 1.  A 
CDP of 1 means that the entire area to be searched has been completely 
searched in these models.  The true probability of detecting any targeted cargo is 
then the sensor’s probability of detection once an exhaustive search has been 
completed.  If the search were to be stopped before CDP were to reach one in 
                                           
37 Pilnick Steven. “OA 3602 Search & Detection: Area Search and Patrol,” Slide 6.
38 Wagner, Daniel H., Charles Mylander, Thomas Sanders. “Random Search” Naval Operations 
Analysis, 3rd ed., 174.
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the model (i.e.  not the entire area has been searched), then the probability of 
detection would be the current CDP multiplied by the probability of detection of 
the sensor as shown in equation.
0
0





CDP F t t t A vW
A
t A vW
     
 
(9.1)
( ) 1 tTCDP F t e
   (9.2)
Probability of Detection  CDP  Sensor's Probability of Detection  (9.3)
For the models, the sweep width and speed of advance of each sensor 
were needed.  Sweep width was based upon the estimated range of the sensors 
after significant research.  The speed of advance was then estimated based 
upon the time it would take to search a circle with a diameter of the sweep width.
  
2. Time to Search Entire Suspect Vessel
The time taken to search was then calculated for a 1,000 GT vessel, 
which would have an approximated deck area of 250 m2 to search.  The results 

















Human Eyes 0.6 2 0.033 250 63 330
IMS 0.95 6 0.042 250 17 88
Dogs 0.95 2 0.1 250 21 110
Table 13:  Search Model Results
As can be seen in Table 13 it takes shorter to search the entire vessel 
when using search equipment as compared to using just human eyes.  It is 
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important to note that the probability of detection for each sensor has yet to be 
considered.  As can be seen later, when the probability of each sensor is 
considered, the differences will be even more drastic.
3. Probability of Detection Achieved for a Given Time to Search
The sensors can also be compared in their capability to maximize 
probability of detection within a given time.  The time given for search of a 1,000 
GT vessel with an approximate deck area 250 m2 is stated to be approximately 
two hours according to the project’s operations management plan.  In this two 
hour time period, certain probabilities of detection are possible with the given 
sensors and can be seen in Table 14.  The results demonstrate the advantage of 
sensors over simply using human eyes.  

















Human Eyes 0.6 2 0.033 250 0.82 0.41
IMS 0.95 6 0.042 250 1 0.95
Dogs 0.95 2 0.1 250 1 0.95
Table 14:  Achievable Pd in Given Time
The results show that both IMS and dogs can achieve a probability of 
detection between 0.95 to 1 when searching a 250 m2 vessel for 2 hours.  The 
results also show that for a given time, the search equipment can achieve higher 
probability of detection than using human eyes only.
4. Time Needed to Search Suspect Vessel to Achieve a Given 
Probability of Detection 
High rates of success demand come at a higher cost.  To achieve a 
probability of detection that would satisfy a commander’s reasonable desire to 
ensure a ship is clean, the time taken to search must be increased for some 
sensors.  The times necessary to achieve 0.95 probability detection for a 1,000 
GT vessel with an approximate deck area 250 m2 can bee seen in Table 15.  
These results again reaffirm the improvement of using sensors over only the 
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human eye especially seeing as it is impossible to truly achieve a probability of 
detection of 0.95 using the human eye.
  

















Human Eyes 0.6 2 0.033 250 204 N/A
IMS 0.95 6 0.042 250 17 91
Dogs 0.95 2 0.1 250 21 115
Table 15:  Time to Achieve Pd of 0.95
The results show that IMS can achieve the required probability of 
detection the quickest.  When searching a 250 m2 vessel, there is little difference 
in the time taken for both IMS and dogs, however, there is a marked 
improvement when using the search equipment instead of purely human eyes.
5. New Sensor Recommendations
Based upon the results of the models for the various sensors, 
recommendations were made for the new sensors that will hopefully be 
developed for MIOs soon in the future.  These sensors are the millimeter wave 
and x-ray sensors.  Equipment using these technologies currently exists but none 
are really suitable for MIO.  The desire is for these sensors to ultimately improve 
upon the performance of the human eye being used as an instrument for search.  
The recommendations can be seen in Table 16.
X-Ray Sensor
Sensor Sweep Width 2 m
Speed of Movement 0.067 m/s
Recommended Sensor Pd >0.8
Table 16:  New Sensor Recommendations
The parameters were chosen for various reasons.  In order to see across 
the width of a container and to match eye performance, 2 m were selected as 
sweep width.  The speed of movement was estimated to be 0.0667 m/s with the 
hope that it would improve upon the speed of a sight search that would require 
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moving objects or containers to search.  The sensor probability of detection was 
also chosen to be an improvement over the human eye and to ensure that the 
improvement given would be worth the technology investment.  
H. CONCLUSION
The Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS) and dogs are recommended as 
solutions in the study.  As can be seen from the results of this model, both IMS 
and dogs improve the search efficiencies.  
Costs to operate and support using these pieces of equipment are 





 During Maritime Interdiction Operations, it is vital to obtain and maintain 
information superiority.  Reliable systems must be in place to collect intelligence 
both on the macroscopic and microscopic levels.  That information is of no use 
unless it can be analyzed and then used.  Thus, a need exists to have reliable 
communication systems throughout the operation.  Effective communications 
must exist between crew members on the suspect vessel, between the suspect 
vessel and the mother ship, and between the mother ship and shore installations 
around the globe.
2. Approach
In keeping with the timeframe of 2013-2014, surveys were taken of the 
current technological landscape to find systems that would be suitable for MIO 
operations.  The team studied a number of systems, conducting analytical trade 
studies, to best weigh them against identified requirements.  The team then 
proposed recommendations for utilization in each area.
3. Current Practice
The current practice of intelligence collection has just started to take 
advantage of available technology.  On a macroscopic level, intelligence is being 
collected using traditional ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) 
means.  On the microscopic level, technology can be much better used.  It was 
just in November of 2006 that the Coast Guard began using biometric technology 
in immigration operations.  The team believes that technology could be leveraged 
and used in Maritime Interdiction operations.  In the area of communications, 
152
current practice is to use hand-held radios to communicate between the boarding 
team and the mother ship.  These radios have range limitations and do not have 
the ability to simultaneously transmit and receive voice and data.  As biometric 
data is collected, reliable communications are needed to transmit the data and 
perform near-real-time analysis of that data.  Additionally, the current tactical 
radios being used have shortcomings when attempting communications in the 
interior of a metal-hulled ship.  The channel environment introduces significant 
Rayleigh fading, making these internal communications difficult and unreliable.
4. Problem Definition
The problem is to research and recommend reliable systems for collection 
of intelligence on the macroscopic and microscopic levels.  Additionally, current 
technology was researched in order to recommend systems to use in transmitting 
communications internally on and within the suspect vessel and externally, both 
between ships and globally.
5. Functional Decomposition
7.1 To Collect Information
7.1.1 To Collect Microscopic Intelligence
7.1.1.1 To Perform Biometric Collection
7.1.1.2 To Conduct Non-networked Computer 
Exploitation
7.1.2 To Collect Macroscopic Intelligence
7.2 To Transmit Information
7.2.1 To Transmit Communications Externally





During MIO operations when a ship is identified as a suspicious 
target based on intelligence sources, there is a need for the boarding team to 
board the target ship and conduct the interdiction operations.  The means of 
communications for the boarding team to send voice or data back to the mother 
ship is critical for the success of the operation.  Communication links enable the 
whole team to achieve common situational awareness throughout the 
interdiction.
The mother ship also requires communications with other military or 
non-military MIO stakeholders or partners to access or retrieve relevant 
intelligence information during the execution of the MIO operation.  This 
requirement includes transmitting scanned “biometric” data to relevant authorities 
for verification and validation or accessing data via corporate secure intranets to 
exchange important files or information.
b. Requirements
1. Develop ship-to-ship communication links for MIO boarding 
teams to communicate back to mother ship. 
2. Develop ship-to-global communication links for the mother ship 
to communicate with global MIO partners or stakeholders.
c. System Proposals
1. Ship to Ship: The two options for ship to ship communications 
are as follows: 
 Setting up point-to-point data link communications between 
the mother ship and the interdicted target ship.
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 Setting up data link communications between the mother 
ship and the interdicted target ship via a relay.  The relay 
can be implemented using a UAV or satellites.  However, 
due to the higher operating costs of satellite 
communications, the use of UAV relay is recommended 
since the UAV is also employed for other MIO functions as 
explained in Chapter 8.   
The first option (point-to-point data link communications) is 
preferred, as it does not introduce another point of failure (i.e., UAV and satellite) 
as in the second option.  Moreover, in the majority of MIO operations, the target 
ship is within visual range (~8 nm) of the mother ship.  Hence, the use of a relay 
is unnecessary.
(2) Ship to Global: Due to the long distance required by the ship-to-
global communications, satellite communication is suitable. 
Figure 23 illustrates the external communication architecture described in this 
section.
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Figure 23:  Conceptual Design of MIO External Communications
d. Ship-to-Ship Communications. 
Ship to ship communication requires the bi-directional transfer of 
voice and data between two nodes.  For MIO operations, the key system design 
issues include environmental conditions, effective data throughput, need for 
encryption, link performance, and inter-operability.  The WetNet system by Harris 
Corporation has factored all of these issues into its design and hence, it is 
recommended for use here.
(1) Description: The WetNet system by Harris Corporation39
is an IP-based network radio system based on the IEEE 802.11g protocol40 with 
a maximum data rate of 54 Mbps.  The system consists of a high-data rate 
network centric protocol with extended range capability and it can operate at 
                                           
39 Christopher D. Moffatt, “High Data Rate, Line of Sight Network Radio for Mobile Maritime 
Communications (Using Harris WetNet Technology)”, Harris Corporation
40 IEEE 802.11 Standard. http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/802.11.html
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various military and commercial frequency bands.  The WetNet system has the 
following benefits:
 It is compatible with standard IP addressing and network topologies, 
including ad-hoc mode or infrastructure mode.
 It uses standard Ethernet-based physical device interfaces.  This allows 
for convenient connection of external devices to facilitate voice and data 
transmission.
 It has multiple levels of cyclic redundancy checks (CRC) and integrated 
data encryption ensuring data integrity and security.
 It has a data packet structure with guaranteed delivery.  This ensures that 
100% of all data is delivered to the destination node.41
 It uses advanced OFDM waveforms with convolutional coding and 
scrambling.
This system leverages on the benefits of the 802.11 standards42 as follows. 
Data is transmitted in ‘bursts’ of very short duration (microseconds) compared to 
the coherence time communications channel, Ts<<Tc, resulting in slow fading. 
Slow fading is desirable as it reduces the effect of phase shifts due to Doppler 
spreading. OFDM modulation is inherently robust to multipath effects. This is 
because Ts>>σT, which results in flat fading.  Flat fading is desirable as it 
reduces ISI due to multipath effects. The 802.11 ARQ protocol ensures that all 
data packets are delivered by issuing an acknowledgment for each packet 
transmitted.  Hence, packets missed because of LOS blockages are re-
transmitted.43
                                           
41 Christopher D. Moffatt, “High Data Rate, Line of Sight Network Radio for Mobile Maritime 
Communications (Using Harris WetNet Technology)”, Harris Corporation
42 IEEE 802.11 Standard. http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/802.11.html
43 Ibid.
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(2) Key Design Considerations:  The system is designed 
around low cost commercial 802.11(x) chipsets.44 The waveforms are translated 
to frequencies as desired by the users for their unique requirements.  High gain 
antennas, power amplifiers and LNA are added to overcome path loss at long 
ranges. Software modifications ensure 802.11 COTS products can function 
properly at long ranges.  In addition, peaks of communication waveforms are 
reduced to reduce DC power consumption by the system.  Additionally, data 
encryption for secured communications is layered into the protocol.
(3) System components: At each node, there is an 802.11 
transceiver. At the transmit node, there is a power amplifier. At the receive 
node, there is a Low Noise Amplifier.  At each node, omni or directional antennas
can be used depending on the range required.
(4) Link analysis: The purpose of link analysis is to obtain the 
system signal to noise ratio (SNR) for performance assessment. This is because 
SNR determines the bit error rate that in turn determines the quality of service or 
accuracy of the data. A sample calculation of the SNR using representative 











1 10 1.38 10 10 10 500
SNR dB
 
     
(9.5)
A SNR of 32 dB indicates excellent performance given added noise.    
 (5) Performance and Test results: Field tests were 
conducted by Harris Corporation over the ocean to validate the WetNet system’s 
                                           
44 Christopher D. Moffatt, “High Data Rate, Line of Sight Network Radio for Mobile Maritime 
Communications (Using Harris WetNet Technology)”, Harris Corporation
158
performance in a representative maritime environment.  Of particular interest to 
MIO was the boat to air field test.  A Cessna 172 was flown at 3500 ft above MSL 
fitted with a small omni antenna mounted to the bottom of the fuselage.  The boat 
was fitted with both omni and directional antenna at 15 ft above MSL.  The data 
throughput was then measured at various distances and are tabulated in Table 
17.  Longer distances can be achieved by additional link gains.45  Table 17
shows that WetNet’s performance is suited for Maritime Interdiction Operations, 
as it achieves high throughput even at a distance significantly greater than that of 
a standard MIO.
Table 17: WetNet Performance
(6) Ship-to-global Communications: Fleet Broadband is the 
first maritime communications service to provide broadband data and voice, 
simultaneously, through a compact antenna on a global basis.  The services are 
supported by two of Inmarsat’s heavyweight I-4 satellites that were operational in 
early 2007.46
                                           
45 Christopher D. Moffatt, “High Data Rate, Line of Sight Network Radio for Mobile Maritime 
Communications (Using Harris WetNet Technology)”, Harris Corporation




Antenna (3500 ft 
above MSL)






Omni Directional 90 5.4
Omni Directional 88 10.3
Omni Directional 86 12.4
Omni Omni 40 9.15
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(7) Specifications: The specifications of the types of 
antennas and 
Inmarsat 4 are indicated in the Tables 2 and 3.  Both antennas shown in Table 
18 are capable of being utilized for Fleet Broadband operation.  Table 19 gives 
the specifications of the two current Inmarsat satellites currently in operation.
Table 18: Specifications of Fleet Broadband Antennas
FB250 FB500
Data
Standard IP Up to 284 kbps Up to 432 kbps
Streaming IP 32, 64, 128 kbps 32, 64, 128, 256
kbps
ISDN - 64 kbps
Voice 4kbps digital 3.1 kHz audio
Fax Group 3 fax via 3.1 kHz audio




25 cm/ 28 cm/ 2.5
kg
57 cm/ 68 cm/ 18 kg
Frequency Band Rx: 1525.0 – 1559.0 MHz
Tx: 1625.0 – 1660.5 MHz
Ch. Spacing: 1.25 kHz – Rx.
Table 19: Specifications of Inmarsat 4 F1 and F2
Inmarsat 4 F1




Design life: 18 years
Contractors: EADS Astrium: integrator, bus and payload; 
Northrop Grumman: reflector; EMS Technologies: 
antenna system
Transponders: 228 narrow-spot (1.1°) beams; 19 wide-spot 
beams; single global beam.  Up to 630 200 kHz 




Configuration: Eurostar E3000 bus with 9 m deployable reflector.  
Body dimensions 7 m x 2.9 m x 2.3 m
Mass: 5,950 kg launch, 3,340 kg dry
Power 
system:
45 m-span hybrid (GaAs and Si) ten-panel solar 
array, delivering 13 kW
Inmarsat 4 F2
Launched: 8 November 2005 by Zenit 3SL from Sea Launch
platform Odyssey from Cape Canaveral LC-41
Location: 53°W
Rest of the specifications are similar to Inmarsat 4 
F1
(8) MOE: The measure of effectiveness of communications 
was based the amount of downtime of communication links during actual 
operations.  This MOE was applicable, because if communication links were 
unusable, the communication system was deemed to have failed.
(9) MOP: There were 2 measures of performance proposed 
for the external communications.  Namely, the time required to transmit different 
sizes of the data (~4 Mb for the thumb and iris biometric data of 10 people)
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across the communication links, and in addition, the error rates of the data 
transmitted. 
(10) Recommendations: The recommendations for external 
communications were to set-up the ship to ship communications using WetNet 
technology and engage the Fleet broadband services provided by Inmarsat for 
the ship-to-global communications.  This recommendation provides seamless 
communications for all parties involved during MIO operations.
2. Internal Communications
a. Background
The inherent dangerous nature of MIO operations necessitates 
reliable and robust communications between boarding team members as well as 
the parent ship.  No matter where a team member is onboard the suspect vessel, 
he or she must be able to use his tactical radio to communicate with other 
members of the team to safely execute these complex operations.  The inherent 
nature of a target ship’s hull introduces significant complexity to the channel 
environment in which signals are transmitted and received.
b. Requirements
 Must operate in an intensely Rayleigh faded environment 
with disproportionally greater attenuation (due to the metal 
super-structure) in any direction than free space path loss.  
 Support voice and data simultaneously.
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c. Findings
Four radio systems (802.16d, ITT Mesh, Trellisware and 802.11b) 
were compared in an NPS thesis.  Trellisware was shown to be vastly superior to 
the other four radio systems.47
d. 802.11b Conclusions
 Performance was highly reliant on power supplied.  As 
power was decreased to the system, latency increased 
substantially.  The amount of available power is always 
limited by the weight of the transmitter and available battery 
power.  Therefore  
 As the apparent speed of a radio’s movement increased, 
both latency and packet loss increase.  “Speed” in this sense 
refers to the rate at which a radio moves from a fading zone 
to a constructive interference zone.  This movement 
effectively modulates the received waveform.  As the rate of 
modulation increases, the performance of an 802.11b 
system decreases. 
 Increasing values of inter-reflection spacing causes greater 
amounts of inter-symbol interference (ISI).  This 
phenomenon causes the radio to react in order to guarantee 
that the packet was received intact.  The reaction in this 
case is to simply retransmit portions of the original message.  
This retransmission takes more time, which can be 
measured in the overall average latency.  The effect of 
                                           
47 Fuller, Randal.  “Performance Measurements of Network Radios in Harsh Multi-path 
Environments”.  NPS Thesis, September 2008 
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increasing inter-reflection spacing is not as pronounced as 
the Doppler shift effects; however it is still visible.
e. Trellisware Conclusions
 Average latency remained constant for all permutations of 
channel parameters.
 As power decreased, degree of packet loss increased.
 Degradation also occurred with increasing inter-reflection 
spacing.  The degradation was negligible compared to 
802.11b tests.
 Trellisware did prove to be immune to Doppler shift.
 Trellisware also has the ability to transmit at ranges of 100 
nm when unobstructed, allowing voice communications to 
reach back to the parent ship.
 Trellisware has an automatic relay capability built into the 
radio.  The algorithm for that relay functionality does not 
utilize routing like an IP network, but utilizes a flooding 
approach, whereby all information is relayed using only a 
minimum of computation.  This allows more opportunities for 
forward error correction strategies to overcome channel 
fading conditions while also serving to effectively amplify a 
given signal.  This relay capability allows the Trellisware 
radios to communicate ‘around’ the walls of a ship vice 
having to go through them.
 Trellisware, at the time of the writing of this report, had an 
insufficient amount of available throughput in order to 
support the biometrics.  However, if the radio were able to 
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surpass WetNet’s performance (without trading performance 
in any other areas), then Trellisware may be ideal for both 
internal and external communications.
f. Recommendations
In the current format, tactical radios based on the Trellisware 
technology would be ideal for the MIO environment.  Trellisware radios cost 
approximately about $6,000 each and are approximately technology readiness 
level seven.  When confined within a possibly large, steel-hulled suspect vessel 
the radio must be immune from the numerous Doppler shifts introduced by the 
frequent reflections within the vessel.  While this does not meet all the 
requirements introduced above, it is the best option at the current time.  
C.  INTELLIGENCE
1.  Microscopic Intelligence Collection
a. Biometric Collection
(1) Introduction to Biometrics: Biometrics is defined as:
“The development of statistical and mathematical methods 
applicable to data analysis problems in the biological sciences.  
The term ‘biometrics‘ is derived from the Greek words bio (life) and 
metric (to measure).  For our use, biometrics refers to technologies 
for measuring and analyzing a person's physiological or behavioral 
characteristics, such as fingerprints, irises, voice patterns, facial 
patterns, and hand measurements, for identification and verification 
purposes.”48
                                           
48 “Biometrics Comparison Chart”, National Center for State Courts, 
http://ctl.ncsc.dni.us/biomet%20web/BMCompare.html#aspects
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As technology advances and improves, the use of biometrics 
for identification and verification has become increasingly affordable and 
accurate.  Biometrics can help to speed up the process of identification and 
verification significantly. 
(2) Types of Biometrics: There are many types of biometrics,
and 
each type has its advantages and disadvantages.  Below is a chart from Court 
Technology Laboratory of the National Center for State Courts comparing 
different types of biometric measurements.
Figure 24: Biometric Comparison Chart
The symbols in Figure 3 are based on expert opinion for each Biometric.  A 
check mark means a particular biometric satisfies the requirement.  For 
accuracy, a greater number of circles indicates greater accuracy.  In the other 
columns, green indicates better performance in that requirement than yellow, 
which is better than red.  The terms Ext Diff (Extremely Difficult), Very Diff (Very 
Difficult), Difficult, Medium and Easy used in Figure 24 are used to define the 
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level of difficulty for a False Positive or False Negative identification.  Based on 
Figure 24, the required inputs were narrowed down to Fingerprint, Iris Scan and 
Retinal Scan as they can be used for verification and identification.  DNA is not 
shortlisted due to user acceptability and possible legal issues.  The retinal 
biometric is less error prone and very difficult to fake, but “during a retinal scan, 
the user must remove glasses, stare at a specific point, and hold their head still 
for 10-15 seconds” “to complete the scan.”49  This could prove difficult during a 
boarding situation for an uncooperative crew member.  However, by the time the 
scan would be conducted, the situation would be stable onboard the suspect 
vessel with the crew already subdued, lessening the probability of difficult 
interactions with the crew.  If the crew refuses to hold still for the retinal scan and 
there has been no provocation, the boarding team will have to use the fingerprint 
and iris data.
 (3) Background work on Biometrics Used for Verification 
and Identification: Many countries have implemented a biometric passport and 
these passports are mainly used due to International Civil Aviation Organization’s 
(ICAO) requirements.  The information in the following paragraphs is extracted 
from an ICAO working paper on machine readable travel documents (MRTD).50
The International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical 
Commission (ISO/IEC) standards incorporated into the e-passport specification 
are: Facial Image Format for Interoperable Data Interchange (ISO/IEC 19794-5); 
Iris Image Format for Interoperable Data Interchange (ISO/IEC 19794-6); 
Fingerprint Image Format for Interoperable Data Interchange (ISO/IEC 19794-4); 
Fingerprint Minutiae Format For Interoperable Data Interchange (ISO/IEC 
19794); Fingerprint Pattern Format for Interoperable Data Interchange (ISO/IEC 
19794-3)
                                           
49 “How does a Retinal Scan Work?”, wisegeek, http://www.wisegeek.com/how-does-a-retinal-scan-
work.htm
50 “Technical Advisory Group on Machine Readable Travel Documents” page 25 to 31, ICAO TAG-
MRTD/17-WP/16, 1 June 07
167
The face record format (facial image) requires that the 
header and the entire data structure be CBEFF compatible and the image data 
be encoded using JPEG to JPEG2000.  Compression of the facial image to 15 
Kb to 20 Kb is recommended in the ICAO paper.51 The term CBEFF stands for 
Common Biometric Exchange Formats Framework, which is a biometric 
standard.  The term JPEG stands for Joint Photographic Experts Group, which is 
a type of data compression standard for images.  JPEG2000 is a more recent 
data compression standard by Joint Photographic Experts Group.
Based on the ICAO paper, fingerprint scanners should 
capture fingerprints at a minimum resolution of 500 pixels per inch (ppi) in both 
the detector row and detector column directions.  Both the white signal-to-noise 
ratio and black signal-to-noise ratio of the scanner should be greater than or 
equal to 125.  At least 80 percent of the fingerprint images taken with a given 
scanner must have a gray-scale dynamic range of at least 200 gray levels and at 
least 99 percent shall have a dynamic range of at least 128 gray levels within the 
scanner hardware.  Gray-scale linearity and uniformity within the scanner must 
be verified with test patterns (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 37 N 466).52  Gray-scale finger 
image data may be stored, recorded, and transmitted in either compressed or 
uncompressed form.  Compressed data is highly preferred for purposes of 
transmitting large quantities of data from multiple people.  Images with a 
resolution of 500 ppi can be compressed using Wavelet Scalar Quantization 
(WSQ) with a 15:1 compression ratio or with JPEG at a 5:1 compression ratio.  
The optimal compressed size for a fingerprint image was estimated by ICAO to 
be approximately 10 Kb per finger.53
                                           
51 “Technical Advisory Group on Machine Readable Travel Documents,” 27 -28, ICAO TAG-
MRTD/17-WP/16, 1 June 07
52 Ibid., 29.
53 “Ibid., 30. 
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According to the ICAO paper, the optimal compression size 
for an iris image is 30 Kb per eye.  If JPEG or JPEG2000 compression is used, a 
compression factor of 6:1 or less is recommended.  The image should have a 
dynamic range spanning at least 256 gray levels.  The iris image within the 
scanner should have a minimum of 90 gray levels between the iris and sclera 
and a minimum of 50 gray levels separation between iris and pupil for all eye 
colors.  Within the scanner, at least 70 percent of the iris should be visible.  The 
minimum digital iris diameter should be comprised of at least 100 pixels, with 70 
pixels between the left or right edge of the iris and the closest edge of the image, 
and at least 70 pixels between the upper or lower edges of the iris and the 
closest edge of the image.  The iris image should not exhibit effects of optical 
distortion including spherical aberration, chromatic aberration, astigmatism and 
coma consistent with standard optical design practices.  The signal-to-noise ratio 
should not be less than 40 dB inclusive of any noise introduced by image 
compression techniques (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 37 N 504). 54
Figure 25: US Coast Guard Biometric Equipment55
(4) U.S. Coast Guard “Biometrics at Sea”
                                           
54 “Technical Advisory Group on Machine Readable Travel Documents” page 31, ICAO TAG-
MRTD/17-WP/16, 1 June 07
55 US Coast Guard Research and Development Center -
http://www.rdc.uscg.gov/Portals/0/BTS2.pdf
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In November 2006, the United States Coast Guard began 
fielding a device that collects biometric information from immigrants attempting to 
gain entry into Puerto Rico.  The ruggedized biometric data capture device is 
built around a Hewlett-Packard iPaq Personal Digital Assistant (PDA).  The PDA 
is housed in a plastic case that includes a digital fingerprint scanner and a 
camera.  The biometric capturing device is then linked to a stand-alone laptop 
PC which extracts the data.  The company responsible for the device is Identix.56  
Identix, which recently merged with Integrated Biometric Technology, assembled 
all the components, including its proprietary fingerprint capture software.  Identix 
also worked with the Coast Guard to tailor the software to the service’s needs.  
The device is capable of withstanding environmental extremes such as high 
temperature and humidity, ocean spray, and constant movement.  
In order to gain access to a database of fingerprints, the US 
Coast Guard partnered with the Department of Homeland Security’s United 
States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program, better known 
as the US-VISIT Program.  The US-VISIT Program uses a database of photos 
and two index finger fingerprints of individuals previously apprehended by border 
and immigration agents.  The database is known as the Automated Biometric 
Identification System (IDENT).  In May, the Coast Guard installed satellite 
technology on several cutters, which gave the agency access to all 90 million 
fingerprints in the IDENT database.
Biometric data consisting of two digital fingerprints and a 
digital photograph of the face and basic biographic information is collected from 
the immigrants by trained, uniformed USCG personnel.  The data is then 
transferred to secure stand-alone laptops on the ships via USB cable and stored 
in encrypted files, which are then sent to US-VISIT as email attachments.  The 
information is automatically erased from the handheld scanners when it is 
                                           
56 Government Computer News, “Agency Award- Coast Guard and DHS, a touch of the finger stems 
the tide”, http://www.gcn.com/print/26_26/45187-1.html.  Last accessed 8 July 2008.
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transferred to the laptop.  It takes approximately two minutes to search all of US-
VISIT’s records.
Figure 26: USCG Use of Fingerprint Scanner
The US-VISIT program wrote software that opens the file, 
sends out a reply that it has been received, and begins the database processes 
where the matches are made.  If there is a match, then the requisite information
is sent back to the Coast Guard command center in San Juan.  The data will then 
be compared to a subset of the IDENT database which includes known and 
suspected terrorists, aggravated felons, previous deportees, and recidivists from 
Caribbean countries.  In the Coast Guard’s application, the command center 
communicates back to the cutter regarding the status of the person and any 
precautions that might need to be taken57 IDENT has proven the feasibility and 
scalability of capturing two prints and successfully identifying individuals with 
greater than 99% accuracy against a current population of 12 million.58 Since all 
illegal migrants are informed that repeat offenders are subject to legal 
                                           
57 FEDTECH, “Biometrics at sea”.  
http://www.fedtechmagazine.com/article.asp?item_id=377&sv=related.  Last accessed 8 July 2008.
58 Department of Homeland Security, “Ident Implementation for  U.S. Visit”, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/US-VISIT_IDENTImplem.pdf.  Last accessed 8 July 2008.
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prosecution, the US Coast Guard has seen a decline in the number of migrant 
interdictions.  In 2005, the number of interdictions was up to 10,000; in 2006, it 
decreased to 7,000.  This measure of effectiveness can be attributed to the 
deterrent of the threat of prosecution.
(5) Proposed Solutions: The biometric solution for the 
purpose of identification and verification can be put together using COTS 
products, such as a fingerprint scanner, digital camera and laptop.  The 
fingerprint biometric is selected here for its low cost and ability to perform the 
verification and identification tasks.  The camera will be used to capture and 
store facial images of screened crew members.  Below is a typical design of a 
self developed solution:






Matching on offsite server – 30 sec
Wireless link back to HQ - 2 sec
Figure 27: Basic Biometric Collection Solution with Sample Processing 
Times
Although this self-developed solution has the advantage of low cost COTS 
products, it is not as ruggedly designed as the USCG biometric device and might 
not be capable of operating in a diverse maritime environment.  Additionally, it 
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might not be as portable as other solutions.  The overall system suitability, 
including but not limited to the reliability, availability, and maintainability will 
increase the overall lifecycle cost.  This solution only provides the fingerprint 
biometric.  It is not as reliable as the iris or retina biometric because its error rate 
is the highest among the three.
IBIS Mobile Identification System:  The IBIS solution is 
provided by L-1 Identity Solutions.  According to L-1 Identity Solutions, this 
solution uses “a modular handheld device that links via encrypted Bluetooth to 
any pre-configured, supported PDA”. Bluetooth operates at a frequency of 2.4 
GHz and the range can vary from 1 to 100 meters depending on the particular 
device.  Facial images of crew members can be captured and stored using the 
camera on the PDA.  Figure 28 shows the IBIS mobile identification system.  
Appendix H includes the full product description from L-1 Identify Solutions.
Figure 28: IBIS Mobile Identification Process
The advantage to this system is that it is portable and flexible in deployment.  
The primary disadvantage is that this solution only provides a fingerprint 
biometric.  It is not as reliable as an iris or retina biometric as its error rate is the 
highest among the three.  The performance of the PDA may not be as good as 
laptop computer.
(6) Hand-held Interagency Identity Detection Equipment 
(HIIDETM): This solution is also provided by L-1 Identity Solutions.  According to 
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L-1 Identity Solutions, “the HIIDETM has an onboard processor and data storage 
capacity” and “utilizes the speed and accuracy of iris identification”.  This device 
also includes a fingerprint scanner.  Below is a picture of the device, the product 
description from L-1 Identity Solutions is attached as Appendix I.
Figure 29: Hand-Held Interagency Identity Detection Equipment
This is an integrated solution which provides both fingerprint biometric and iris 
biometric capability.  This device is also integrated with a face capturing camera, 
where the image can be captured and stored in the database.  It is a very 
portable device and could be easily transported by the boarding team to the 
suspect vessel.  The primary disadvantage to this system is its high initial cost.  
Each system will cost approximately $10,000.
(7) Product Analysis/ Comparison: The three solutions are 
compared based on the following six criteria:
 Cost – The cost involved in the procurement stage.
 Supportability and Maintainability – This deals with all aspects of the 
product beyond the procurement stage.
 Reliability – The ruggedness and suitability of the product for the marine 
environment.
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 Development Time – The product lead time before the solution is 
customized for our needs.  This includes the time needed to interface with 
the communication devices for offline identification purpose.
 Portability – Ease of bringing the product for a boarding operation.  
Products will be judged based on weight, size and form factor (ease of 
carrying).
 Usability – Ease of use.
The result of the comparison is shown in Table 20 below.  The highest rating 
possible for each criterion is 5.
Table 20: Weighting Criteria for Biometric Systems
Self Develop HIIDE IBIS
Cost (~USD1200) 5 (~USD10,000)2 (~USD1800) 5
Supportability & 
Maintainability 2 5 4
Reliability 2 4 4
Development time 2 4 4
Portability 3 5 4









1 4 or more Components; Support from multiple vendors
2 2-3 Components, Support from multiple vendors
3 2-3 Components, Support from single vendor
4 Single Components; Support from multiple vendors
5 Single component; Support from single vendor
Reliability
1 Designed for indoor usage.
2 COTS.  Designed for indoor usage.
3 Designed for outdoor usage.
4 Designed for harsh environment.
5 Mil Specs.  Can be used in harsh environment.
Development Time (Assuming Unlimited Budget and Resource)
1 New Development ~ 48 months
2 Require exhaustive customization.  Estimated Development Time ~24 
months.
3 Require customization.  Estimated Development Time ~12 months
4 Require minimal customization.  Estimated Development Time ~6 months
5 Ready to use OOB.
Portability
1 Four or more Components; Bulky
2 Three Components; Less than 5.0lbs; Medium Sized.
3 Two Components; Less than 2.5lbs; Small Sized.
4 Single Component; Less than 5.0lbs; Medium Sized.
5 Single Component; Less than 2.5lbs; Small Sized;
Usability
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1 Three or more separate interface to operate/ coordinate.
2 -NOT USED-
3 Two separate interface to operate/ coordinate.
4 -NOT USED-
5 Single MMI; Single device to operate/ coordinate.  Ergonomic.
The Hand-held Interagency Identity Detection Equipment stands out in all 
categories.  It is a highly customized product which seems to be most suited for 
our purpose.  Since all features are integrated into a single piece component, it 
makes it highly portable and simplifies spares provisioning.  The all-in-one 
interface is also cleaner and more usable.
(8) Recommendation: There are many types of biometrics; 
the proposed solution is based on a combination of a fingerprint biometric and/or 
iris biometric as they are more suitable for verification and identification 
purposes.  All of the proposed solutions also include the feature of capturing and 
storing of photographs of screened crew members.  The team recommends that 
the boarding team to be equipped with the HIIDETM biometric device.  Despite 
the cost favorably leaning towards the self developed solution, the advantages of 
the HIIDE system are simply too overwhelming.  More importantly, it is the better 
solution for our operational needs.  Since the entire solution is encompassed in 
one product, the advantage of maintainability and supportability point in favor of 
HIIDE in terms of the total cost of ownership.
2. Macroscopic Intelligence
For the purposes of this report macroscopic intelligence collection refers to 
large scale area surveillance.  The purpose of macroscopic intelligence collection 
is to begin to gain some degree of awareness to the locations of all the different 
ships in a given area as well as to gain the maximum amount of information that 
can be discerned from examining the exterior of a vessel.  
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Improvements in macroscopic intelligence collection are characterized by 
both the probability that a given target is detected and the resolution of which 
potentially identifying information can be discerned.  For example, a picture that 
is of such low resolution that the lettering of a ship cannot be read is of less value 
than a picture of resolution sufficient to read the same lettering.  
The challenge in collecting macroscopic intelligence becomes one of 
rapidly detecting all the contacts in a given area with a known probability of 
detection, as well as gathering identifying information about each of these.  In 
this section, criteria for evaluation of surveillance systems is described.  Two 
different surveillance systems were evaluated, and a final score given to the two 
basic systems.
a.  Evaluation Criteria
Evaluation criteria for determining the effectiveness of a given 
surveillance platform were very similar to the criteria for the evaluation of overall 
MIO architectures, as was shown in chapter two of this document.  
(1) Probability of detection:  When evaluating different 
architectures, an overall generic category of “effectiveness” was assigned as the 
number one trait.  In the case of evaluating macroscopic intelligence collection 
platforms, the probability of detection was given the highest consideration.  This 
was given a higher consideration than other categories such as the resolution of 
potentially identifying information, because if a target is detected, then greater 
sensor time can be used to compensate for potentially low resolution identifying 
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  (9.6)
Where in the equation, v is the velocity of the searching platform, W is the width 
of the swath covered, ,d sensorp is the instantaneous probability of detection of a 
given sensor employed on a platform, t is time and A is the overall area being 
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searched.  [1]  The area being searched was assumed to be a 300 x 500 nautical 
mile area as described in the scenario’s section of this report.  The swath width 
was calculated from the geometric height (h) of the mast and radius of the earth’s 
curvature ( 6371eR km ) by equation(9.7). 
22 ed R h h  (9.7)
In the event the surveillance platform was airborne, then an operating altitude 
was assumed.  A timeframe of one day was assumed for all further analysis in 
this section.
Equation (9.6) can be modified to show the cooperative 
effect of multiple identical sensors searching as shown in equation (9.8).  This 
assumes that each sensor is given a non-overlapping segment to search and 
that all area to be searched was assigned to a sensor.
,
1
d sensorv W p t N
A
dp e
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  (9.8)
Assuming an eighty percent probability of detection was 
desired, the number of sensors required to generate this result in one day was 







     (9.9)
(2) Amount of identifying information:  The amount of 
information an analyst can use to specifically identify a detected target depends 
on a variety of different factors.  Moonlit-spectral and RF emissions are also a 
factor in identifying a detected target.  Because no identifying information can be 
gleaned from un-detected targets, this category was given a lower score than the 
probability of detection.  It was given a higher score than any of the other criteria 
considered as it relates directly to the effectiveness of a sensor.
(3) Bandwidth:  If a sensor of some form was able to 
detect a target and collect identifying information on the same target, this would 
be useless unless it could transmit the information to a platform capable of either 
retransmitting or acting on the information.
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(4) Survivability:  A sensor that was intended to maintain 
a large scale macroscopic view of a large area needs to be able to survive 
weather as well as any likely enemy action.  If a sensors delicacy or susceptibility 
to attack causes it to break (or be attacked), then it will not be able to detect or 
identify targets.   
(5) Cost:  If a sensor is relatively inexpensive, then a 
large number of them can be purchased and employed with relative impunity.  
This criterion has to be given equal weight to survivability.  If a large number of 
inexpensive yet easily-attacked sensors can produce equivalent surveillance to 
one large (yet expensive) sensor, then the performances of both sensors will be 
equivalent.  The survivability/cost tradeoff is given less consideration than the 
actual ability of a sensor to perform its mission independent of it being attacked 
or funded.  Table 20 identifies the relative weights given to each of the sensors.
Probability of Detection 10




Table 21:  Relative weights for comparing macroscopic surveillance 
platforms
b. Robotic Sailboat
The robotic sailboat or “Autonomous Unmanned Surface Vessel 
(AUSV)” as manufactured by Harbor Wing Technologies, Inc is the principle form 
of an autonomous surface vehicle considered in this report.  Appendix H contains 
excerpts from a briefing generated by Harbor Wing Technologies for use in this 
report.
The purpose of considering the robotic sailboat is to answer the 
macroscopic aspects of the “collect maritime intelligence” requirement of the 
original problem.  
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 (1) Probability of detection - 1:  With a mast height of 
sixty meters, the resultant horizon distance is (W) 14.9 nautical miles (nm).  The 
craft moves at a velocity of five to seven knots (depending on weather 
conditions).  For this analysis, seven knots is assumed.  As the description of the 
robotic sailboat’s camera suggests that it is very high resolution, a very generous
sensor probability of detection of 100% is assigned.  In order to cover the larger 
area defined in the scenarios, 97 sailboats are required.  The very low probability 
that a robotic sailboat will be able to move around enough to cover and 
effectively search enough of an area to find a target of interest results in a score 
of one (out of ten) being assigned to this category.  While recognizing that this 
gratuitous number of robotic sailboats is dependent on comparisons of random 
search areas, it is important to note that the relative orders of magnitude required 
to obtain a satisfactory result.  
(2) Amount of identifying information - 6:  Assuming a 
target moves within the detection range of the sailboat, it is assumed that for the 
length of time the sailboat will be in range of its target that the sailboat will be 
able to collect a good deal of information as can be observed from near the 
waterline.  It will not be able to generate overhead imagery of a target like an 
aircraft could.  Given the relative speed between a slow moving sailboat with 
limited maneuverability and a merchant vessel (which is likely going twice as 
fast), the robotic sailboat will only be able to collect video of one side of the 
detected vessel.
(3) Bandwidth - 2:  In order to utilize any of the 
information obtained by the robotic sailboat, the information must be transmitted 
to a platform that is either capable of retransmitting it, or a platform that is 
capable of independently acting on the information.  Since the horizon distance 
for the robotic sailboat is only 14.9 nm, the odds of a unit capable of acting on the 
intelligence being present within the line of sight communications range of the 
robotic sailboat is very small.  Therefore, the robotic sailboat will have to transmit 
the communication to a satellite for further relay onwards to a unit that can relay 
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the information or otherwise directly act on it.  The free space path loss between 
the satellite and the robotic sailboat will severely diminish the link margin.  In 
order to get an equivalent degree of bandwidth, a large gain on an antenna will 
be required.  Since the form-factor of the sailboat is not conducive to large dishes 
(approximately six feet) that are gyro stabilized and able to communicate with a 
geostationary satellite, it is unlikely that the sailboat will be able to get sufficient 
bandwidth to relay the amount of information it could collect on detected targets.  
Some information could be transmitted using omni-directional satellite antennae; 
however, streaming video will be impossible.
(4) Survivability -1:  The robotic sailboat is weakest in this 
area.  Although its top speed is seven knots (in good winds), in the absence of 
winds, the sailboat is immobile.  Should the sailboat be operating in a densely 
packed shipping channel, the sailboat will be unable to maneuver to avoid 
oncoming traffic and could very easily be destroyed by merchant traffic.  
Furthermore, the sailboat is defenseless from the hostilities of either nation states 
or individuals acting out of an anti-American malice.  Given that it is solar 
powered and has large exposed surfaces, automatic weapons fire from an AK-47 
would be severely damaging.  Lastly, in addition to being defenseless, the 
sailboat has inadequate speed to escape a given threat.   
(5) Cost - 1:  The robotic sailboat costs $2.2 million 
(2008) dollars each as quoted by Harbor Wing Technologies, Inc.
c. Generic UAV
(1) Probability of detection - 7:  If it is assumed that a 
UAV can travel one hundred knots at an altitude of one thousand feet and have a 
fifty percent chance of detecting a target on the ground, then fourteen UAVs are 
sufficient to conduct a random search of the same area described for the robotic 
sailboat in a twenty four hour time period.  As this is seven times more efficient 
than the robotic sailboat, a score of seven is assigned.
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(2) Amount of identifying information - 10:  The UAV has 
the capability to maneuver to see all sides (including the top) of a detected target.  
As it moves relatively fast, it can revisit frequently.  It has the option to fly by 
more frequently to get closer to a target as the velocity of a UAV is likely many 
times greater than the velocity of any given target vessel.    
(3) Bandwidth - 8:  Though the UAV’s payload is more 
constrained than the robotic sailboat, the UAV has the option to climb to a higher 
altitude at which point its footprint is significantly larger.  Once at altitude, the 
probability that a US asset capable of either relaying the UAV’s information or 
directly acting on it is substantially larger (especially considering that the UAV 
was probably launched from the ship).  
(4) Survivability – 10:  The UAV is capable of 
maneuvering away from threats as it will move significantly faster than any 
surface vessel.  Its relatively small size will make it substantially more difficult to 
shoot using crew-served weapons than is the case for the robotic sailboat.
(5) Cost - 10:  UAVs can be as inexpensive as $100,000
d. Comparison
The scores and resultant values of a generic UAV and a robotic 
sailboat are detailed in Table 22.
Weight Sailboat UAV
Probability of Detection 10 1 7
Amount of Information 7.5 6 10
Bandwidth 5 2 8
Survivability 2.5 1 10
Cost 2.5 1 10
Total 27.5
2.6 8.6
Table 22:  Comparison of scores and weighted results
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The sharp contrast in scores shows that the robotic sailboat is a 
fundamentally flawed paradigm in conducting large scale area surveillance.  
UAV’s of any form will always be greatly superior as a direct result of their 
relative velocities, ability to maneuver, and relatively low cost. 
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b. Non-Networked Computer Exploitation
Non-networked computer exploitation will generally involve two
steps: The first step involves gaining access to the system to access the file 
system, and the second to carry out the exploitation, which is the search for the 
information of interest.
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The first step will be trivial if the crew of the ship provides the 
boarding team with an account on the system.  Without it, if the boarding team 
has the required rights within the legal limits of the law, they may attempt to 
access the system file directories via an auxiliary boot-up disk.  The hard disk 
might have to be removed for cloning or for mounting on a separate system for 
analysis.
The second step involves searching the system for relevant 
information.  This step can prove to be extremely difficult and time consuming.  If 
the data is encrypted, assuming the crew of the ship does not provide the 
decryption key, cracking the key or breaking the algorithm is required to get to 
the files.  He or she will also need to define a set of search criteria.  In addition, 
quoting Professor Garfinkel’s article on DOcument & Media EXploitation 
(DOMEX), the work of deep searching will probably involve more than pure 
exploring and opening discovered files on the system as that may miss a big deal 
of information.  On top of deep searching, analysis and verification of the findings
may be required.
As evidenced by these and countless other cases, digital 
documents and storage devices hold the key to many ongoing 
military and criminal investigations.  The most straightforward 
approach to using these media and documents is to explore them 
with ordinary tools—open the word files with Microsoft Word, view 
the Web pages with Internet Explorer, and so on.
Although this straightforward approach is easy to understand, it can 
miss a lot.  Deleted and invisible files can be made visible using 
basic forensic tools.  Programs called carvers can locate 
information that is not even a complete file and turn it into a form 
that can be readily processed.  Detailed examination of e-mail 
headers and log files can reveal where a computer was used and 
other computers with which it came into contact.  Linguistic tools 
can discover multiple documents that refer to the same individuals, 
even though names in the different documents have different 
spellings and are in different human languages.  Data-mining 
techniques such as crossdrive analysis can reconstruct social 
networks—automatically determining, for example, if the 
computer’s previous user was in contact with known terrorists.  This 
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sort of advanced analysis is called DOMEX, the intelligence 
practice of document and media exploitation.
In summary, it is difficult to gauge the time needed for the 
exploitation as it is dependant on a myriad of factors: State of system to exploit 
(OS flavor, security state); State of information (encrypted, non-encrypted); 
Skill/Experience of Forensic Expert; Cooperation of ship crew; Depth of 
exploitation (Pure surface search for documents or going deep, DOcumentation 
& Media EXploitation (DOMEX))
There is also a chance factor involved. Analysis of the retrieved 
information will take time and effort and the entire exploitation process may take 
from a couple of hours up to a few weeks. The time needed is unpredictable and 
there is high chance that the work may not be completed within a short time.  
Time is certainly required for thorough analysis.  DOMEX is also a new field and 
few people can judge how successful the technique is or will be, but it certainly 
does not seem to be guaranteed achievable when given a time and resource 
constraint.  This point is again supported by the same article by Prof Garfinkel.
For example, in 2005 the United Kingdom passed legislation 
extending the time that terrorism suspects could be held without 
being charged from 14 days to 90 days, in part because the two 
weeks provided by the previous terrorism law did not provide 
sufficient time for the forensic analysis of a typical hard drive.
The conclusion from the paper was that "a high-confidence 
automated DOMEX system might give police the tools they need to clear a 
suspect in days, if not hours," but automated DOMEX systems are still very much 
under research.  
(1) Skill Set Required: The Forensic Expert will require a 
wide range of skills to have a fair chance of successfully exploiting the system 
including, but not limited to: OS specific skills to hack into the system on board 
(Nobody can predict the OS that will be encountered); cracking encrypted files; 
domain Knowledge for information to be sought; analytic skills; forensic 
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Investigator skills.  He or she will need to be extremely efficient, meticulous and 
be able to perform all that under the constraint of time and tools (probably better 
equipped inside the lab).  
(2) Recommendations: Time required to perform non 
exploitation can widely vary and the skill set required is diverse depending on the 
system on board.  The team feels that it is most optimal to clone the disk in 
question or to seize the system back to perform an offsite analysis in the comfort 
of the forensic lab, and support of more forensic staff.  Only when there is 
intelligence to believe that doing the forensics while on-board is more fruitful 
would the boarding team need to take a forensic expert along to attempt to do 
some hacking in real time.
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The action of boarding a vessel (regardless of level of compliance of the 
target crew), requires the team of people conducting the boarding to assume a 
number of inherent risks.  Although the preponderance of analysis in this report 
considers compliant cases, this analysis is targeted at the conditions where 
compliance becomes variable.  From the outset of an attempt to board, the target 
ship’s crew may be hostile to the idea of boarding or even making efforts to 
prevent the boarding team from getting on board.  Alternatively, the target crew 
could give all appearances of compliance but then change their stance once 
contraband is located.  This report considered a few possible approaches to 
ensuring the crew of the target vessel remains compliant, or that a hostile target 
crew becomes compliant. 
In order to provide the MIO task force with other options beyond the 
destructive firepower that a DDG can bring to bear, unmanned systems are 
considered here.  Proposed unmanned systems will be able to accomplish 
missions such as communications relays, escorting of suspect vessels, a show of 
force (deterrent) as well as warning and disabling fires.  This section attempts to 
analyze the effectiveness of various unmanned systems in performing these 
rolls.
B. APPROACH
As unmanned systems will be used for the first time for MIO, a new 
Concept of Operation (CONOPS) will have to be determined.  Thereafter, 
suitable unmanned systems will be selected based on the overall MIO CONOPs.  
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For the selection processes contained herein, the Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (AHP)59 was used to evaluate all suitable candidates and select the 
optimal platform based on an evaluation of set criteria.  AHP, developed by 
Thomas Saaty, provides a proven, effective means to deal with complex decision 
making and can assist with identifying and weighting selection criteria, analyzing 
the data collected for the criteria and expediting the decision-making process.  It 
is a method to derive ratio scales from paired comparisons.  The ratio scales are 
derived from the principal Eigen vectors and the consistency index is derived 
from the principal Eigen value.  
C. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Conventional boarding operations can have many complications.  Current 
operation requires a manned helicopter to support the boarding crew.  However, 
the endurance for the helicopter is limited and refueling is required back at the 
mother ship.  This may lead to a level one vessel (compliant) turning into a level 
four (opposed) if the target ship’s crew believes that support from the mother ship 
will not be forthcoming.  With unmanned systems, the long endurance capability 
and sensors onboard will allow the mother ship to maintain constant surveillance 
on the boarding operation.  
More importantly, the unmanned systems will provide precision strike 
capability which is potentially lacking from the parent ship.  Precision strike 
capability from a UAV can disable the suspect vessel should the need arise and 
non-lethal weapons can be used by an unmanned surface vehicle (USV) to 
disarm the crew onboard the suspect vessel and to remove any potential lethality 
threats against the boarding crew.  
                                           
59 Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) is an approach to decision making that involves structuring 
multiple choice criteria into a hierarchy, assessing the relative importance of these criteria, comparing 
alternatives for each criterion, and determining an overall ranking of the alternatives.  The concept of AHP 




The functional decomposition is broken down into two categories: 
Intercept and Disable.  
1.  Intercept
The intercept function is composed of: intercept of level one through level 
four adversaries and the protection of the boarding crew.  
2. Disable
The disabling function is composed of: determine weapons availability, 
match weapons to Targets, determine weapons payload, utilize appropriate 
weapon and assess battle damage.  
E. INTERCEPT OPERATION
Upon confirmation of intelligence on the location of the suspect ship the 
boarding vessels will begin the intercept on the suspect ship.  A UAV and a USV 
will be utilized to carry out the intercept while the boarding vessels and crew are 
put out of harm’s way.  The entire intercept operation is elaborated in this
section.  
Rules of Engagement (ROE) are assumed to be completely permissive for 
the purposes of this analysis.  Specifically, shows of force, warning shots, 
employment of non-lethal weapons, and disabling fire against non-compliant 
vessels are all allowed.  In actual employment of said systems, the degree to 
which the features of recommended platforms can be employed may be limited 
based on what the combatant commander sets in the ROEs.   
1. Receipt of Mission Orders
The boarding operation will commence upon the receipt of mission orders.  
The phases involved in the boarding operation include: the deployment of 
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organic intelligence-gathering equipment, approach to the suspect ship, transition 
state during boarding, stand-off fire support and retrograde.  The approach and 
Rules of Engagement (ROE) for levels one through four vary, depending on the 
condition and state of the suspect vessels.
2. Level 1: Compliant
Compliant intercept procedure involves an ISR UAV and an USV.  The 
intercept procedure begins with the launching of the ISR UAV (assuming it is not 
already on station) and the USV.  The ISR UAV and USV will assess the routes 
of approach by the boarding vessel and determine the most appropriate 
embarkation point.  The UAV is to maintain loitering position over the suspect 
ship for the duration of the operation.  
The suspect ship will be requested to prepare for embarkation on both 
sides of the ship in order to allow flexibility to the boarding operation and 
maintain an element of tactical surprise.
The boarding vessel will maintain a safe distance abaft the beam from the 
suspect ship until all information has been confirmed and the suspect vessel is 
prepared to be boarded.  The USV will maintain the same position opposite the 
boarding vessel.
Once the suspect vessel has been confirmed to be compliant, it will be 
escorted to the area in which the physical boarding will take place.  
3. Level 2 and 3: Non-Compliant (Low and High Free Board)
Non-compliant intercept procedure involves an armed UAV, an ISR UAV, 
and an USV.  The ISR UAV, armed UAV and USV are launched at the same 
time.  The suspect vessel’s crew will be requested to assemble in the deck for 
visual mustering by the UAV.  The UAV will assess the routes of approach by the 
boarding vessel and the embarkation point.  The UAV will continue to maintain 
loitering position over the suspect ship for the entire duration of the operation.
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All three unmanned systems will provide a show of force that is intended 
to convey a higher level of seriousness by the boarding team.  In the event of 
continued non-compliance, a verbal warning will be issued in order to establish 
the intent of the suspect vessel.  If the suspect vessel continues the non-
compliant action, the USV will fire a warning shot(s) across the bow of the 
suspect vessel in order to coerce the vessel into a compliant state.
The USV, equipped with both lethal and non-lethal weapons, is to 
maintain a forward position on the suspect vessel in case there is an attempt of 
escape.  In this event, the USV will give the parent ship the option (depending on 
applicable ROEs) to utilize non-lethal or lethal weaponry to prevent or hinder the 
escape of a target vessel.
Information gathered by the unmanned vehicles will be processed and the 
threats will be determined from the information gathered.  The USV will maintain 
an adequate communication linkage back to the parent ship in order to allow for 
timely exploitation of information gathered by the USV.
If compliance is not achieved following warning shots, disabling fire from 
the armed UAV will commence in order to stop the suspect vessel.  If compliance 
is then achieved, the boarding team will approach the suspect vessel from abaft 
the beam and begin the physical act of boarding the suspect vessel.  
After embarkation of the boarding team, both UAVs and USV will remain 
on station to provide air cover, communication relay, and fire support.  
4. Level 4: Opposed
Level four intercepts require the same amount of resources as the level 
two and three scenarios.  There is also a likelihood that a level two or level three 
boarding could develop into a level four boarding.  
The deployments of the UAV and USV will be the same as that described 
for level two and level three intercepts.
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If the suspect ship displays hostile intent and does not change action 
based on a verbal warning, non-disabling warning shots will be fired from the 
USV.
If signs of hostility continue, incapacitating weapons mounted on the UAV 
and USV will be employed to disable the propulsion system of the suspect 
vessel.
Assessment will be made using sensors onboard the unmanned system to 
determine the threat level.  If level one boarding scenario has been achieved, the 
boarding team will commence the boarding procedure.
5. Communications
Due to the boarding teams’ radio system limitations, the unmanned 
system can serve as a communication relay to the mother ship.
Real time intelligence from the UAV will be viewed by the boarding team 
members on the boarding vessel.  The information will be processed and 
simultaneously relayed back to the boarding team.  This information will be 
specific to on-deck activities that could pose a threat to the boarding team 
conducting the search on the suspect vessel.
F. DISABLE
Based on the proposed Concept of Operations, a minimum of one armed 
UAV, one ISR UAV and one USV are needed to support one MIO mission.  
Although guided munitions launched from the parent ship have been considered, 
these munitions do not have the responsiveness and flexibility of guided 
munitions fired from unmanned systems in closer proximity to the target vessel.  
The UAV and USV will have surveillance, identification, force protection, 
targeting, and precision attack capabilities.  The platforms are equipped with 
lethal and/or non-lethal weapons.  Table 23 shows the matrix of the type of 
weapon systems to be carried by the platforms.
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Table 23:  Matrix of Weapon Systems for Platforms
 There are several platforms currently available to the defense market that 
may be suitable for deployment in MIO missions.  This chapter deals with the 
evaluation and selection process for the platforms and selected weapon system 
payloads.   
As discussed in the “approach” section earlier.  The Analytic Hierarchy 
Process was used for determining the platforms and selected weapons system 
payloads.
1. Determine Platforms/Weapon Systems Availability
It is recommended to obtain from the defense market suitable platforms 
that will meet the five year scoping requirement.  It is also recommended to use 
existing weapon systems that can be integrated onto the platform.  However, the 
integration of new weapon systems can still be conducted if the weapon system 
is assessed to be tested, fielded, and operational.     
a. Selection of UAVs
The operational requirements for the UAV platform are as follows:
(1) Conduct surveillance, force protection, targeting and 
precision attack capabilities.
(2) Launch and recovery using vertical take off and landing 
(VTOL).
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(3) Minimum external payload of 100 Kg.
(4) Mission radius not less than 30nm.
Table 24 shows the various UAVs that were studied to determine 
the suitability for deployment.  Several UAVs cannot meet the operational 
requirements due to reason given in the remark column.  Three UAV’s (MQ-8B 
Fire Scout, A160 Hummingbird and Seamos) meet the requirements and were 
selected using AHP.  This process was performed using a commercial software 
known as the Expert Choice.  AHP analysis and technical specifications can be 
found in Appendix K.  




X Limited payload (25 kg)
Hermas X Not VTOL capable
MQ-8B Fire Scout √
Pioneer X Not VTOL capable
Sentry X Not VTOL capable
Seamos √
Vigilant Observer X
Limited payload (8kg), 
short mission radius 
(15+km)
Table 24:  List of UAVs
Figure 30:  MQ-8B Fire Scout (U.S.)
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Figure 31:  A160 Hummingbird (U.S.)
Figure 32:  Seamos UAV (Germany)
The evaluating criteria used in AHP analysis are External Payload 
(weight), Endurance, Capabilities (existing and projected), Interoperability, Ease 
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of Integration and Program Risk.  The description and weighting of the evaluating 
criteria can be found in Appendix K.  
Figure 33:  AHP’s results for UAV Selection
The final UAV selection as described by the global weighted 
evaluation gives the Fire Scout as the best option at 56.7%.
b. Selection of USVs
The operational requirements for the UAV platform are as follows: 
Conduct surveillance, targeting and precision attack capabilities:
(1). Prepare the waterspace for boarding.  
(2). Provide protection for boarding crew.  
(3). Minimum external payload of 1500lbs.
(4). Mission radius not less than 30nm.
Table 3 showed the various USVs that were studied to determine 
the suitability for deployment.  Several USVs cannot meet the operational 
requirements due to reason given in the “Remarks” column in Table 3.  3 USVs 
(Protector, Spartan and Silver Marlin) meet the requirements and were down 
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selected for AHP selection process.  Technical specifications for the three 
platforms can be found in Appendix L.
Platform Selected Not Selected Remarks
Protector (Israel) √
Silver Marlin (Israel) √
Sea Fox (US) X
Limited payload.  
Experimental platform
Sea Owl (US) X
Limited payload.  Jet 
ski chassis
Sentry (UK) X
Limited payload.  
Intended as harbor 
security vehicle.
Spartan (US) √
Rodeur (France) X Limited payload 
Table 25:  List of USVs
Figure 34:  Protector USV (Israel)
Figure 35:  Silver Marlin (Israel)
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Figure 36:  Spartan USV (US)
The evaluating criteria used in AHP analysis are external payload 
(weight), endurance, capabilities (existing + projected), interoperability, ease of 
integration and program risk.  The description and weights of the evaluating 
criteria can be found in Appendix L.  
Figure 37:  AHP’s results for USV Selection
The final USV selection as described by the global weighted 
evaluation gives the Spartan the best option at 56.9%.
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c. External Weapons Payload Selection
The Fire Scout and Spartan platforms shall be equipped with lethal 
and/or non-lethal weapons for the mission.  Lethal weapons are intended to 
intimidate, disable and destroy the intended target while non-lethal weapons are 
intended to temporary incapacitate potential threat persons.  The non-lethal 
weapons offer alternatives to the commander and allow a more proportional 
response to a perceived threat.
To minimize integration efforts and funding, weapon systems that 
are already integrated or planned for integration on the Fire Scout UAV and 
Spartan USV will form the basic payload for the mission.  
d. Lethal Weapons Selection
Currently, the only lethal weapon on the platform is the GAU-17 
Gatling Gun integrated onto the Spartan USV.  However, there are programs on-
going to integrate precision strike weapon on both Fire Scout (Hellfire) and 
Spartan (Hellfire & Javelin).  With sufficient support and funding, the Hellfire and 
Javelin are likely to be ready for operation with the platforms in the next 5 years.    
AGM-114M Hellfire Missile.  There are plans to integrate the 
Hellfire on both the Fire Scout UAV and Spartan USV.  The Hellfire missile can 
be used to engage and destroy the target vessel at standoff range of more than 
8km.  The missile has a semi-active laser seeker and a blast fragment warhead.  
The missile can operate in a co-operative mode where the laser designator does 
not need to be on the launch platform, but can be located several km away.
Javelin Missile.  There are plans to integrate the Javelin missile on 
the Spartan USV.  Similar to the Hellfire, the Javelin is an anti-armor missile 
capable of engaging and destroying the target vessel at standoff range although 
the maximum standoff range for Javelin (2.5km) is shorter than the Hellfire (8km).  
The missile has an imaging infrared seeker, shorter minimum range and lighter in 
weight compared to the Hellfire.  While the Javelin missile would be incapable of 
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destroying a target vessel, its precision strike capability might enable it to be 
guided towards a more vulnerable area of a target ship (i.e., destroying the target 
ship’s rudder or pilot house). 
GAU-17 (7.62mm) Gatling Gun.  The GAU-17 is integrated on the 
Spartan USV.  The gun can be used to fire warning shots and provide covering 
fires for the boarding team when required.  The gun fires 7.62mm ball, tracer or 
Sabot launched armor piercing (SLAP) rounds and the typical engagement range 
for the gun is about 2.2km.  The technical specification can be found in Appendix 
M.  
e. Non-Lethal Weapons Selection
There is no requirement for non-lethal weapon on the Fire Scout 
UAV in the current concept of operations.  Presently, there is also no non-lethal 
weapon integrated on the Spartan USV platform but the following classes of non 
lethal weapons have been considered for deployment on the Spartan USV to 
enhance existing operations: 
Against Platform.  It is recommended that the USV be fitted with the 
MK 11 static running gear engagement system (RGES) against evasive targets.  
The RGES (about 60 ft of line) will deploy the system ahead of the fleeing boat 
from the USV.  When the fleeing vessel runs over it, the RGES will become 
entangled in the propellers disabling it.  
Against Personnel.  Three types of weapons were considered for 
integration with the USV and they are evaluated using AHP:
(1) High Pressure Water Cannon System (WCS).  Water 
cannons are devices that shoot a high-pressure stream of water.  Typically, water 
cannons can deliver a large volume of water, often over dozens of meters / 
hundreds of feet.  WCS provides enough force to restrain an average sized 
human at this distance and are typically used in riot control.
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(2) Remote Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD-R).  LRAD-R is 
a long-range hailing and warning directed acoustic beam device.  Some devices 
project audible, ultrasonic or infrasonic sound frequencies and may cause 
pain/discomfort, nausea, disorientation to personnel.  
(3) Anti-Traction Mobility Denial System (MDS).  The MDS is a 
non-hazardous chemical spray system that spreads a highly slippery, viscous gel 
to inhibit the movement of individuals or vehicles on treated surfaces such as 
asphalt, concrete, grass, and wood.  The gel can be distributed over a wide area 
by a vehicle-mounted system or /and around buildings from a portable unit 
operated by an individual.  
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Figure 38:  MK11 Static RGES
Figure 39:  Water Cannon System
Figure 40:  Mobility Denial System
203
Figure 41:  LRAD-R
The evaluating criteria used in AHP analysis were namely; Ease of 
Integration, Equipment Operating Range, Ease of Operation, Weapon 
Effectiveness and Maintainability.  The description and weights of the evaluating 
criteria can be found in Appendix N.  
Figure 42:  Non-Lethal Weapon Selection
From the AHP evaluation, the LRAD-R is selected as the most 
suitable (52.3%) weapon type to meet the objective for mounting on the USV 
platform.
Manufactured by American Technology Corporation, the LRAD-R is 
highly directional and is able to clearly communicate instructions and warnings 
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well beyond 500 meters.  The system can also transmit powerful deterrent tones 
to influence behavior or determine intent of crew onboard the suspect vessel.  In 
addition, the LRAD-R can be operated remotely enabling system operators to 
respond to security threats from a safe environment.
2. Matching Weapons to Target
Based on the selected weapon systems, the matrix of weapons and 
intended targets are tabulated in Table 26.















Hellfire or Javelin 
(future)
Table 26:  Platform-Weapon-Target Matrix
3. Configuration List








EO/FLIR Systems (Brightstar III)
Laser Range FinderDisabling
Weapon Hellfire Missile (planned)
Table 27:  MQ-8B Fire Scout Configuration
                                           
60 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
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The Spartan USV can be configured with external payloads as listed in 
















Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD)
MK11 Static RGES
Table 28:  Spartan USV Configuration
4. Equipment List
The recommended equipment list for single mission is tabulated below in 
Table 29.
Description Equipment Qty




Hellfire / Javelin (USV) 2





MK11 Static RGES 1
Brightstar III 2
Target Acquisition
Laser Range Finder 3
Others Chemical/Biological Detector 1
Table 29:  Equipment List
5. Assess Battle Damage
The platforms are equipped with both camera and IR systems that 
transmit real-time images back to the mother ship.  The operator on-board the 
mother ship can then assess the damage through information obtained from 




Compatibility study between the DDG 51 - Arleigh Burke Class Aegis 
Guided-Missile Destroyer and MQ-8B Fire Scout will be discussed in this 
chapter.  
2. Description of DDG 51 – Arleigh Burke Class Aegis Guided-
Missile Destroyer
The DDG 51 class is a multi-mission guided missile destroyer designed to 
operate independently, or as a unit of Carrier Strike Groups (CSG), Expeditionary 
Strike Groups (ESG), and Missile Defense Action Groups in multi-threat 
environments that include air, surface, and subsurface threats.  These ships will 
respond to Low Intensity Conflict/Coastal and Littoral Offshore Warfare 
(LIC/CALOW) scenarios as well as open-ocean conflict providing or augmenting 
power projection, forward presence requirements, and escort operations at sea.
Figure 43:  DDG 51 - Arleigh Burke Class Aegis Guided-Missile Destroyer
Several upgrades and modification were made to the DDG 51 and Flight 
IIA was introduced.  Engineers added a helicopter hangar with one anti-
submarine helicopter and one armed attack helicopter to the Destroyer.  
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3. Flight IIA
Introduction of Flight IIA is critical to littoral war fighting effectiveness as it 
includes embarked helicopters (SH-60R), an organic mine-hunting capability and 
the introduction of area theater ballistic missile defense capability to protect near 
coastal air-fields and seaports essential to the flow of forces into theatre in time 
of conflict.
The first 28 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers have a helicopter deck but no 
hanger or embarked helicopters.  Ships in production, such as the Flight IIA,
have landing and hangar facilities for operation of two SH-60Rs.  
Figure 44:  Helicopter Flight Deck
The construction of the helicopter hangar is the most visible change for 
this new generation of AEGIS Destroyers.  Located aft of the after Vertical 
Launching System (VLS), the hangar is large enough to accommodate 2 SH-60F 
helicopters, support equipment, repair shops and store rooms.  Modifications 
were also made for additional crew required for a helicopter detachment to 
deploy with the ship.  
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For the purposes of this analysis, the mission profile is for the 
AEGIS Destroyers to be able to accommodate one SH-60F helicopter and 1 MQ-
8B Fire Scout.  
Figure 45:  Detail Dimension of Helicopter Deck
4. Description of MQ-8B fire Scout
The MQ-8B Fire Scout is a Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle system that provides unprecedented situation 
awareness and precision targeting support for the future.  The MQ-8B Fire Scout 
has the ability to autonomously take off and land on any aviation-capable warship 
and at prepared and unprepared landing zones in proximity to the soldier in 
contact.
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Figure 46:  MQ-8B Fire Scout
Figure 47:  Fire Scout along side a Seahawk
Northrop Grumman has conducted several tests onboard U.S Navy ships
with the Fire Scout and it has demonstrated stability in taking off and landing 
procedure.
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Figure 48:  Fire Scout landing on ship platform
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IX. LOGISTICS 
When operating in a logistically barren environment, there will be a need for a 
continuous flux of parts, equipment and fuel to support an operating force.  Some items 
will be “pushed” into the operational theater on a regular basis, and will include items 
such as consumables and fuel.  Other items will need to be “pulled”, such as spare parts 
or fulfillment of unanticipated needs.  This chapter begins by describing the statistical 
nature of parameters in a logistics system.  Next, the results of modeling and simulation 
work describing the effectiveness of a force at conducting Maritime Interdiction 
Operations (MIO) are described as they related to unavailable assets.  Finally, the two 
analyses were combined in a Monte-Carlo simulation to describe the degradation of an 
Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) at conducting MIO in a logistically barren 
environment, e.g., as the uncertainty in arrival of materiel increases.
A.  MEAN TIME BETWEEN FAILURES AND TIME TO SHIP
Poisson distributions can be thought of as the result of the intersection of a series 
of unfortunate (and unlikely) events.  The rate at which necessary items needed to be 
repaired was assumed to be a Poisson distributed process.  A Poisson process is a 
distribution useful for modeling non-negative integers with a single parameter.  Poisson 










Here,   is the average mean time between failures for an arbitrary part, and time is the 
variable t .  Figure 49 shows the approximate behavior for a Poisson distributed process 
as a response to average mean time between failures.
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Figure 49:  Probability of Failure of a Poisson Distributed Process
After a key component fails (such as an aircraft), it will be necessary to conduct a 
repair to be fully mission capable.  For the purposes of this analysis, repairs that can be 
conducted in a period that is negligible in comparison to the amount of time it would take 
to have a replacement part shipped into a logistically barren environment were not 
considered.  The amount of time taken to ship a replacement part into an operating theater 
was the primary variable of interest.
The amount of time taken to transport a part into an operating theater was 
assumed to be dependent on the geographic distance between the continental United 
States (CONUS) and the logistically barren environment where MIO forces are operating.  
Furthermore, consistent with the reasoning defined in chapter one discussing logistically 
barren environments, the time of arrival for a replacement item cannot be guaranteed.  
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Therefore, a statistical distribution was required to describe the amount of time to move a 
replacement part into theater.  
The statistical distribution of in theater arrival times had several known key 
characteristics.  For instance, there was a minimum amount of time for which to move a 
part into theater as a result of the relative speeds of aircraft and ships.  This fact precludes 
the use of statistical distributions that are defined for negative values of time, such as the 
normal distribution.  Furthermore, the employed statistical distribution must be exactly 
zero for the duration of time between when the replacement part was ordered and when 
the absolute minimum time that the part could arrive in theater.  
One statistical distribution that has this characteristic is the log-normal 
distribution.  Given by equation (9.2), the log-normal distribution was used to model the 
probability of a replacement part arriving in the logistically barren environment.  The key 
variables were analyzed as a function of the average amount of time it takes to move a 
part into theater and the variance on that time.  The values of   and   are parameters of 















The expected value (E) and variance (V) of the statistical distribution are given by 
equations (9.3) and (9.4).  
2
2( )E t e
 (9.3)
 2 22( ) 1V t e e    (9.4)
Conversely, it can be shown that the parameters for a log-normal statistical distribution 
can be calculated given an anticipated expected value and variance.  Equations (9.5) and 
(9.6) give these parameters for the log-normal statistical distribution as a function of a 
given expected value and variance.
  2, ln 1VE V E
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(9.6)
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The log-normal distribution is undefined below zero and requires a shift term to be 
introduced to indicate the absolute minimum amount of time for which a part could 
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Equation (9.7) is a re-expression of equation (9.2) with a term added to shift the time by 
an amount t .  To finish formulating the log-normal distribution as a model for shipment 
of replacement parts into a logistically barren environment, equation (9.7) is rewritten in 
terms of equations (9.5) and (9.6).  
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(9.8)
With these two processes defined as a function of the average time to transport a 
product into theater, the variance on that time, and the mean time between failures part of 
the framework was established for the creation of a Monte-Carlo simulation.
B. MODELING RESULTS
Chapter III of this report identified two basic scenarios that were explored 
in this analysis.  The phase zero scenario was a basic problem of finding a single 
identifiable ship among a crowd of neutral shipping.  Phase one was a series of 
MIOs done by an ESG where the number of ships to board vastly exceeded the 
boarding capacity of the ESG.  Results from Chapter IV showed that in phase 
one, the number of operational aircraft was largely irrelevant to the success of 
the MIO task force.  However, in phase zero, the availability of aircraft proved 
crucial to the success of the MIO mission.
Using the NSS scenario runs delimited in Chapter XI, a logistic regression 
analysis was completed on the Phase 0 analysis with critical factors Number of 
Aircraft sorties, a P-3 Long Range Surveillance craft in the area, and the type of 
short-range aircraft either SH-60 helicopters or VTUAVs.  The graph below in 
Figure 50 shows the results based on the NSS runs.   The P-3 in the scenario 
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was treated as a categorical coded “0” if unavailable and “1” if available, since 
the P-3 relieves on station and is available for 24 hours.  The Helo or UAV 
variable is also binary coded “0” for helo and “1” for UAV in the Equation in F.  
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The graph and equation show that the P-3 and UAV require fewer sorties to find 
the single target.  The Red Line in Figure 50 shows the 90% mission success intercept.  
The Logistic Regression equation above satisfies the Pearson Chi-Square Test for 
Significance of Regression and was based on 1064 NSS scenario runs.   The simulation 
varied the number of aircraft sorties by prohibiting some aircraft from launching due to 
mechanical failures, which gives the data a degree of dispersion unlike the ship 
regression where the ships must be integer values in small range.  
C. LOGISTICS IMPACTS ON PHASE ZERO OPERATIONS 
The goal of the numeric logistics simulation shown in Figure 51 was to 
investigate the correlation between the effect that the parameters described in 
part A (E, V, and t ) have on the probability of success of a MIO mission.  This 
numeric logistics simulation is initialized by assuming a maximum number of 
operational aircraft available.  For any given unit of time (e.g., day) in this 
simulation, the number of active aircraft generate a score for success of the MIO 
task force.  The scoring was done in accordance with equation (9.9) and 
accumulated for every day of an operation over the course of a year.
Aircraft, in this simulation operated continuously for a period determined 
by the Poisson distributed random variable .  Poisson distributed random 
numbers were used to simulate this mean time between failures.  After an aircraft 
operated for the duration of the mean time between failures (and thereby 
accumulated success points for the MIO task force), the aircraft is non-mission
capable.  It will remain in a failed state (and therefore not accumulate any 
success points) for a log-normally distributed amount of time.  The parameters of 
the log-normal distribution (E, V, and t ) was used to generate random numbers 
with this distribution.
MathCad version 13 was used to develop this simulation.  MathCad was 
the ideal choice of language as it allowed for the expression of complex 
mathematical algorithms with minimal amount of coding.  The complete source 
for a single logistics simulation run is shown in Figure 51.  
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Figure 51:  MathCad Source Code for a Single Simulation run
In this simulation, the function ‘rpois’ generated random numbers with a 
Poisson distribution of  .  The function ‘rlnorm’ was used to generate log-
normally distributed random variables with parameters of   and  .  The 
resultant value returned by ‘rlnorm’ was then shifted by some amount, t , to 
compensate for the minimum amount of time necessary to transport a needed 
part into theater.  The simulation program shown in Figure 51 was a time-step 
program and was not a discrete event as evidenced by the ‘for’ loop that runs 
from a starting value of t=0 up to t=T where t represents time, and T represents 
the entire length of time for the simulation to run.    and   were functions of E 
and V in this case, where E and V were the expected values of the distribution 
and variance, respectively.  The functions for   and   were given by equations 
(9.5) and (9.6).  N was the number of aircraft used in the simulation.  Lower case 
‘n’ represents the number of aircraft active at any instance of time.  The array 
called “scores” is the values of equation (9.9).  The value retrieved from this array 
is multiplied by four in order to account for the assumption that each operational 
aircraft can generate four sorties per day.  The total score for each run is then 
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divided by 365 in order to generate an average probability of success over a year 
for a given MIO campaign. 
Due to the research nature of this analysis, the source code of Figure 51
was parameterized by all the key performance parameters of a logistics system.  
The last passed parameter was a function called “scoring”.  This function is 
passed as a parameter.  For the purposes of this discussion, the scoring function 
is shown in equation (9.9).
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, this simulation showed the 
effectiveness of a MIO task force as a function of the key performance 
parameters of a logistic system.  The program detailed in Figure 51 was the core 
of this simulation.  In order to determine the value (in terms of cumulative daily 
effectiveness) of the MIO task force, the program of Figure 51 was run for one-
thousand iterations at each selected value of input parameters.
To evaluate equation, all variables were set to arbitrary but fixed values.  
The mean time between failures ( ) was set to ten days.  The expected value 
(E) of the log-normal distribution was set to fifteen days.  The variance was set to 
two days.  The minimum time to receive a replacement part in the logistically 
barren environment ( t ) was assumed to be ten days, with no variability in time.  
Four helicopters were assumed (N=4) and 365 days was assumed to be the 
length of time for which to run this simulation.
In order to see the effect on the MIO task force’s ability to do phase zero 
operations, simulations were run for values of t  ranging from ten to one-
hundred in increments of ten days.  As is shown in Figure 52, there is a sharp 
degradation of performance as the operating environment becomes increasingly 
barren.
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Figure 52:   MIO Effectiveness as Re-supply Distance Increases
By only increasing the minimum amount of time to transport a part into 
theater, the supply line is assumed to be the same, but just longer.  This 
assumption neglects the fact that with each logistics node (airport, seaport, 
warehouse, etc), the probability for a delay inducing error increases.  In order to 
compensate for this, both the expected value and variance of the log-normal 
distribution are increased equally with increasing t .  This added condition 
models a lengthening and increasingly imperfect supply line.  A base expected 
value of ten days was used and increased by the same amount that t  is 
increased.  The initial variances started at two days, and were increased by the 
same amount for each iteration. 
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Logistics Degrading with Length















Figure 53:  MIO Effectiveness as Distance from Re-supply Increases
Lastly, the mean time between failures ( ) is increased while E, V and t
are held constant at ten, two and ten days, respectively.  Here,   was increased 
by factors of ten as in previous runs.



















Figure 54:  MIO Effectiveness as a Function of
221
D. CONCLUSIONS
Increasing the mean time between failures has a diminishing effect as the 
time it takes for an aircraft to fail approaches that of the duration of the MIO 
mission.  For small values of aircraft mean time between failures, a small 
improvement in aircraft availability increases the overall effectiveness by a 
disproportionally greater amount of time.
For a “pull” type logistics system where major aircraft repairs require parts 
to be shipped into the logistically barren environment, the degradation of a MIO 
mission will occur most significantly if the required part is not moved into theater 
in a relatively small amount of time.  If the required part fails to make it into the 
required theater early in the process, the degradation to the mission is 
statistically non-linear and less affected.  As a result, anticipating equipment 
failures, conducting preventative maintenance and shipping parts into theater 
before they are needed (as would be the case with high failure rate items) will 
produce a positive effect on mission readiness.
Overall, a small improvement in the mean time between failures has a 
greater effect on the phase zero mission performance than does an improvement 
in the logistics pipeline.  In short, the analysis shown here shows that it is 
statistically preferred to have a few well maintained aircraft that have a lengthy 
mean time between failures than it is to have aircraft that break frequently but 
can get replacement parts easily.  Fiscal resources are better spent making more 
reliable aircraft than they are in improving the supporting logistics. 
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Cost Estimation is essentially the process whereby the collection and 
analysis of historical data is accomplished by one of four methodologies: 
parametric, analogy, engineering build-up, or quantitative models (techniques, 
tools and databases) to predict the future cost of an item, product, program, or 
task.  All cost estimates are normalized (inflation-adjusted) on information to 
2008 dollars.  This chapter outlines the cost estimates that were made to support 
MIO during the first thirty days of operations.  In some instances, these costs 
included the acquisition of MIO specific materiel that was amortized over the 
lifecycle of the equipment.  Additionally, by using assumptions based on usage 
rates and expert opinion (i.e., the methodology of analogy) regarding operations 
and support (O & S) costs, the second thirty-day cost estimate was estimated.
The purpose of cost estimation was to allow the translation of system and 
functional requirements associated with programs, projects and MIO processes 
into budgetary requirements.
Numerous types of data were used for cost estimation, including (1) 
historical costs, and labor costs for cost data; (2) performance metrics, physical 
characteristics, technology descriptors, and operational environment for technical 
and operational data; and (3) production quantities and rates, design changes, 
and quantities produced for manufacturing data.  The two primary sources of 
data for the cost estimates were from open sources and interviews of ‘experts’61.
                                           
61 The mode of seeking advice from Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) has been used in some of the 
cost estimation. 
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1. Approach to Cost Estimation
The seven-step approach taken for the project’s cost estimation 
was as follows:
(i) Logistics requirements were gathered from the respective functional 
areas associated with Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO).  
(ii) Estimation of the quantity required was then taken from underlying 
assumptions, experiential inputs, open source data, and the generated 
CONOPS.  
(iii)  The functional requirements of a MIO were converted to a MIO work 
breakdown structure (WBS) to capture WBS level-two cost estimates that 
covered Operations, Maneuver, Search, Boarding and Communications.
(iv)Unit costs were determined to be in or out of scope; with in-scope 
estimates subsequently assigned to each of the functional logistics 
requirements.
(v) Cost estimating methodologies were selected to consider the lifecycle 
phases of a MIO and materiel as well as the availability of source data.  Of 
the four cost estimating methodologies, primary emphasis was placed on 
engineering build-up, supplemented to a lesser extent by analogy, 
parametric, and modeling. 
(vi)Data were gathered and normalized by adjusting for inflation to the 
baseline year of constant FY08 dollars.
(vii) Point estimates were then developed and reported in this chapter. 
2. Assumptions
The following assumptions were made to obtain cost estimates that 
were both realistic and applicable to the study of MIO in a logistically 
barren environment:
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 (i) Duration of Estimates. In order to amortize the costs of materiel over a 
sizeable overall quantity, it was assumed there would be (1) fifty MIOs
within as given period of thirty days of operation and (2) lifecycle issues 
were described in terms of multiple years.  The cost estimates were then 
taken over the first thirty days of operation.
(ii) Recurrent Versus Non-Recurrent Cost. Recurrent Costs during the 
Operations and Support (O & S) phase for most equipment was assumed 
to be greater than the initial procurement cost (Non-Recurrent), since the 
O & S phase lasts until the equipment is disposed.  The open source data 
for these operating costs reflected commercial best pricing and not the 
Navy-burdened real costs.  In a few instances, reliance on expert opinion 
provided the basis for estimating costs of some disposable items (e.g., 
latex gloves, etc.).  
Due to the elaborately complex nature of determining the cost of a 
vessel (which is essentially a ‘sunk’ cost given the project timeframe of 
2013-2014), only the operation and support costs for vessels and unit 
level maintenance costs were considered.  
(iii) Fiscal Year Tabulation. Cost estimates were calculated in the fiscal 
year of 2008 (FY08$). 
B. ESTIMATION FOR OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
1.  Operations - Ships
All cost information for operating ships was taken from Excel data sheets 
provided by the Navy Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs 
(VAMOSC) management information system.  The MIO function ‘Maneuver’ 
included the components that comprise the Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG).  
As outlined in the Concept of Operations, the ESG was comprised of the 
following U.S. Navy assets:  (1) LHD; (1) LPD; (1) LSD; and (1) CG.  The number 
of DDG(s) varied depending on the phase of operations.  Cost estimates for the 
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P-3C and SH-60B were also included in this section.  The number of aircraft was 
dependent on the phase of operation.
Cost estimates for the LHD were based on the WASP (LHD 1) class ship; 
beginning with the WASP (LHD 1) and ending with IWO JIMA (LHD 7).  These 
estimates consisted of costs attributed in FY07 based on entries by hull number.  
For each hull the total operating cost was calculated by summing the Direct Unit 
Cost and the Intermediate Maintenance Cost.  Direct Unit Cost consisted of the 
following sub-categories:  Personnel, Unit Level Consumption, and Purchased 
Services.  Intermediate Maintenance Costs were comprised of Intermediate 
Maintenance - Labor, Intermediate Maintenance - Material, and Commercial 
Industrial Services/Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantify Contracts.  Not included 
were costs associated with Maintenance and Modernization. 
The estimated total operating cost for each LHD was calculated using the 
following equation:   
Direct Unit Cost + Intermediate Maintenance Cost = Total Operating Cost (FY07) 
The average operating cost was then calculated using the equation:
Total Operating Cost (Annual)
= Annual Average Cost per ship
Total Number of Ships
30 days
Average Cost for First Thirty Days of Operations = Annual Average Cost per ship * 
365 days
Dividing the Average Cost per ship by 365, gives the average operating cost per 
day; finally, in order to calculate the cost to operate (1) LHD per thirty-days, the 
Average Cost per ship was multiplied by 30.  
Cost estimates for the LPD were based on the SAN ANTONIO (LPD 17) 
class ship; beginning with the SAN ANTONIO (LPD 17) and ending with NEW 
ORLEANS (LPD 18).  Estimates were based only on these ships for the following 
two reasons:  Firstly, each of the currently employed Austin Class LPD(s) (LPD 7 
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through LPD 15) are expected to be decommissioned no later than 2015, which 
is approximately the timeframe of this project’s execution.  Secondly, year 2007 
operating cost information was available for only the two newest SAN ANTONIO 
Class LPD(s), hull numbers17 and 18.  
Identical to the procedure used previously to estimate the cost information 
for the LHD, data for the LPD was also extracted from the VAMOSC data sheets 
and used to calculate the total operating costs, average cost per ship, and 
ultimately the cost to operate one LPD for thirty-days.  
Cost estimates for the LSD were an average based on the WHIDBEY 
ISLAND (LSD 41) class ship and the HARPERS FERRY (LSD 49) class ship.  
The same procedures and equations were used to calculate the cost to operate 
one LSD for thirty-days.  
Similarly, data for the TICONDEROGA Class (CG 47) was also taken from 
the VAMOSC data sheets.  Beginning with Baseline two ships, estimates 
included hull numbers 52 through 73.  The cost to operate one CG for thirty-days 
was also calculated.  
Data for the DDG 51 Class (Flt IIA) was taken from the VAMOSC data 
sheets outlining O&S cost and counts, and consisted of costs associated with 
year 2007 operating costs based on hull numbers 79 through 101.  The same 
equations were used to calculate the total operating costs, average cost per ship, 
and ultimately the cost to operate one DDG (Flt IIA) for thirty-days.  
228
2.  Operations – Aircraft
As outlined in the Concept of Operations, the P-3C and the SH-60B were 
elements of the Maritime Interdiction Operation.  Cost estimates for the P-3C 
were based on the data taken from VAMOSC.  For each aircraft, the total 
operating cost was calculated by summing the Mission Personnel, Unit Level 
Consumption, Intermediate Maintenance, Contractor Support, Sustaining 
Support and Indirect Support.  Not included were costs associated with Depot 
Maintenance. 
The total estimated operating cost for (33) P-3C during FY07 was 
calculated using the following equation:
Mission Personnel + Unit Level Consumption + Intermediate Maintenance 
+ Contractor Support + Sustaining Support + Indirect Support = Total Operating 
Cost
Using the above total operating cost per 154 aircraft62, the operating cost per 
aircraft was then calculated using the equation:
154
TotalOperatingCost
Cost Per P-3C per year
Dividing the Average Cost per aircraft by 365, yields the average operating cost 
per day; multiplying the operating cost per day by 30 calculates the cost to 
operate (1) P-3C per thirty-days.  From this calculation, the cost to operate one 
squadron of P-3C aircraft was estimated and shown in Table 1.
Using the same data source, procedure and equations, cost estimates 
were calculated for the SH-60B (145 aircraft were used in the denominator).
                                           
62 VAMOSC Data Sheet (Aviation)
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C. ESTIMATES
The estimates presented in the following tables outlined the cost estimates 
for each of the functional areas of MIO.  Estimates were also made for the 
operations of two, six and ten ships for the first 30 days and the subsequent 30 
days.  The estimated cost for each MIO totaled USD$22,000 per, for a two-ship 
operation.  The top three cost drivers for each of the periods were also analyzed, 
as depicted in Figure 55.  The relative cost estimates for the two periods (first 30 
days and next 30 days) with the employment of two, six and ten ships is depicted 
in Figure 56.
Top Three Contributors for 2 
Ships
Top Three Contributors for 6 
Ships























1 Maneuver Ship O&S 1 Maneuver Ship O&S 1 Ship O&S Ship O&S
2 Ship O&S Maneuver 2 Ship O&S Maneuver 2 Maneuver Maneuver
3 Boarding Search 3 Boarding Search 3 Boarding Search
Figure 55: Cost Drivers in Each Period
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Figure 56:  Cost Estimates for Variable Number of Ships for Two Periods
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Unit Cost/per year 
Cost 
for First 30 days
Total Cost for First 30 
days
Reference
LHD 1  $       105,576,756  $           8,677,542  $           8,677,542
VAMOSC Data Sheet (Ships)
www.navyvamosc.com
LPD 1  $    28,333,792  $           2,368,365  $           2,368,365
VAMOSC Data Sheet (Ships)
www.navyvamosc.com
LSD 1  $    33,312,830  $           2,738,041  $           2,738,041
VAMOSC Data Sheet (Ships)
www.navyvamosc.com
CG 1  $    43,772,167  $           3,597,712  $           3,597,712




2  $    34,340,580  $           2,822,513  $           5,645,026




consists of 2 
aircraft
6  $      3,839,498  $             315,575  $           1,893,451





is comprised of 
9  aircraft
9  $      8,026,334  $             659,698  $           5,937,288
VAMOSC Data Sheet 
(Aviation)
www.navyvamosc.com

















1 97,330,074$                 93,182,249$         765,547$               3,382,278$         97,330,074$            
2 113,151,037$               106,636,185$       2,871,260$            3,643,593$         113,151,037$          
3 104,613,129$               99,301,249$         1,918,578$            3,393,302$         104,613,129$          
4 116,376,702$               112,122,433$       717,976$               3,536,293$         116,376,702$          
5 106,941,747$               103,259,579$       214,810$               3,467,358$         106,941,747$          
6 113,777,530$               109,854,040$       255,643$               3,667,847$         113,777,530$          
7 86,847,071$                 81,287,748$         2,354,222$            3,205,101$         86,847,071$            
Total # of Ships 7 105,576,756$               average cost per 365 days
289,251$                     per day
8,677,542$               per 30 days Cost per day * 30 days
Average Cost per year 1 Ship / 365 days



















17 29,333,792$                 27,306,844$         840,786$               1,186,161$         29,333,792$            
18 28,296,421$                 27,038,398$         75,836$                 1,182,188$         28,296,421$            
Total # of Ships 2
28,815,106$                 average cost per 365 days
78,945$                       per day
2,368,365$               per 30 days
Average Cost for 1 ship per year / 365 days
Cost per day * 30 days



















49 34,234,783.61$            30,299,954$         2,896,343$            1,038,487$         34,234,784$            
50 32,680,871.92$            31,097,710$         601,559$               981,603$            32,680,872$            
51 35,583,459.50$            30,399,596$         4,187,626$            996,237$            35,583,459$            
52 30,752,205.28$            29,088,272$         546,390$               1,117,543$         30,752,205$            
Total # of Ships 4
33,312,830$                 Average cost per 365 days
91,268$                       per day
2,738,041$               per 30 days Cost per day * 30 days
Average Cost for 1 ship per year / 365 days



















52 45,589,681$                 43,313,684$         921,735$               1,354,261$         45,589,681$            
53 36,383,732$                 33,931,209$         846,091$               1,606,433$         36,383,732$            
54 52,153,025$                 49,969,211$         897,856$               1,285,958$         52,153,025$            
55 31,887,859$                 29,712,187$         1,050,695$            1,124,977$         31,887,859$            
56 35,617,106$                 33,828,371$         682,233$               1,106,502$         35,617,106$            
57 42,641,764$                 40,103,972$         1,007,999$            1,529,793$         42,641,764$            
58 37,856,737$                 33,719,220$         2,960,097$            1,177,420$         37,856,737$            
59 53,280,622$                 50,352,155$         1,473,336$            1,455,131$         53,280,622$            
60 55,580,840$                 38,217,390$         16,322,452$          1,040,998$         55,580,840$            
61 41,033,282$                 39,122,519$         892,906$               1,017,857$         41,033,282$            
62 34,519,968$                 31,287,502$         1,367,653$            1,864,812$         34,519,968$            
63 49,330,446$                 46,233,068$         2,001,334$            1,096,045$         49,330,446$            
64 40,055,115$                 37,125,850$         1,850,997$            1,078,268$         40,055,115$            
65 50,045,147$                 48,661,933$         313,189$               1,070,025$         50,045,147$            
66 36,653,537$                 34,524,343$         1,034,160$            1,095,033$         36,653,537$            
67 48,515,942$                 40,315,085$         7,141,695$            1,059,162$         48,515,942$            
68 50,629,654$                 44,708,676$         4,836,038$            1,084,940$         50,629,654$            
69 39,489,761$                 37,505,822$         931,512$               1,052,428$         39,489,761$            
70 68,232,245$                 66,615,446$         514,695$               1,102,104$         68,232,245$            
71 29,309,112$                 27,076,500$         969,463$               1,263,149$         29,309,112$            
72 42,906,527$                 41,546,489$         296,728$               1,063,310$         42,906,527$            
73 41,275,572$                 38,916,617$         1,141,958$            1,216,997$         41,275,572$            
Total # of Ships 22
43,772,167$                 Average cost per 365 days
119,924$                     per day
3,597,712$               per 30 days Cost per day * 30 days
Average Cost for 1 ship per year / 365 days
Average cost per year for 1 Ship( )
22
TotalOperatingCost eachShip 















79 29,930,858$                 28,285,416$        757,076$          888,365$             29,930,858$            
80 37,933,995$                 35,227,859$        1,793,667$       912,469$             37,933,995$            
81 30,801,266$                 29,042,820$        836,292$          922,154$             30,801,266$            
82 39,909,128$                 35,915,218$        3,046,219$       947,691$             39,909,128$            
83 40,508,925$                 38,453,407$        621,168$          1,434,350$          40,508,925$            
84 31,201,652$                 29,447,303$        778,982$          975,367$             31,201,652$            
85 33,473,390$                 31,892,291$        459,392$          1,121,707$          33,473,390$            
86 30,253,849$                 28,417,650$        779,138$          1,057,060$          30,253,849$            
87 36,272,467$                 34,801,797$        514,149$          956,522$             36,272,467$            
88 42,744,983$                 41,262,881$        379,352$          1,102,751$          42,744,983$            
89 38,817,679$                 36,346,163$        1,532,875$       938,641$             38,817,679$            
90 46,158,888$                 44,893,382$        365,303$          900,202$             46,158,888$            
91 39,567,401$                 38,331,709$        277,619$          958,073$             39,567,401$            
92 28,954,345$                 26,678,588$        1,232,401$       1,043,356$          28,954,345$            
93 44,828,738$                 43,681,512$        226,952$          920,274$             44,828,738$            
94 35,784,920$                 34,704,809$        179,391$          900,720$             35,784,920$            
95 34,087,495$                 32,616,834$        567,696$          902,965$             34,087,495$            
96 34,212,755$                 32,919,278$        389,811$          903,666$             34,212,755$            
97 33,336,285$                 31,783,023$        396,990$          1,156,272$          33,336,285$            
98 32,140,327$                 30,992,669$        211,174$          936,484$             32,140,327$            
99 19,940,879$                 18,961,457$        90,663$            888,758$             19,940,879$            
100 23,890,569$                 22,886,405$        221$                 1,003,944$          23,890,569$            
101 25,082,544$                 24,188,219$        37,488$            856,837$             25,082,544$            
Total # of Ships 23
34,340,580$                 Average cost per 365 days
94,084$                        per day
2,822,513$               per 30 days Cost per day * 30 days
Average Cost for 1 ship per year / 365 days




Table 35:  30 Day Operating Cost for DDG
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P-3C
















Total Aircraft 154 1,236,055,542.00$       Cost per year for 154 aircraft 428,339,561$    450,667,895$ 85,289,866$ 3,665,278$  253,383,308$ 14,709,634$  1,236,055,542$   
8,026,334.69$              Cost per year for 1 aircraft
8,026,334.69$              per 365 days
21,989.96$                   per day
659,698.74$             per 30 days
SH-60B
















Total Aircraft 145 556,727,233.00$          Cost per year for 145 aircraft 239,940,779$    233,685,652$ 44,558,994$ 5,569,252$  28,948,709$  4,023,847$    556,727,233$      
3,839,498.16$              Cost per year for 1 aircraft
3,839,498.16$              per 365 days
10,519.17$                   per day
315,575.19$             per 30 days
Cost per year for 1 Aircraft / 365 days
Cost per day * 30 days
Cost per year for 1 Aircraft / 365 days
Cost per day * 30 days
cost per year for 1 A/C
cost per year for 1 A/C
( 154 / )
154
TotalOperatingCost per A C 
( 145 / )
145
TotalOperatingCost per A C 
















































One time cost 
at purchase 
for Equipment
4 4 16 www.defenseindustrydaily.com/




















One time cost 
at purchase 
for Equipment








One time cost 
at purchase 
for Equipment




Total for FIRST 30 days (USD$) (FY$08 in Millions) $47 Total for NEXT 30 days (USD$) (FY$08 in Millions) $0.982
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Each Pack of 
Battery last for 
100 hours of 
operation, Each 
Operation will 
last for 10 
hours, hence 
each Pack of 
Battery  good 
for 10 
operations ~ 5 
Pack of Battery 
for 50 
boardings per 
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One time cost 
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Unit Cost / 
USD$
Total Cost 
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Tied to the pay 
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1 set per 
2 Dogs















Unit Cost / 
USD$
Total Cost 















3 set per 
Dog per 
2 weeks



















Total for FIRST 30 days (USD$) (FY$08) $199,684.00
Total for Next 30 days (USD$) 
(FY$08)
$68,604
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USD$
Total Cost FIRST 
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per boarding team 
















Initial purchase of one 
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Use one per person per 
mission.  CYALUME® 
SNAPLIGHT® CHEM-






















2 per mission. 
CYALUME® CHEM-























Unit Cost / 
USD$
Total Cost FIRST 
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Initial purchase of one 
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Initial purchase of one 
per boarding team 
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Initial purchase of two 
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USD$
Total Cost FIRST 
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per boarding team 
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Initial purchase of 
spares, maintain 
enough for 3 boarding 
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Unit Cost / 
USD$
Total Cost FIRST 
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Unit Cost / 
USD$
Total Cost FIRST 
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person Initial purchase of one 





















Use 50 per mission, 50 
missions in 30 days
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Unit Cost / 
USD$
Total Cost FIRST 
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Unit Cost / 
USD$
Total Cost FIRST 
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12 boarding teams 12 1200 14,400
http://www.donaldsonrope
.com/pilot_ladders.htm





























12 boarding teams 12 199 2388
http://www.capewell.com/
grappling%20hook.pdf















Unit Cost / 
USD$
Total Cost FIRST 
































in excess of 
120 vertical 







12 boarding teams 12 1500 18,000
http://www.digitalforcetech
.com/tpls.asp





Total for FIRST 30 days (USD$) (FY$08) $999,998 Total for Next 30 days (USD$) (FY$08) $9,953
Table 39:  Cost Estimates for Boarding
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Not available in open source. 
Given figure is a ballpark 

















www.nextag.com. Cost of 






















Total for FIRST 30 days (USD$) (FY$08) $64,844 Total for Next 30 days (USD$) (FY$08) $540
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XI. MODELING AND SIMULATION
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to provide high-level quantitative analysis of 
the relative effectiveness of alternative force structures within the context of the 
scenarios and Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) developed by the Operations 
Management group.  Additional analysis is provided that supplements other 
chapters within this report.  As has been described in the Systems Engineering 
section, beginning with the initial Functional Decomposition (FD) of the Maritime 
Interdiction Operation (MIO) task force, and following from the Measures of 
Performance (MOPs) and Key Performance Parameters (KPPs), several overall 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) were identified that lent themselves to 
quantitative analysis by the MS group.
In order to perform the assigned tasks, the first step was to determine 
what modeling and simulation tools would be best suited to answer the questions 
presented by the Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs).  A survey of the modeling 
and simulation tools that were available was conducted.  The best tools available 
were determined to be MANA (Map Aware Non-uniform Automata) and NSS 
(Naval Simulation System).  MANA was used to investigate the searching of 
ships of different sizes, how the search times were impacted by the use of two or 
three search teams, and the probability of finding contraband based on different 
sensor options.  From a higher-level perspective of overall force structure 
alternatives, the Naval Simulation System (NSS) tool promised the best 
capability to a high degree of realism
B. NAVAL SIMULATION SYSTEM (NSS)
1.  Background 
NSS is an object-oriented Monte-Carlo modeling and simulation tool under 
development by Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) and 
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Metron, Inc. for the Chief of Naval Operations.  NSS supports multi-warfare 
mission area analyses and is designed to support operational commanders in 
developing and analyzing operational courses of action at the mission, group, or 
force levels. 
2.  Modeling Description
 The NSS tool allowed our analysts to define objects that interacted within 
the simulation environment, and further to simulate the nature of those 
interactions.  Generally, this process begins by defining a command structure 
and then assigning assets to the various elements of that command structure.  
The assets available for assignment to the command structure can be copied 
from a pre-existing database of various platforms, including air stations, naval 
bases, ships, and aircraft; or they can be created according to the analyst’s 
intentions.  Once assets have been assigned to different command elements, 
they were further defined in terms of their motion within the simulation, sensor 
packages they carry, the communications and data processing capabilities they 
possess, and weapons they can employ.  Further, each asset has its own 
susceptibility defined within the simulation, susceptibilities that make the asset 
detectable, identifiable, and classifiable to other sensor and weapon systems 
within the simulation.  The behavior of the assets were defined by assigning 
tactics on several levels, including command level tactics and individual asset 
tactics.  The behaviors and interactions among the various constructs within the 
simulation take place within a three dimensional geographical representation of 
the earth, which is definable by the analyst.  Within this defined geographic area, 
the motions and tactics of the assets were further specified.  At the initiation of a 
simulation run, a pseudo-random placement of assets within the scenario was 
initialized, along with initial tracking and identification information of those assets 
that fall within each other’s spheres of awareness.  At the start of the simulation, 
the assets move and behave according to the characteristics assigned to them 
by their individual asset characteristics, individual tactics, and command tactics.  
The analyst specified the duration of the scenario that was to be simulated.
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The MOEs evaluated indicated relative effectiveness of different force 
structures in three different scenarios.  The initial scenarios were built around the 
first phase of operations (Phase 0), and involved a maritime interdiction force 
attempting to locate and intercept a known high value vessel.  The primary 
challenge faced by the force in this scenario was to pick out the suspect vessel 
from the neutral commercial shipping traffic.  In these scenarios, the primary 
MOE was whether or not the suspect vessel was found.  The second set of 
scenarios was built around the next phase of operations, Phase 1 (High Density).  
In this phase, the challenge presented is to interdict contraband that was being 
moved via surface vessels through an area where there was a high density of 
commercial shipping traffic and there was no knowledge of which vessels were 
carrying contraband.  This situation dictated that the interdiction force intercept 
and search as many vessels as possible, with the resulting MOEs being the 
number of vessels searched.  The third set of scenarios were built around a third 
phase of operations in which the traffic density was significantly lower than that in 
Phase 1 (High Density), which was called Phase 1 (Low Density).  Again, the 
challenge for the interdiction force was to intercept and board as many vessels 
as possible, but, with the reduced traffic density, more time would be spent in 
transit between contacts, boarding efficiency would be reduced and the impact of 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets would be greater.  Within 
each of the phases, different scenarios were built to compare the overall relative 
effectiveness as different assets are added to the interdiction force.  The storyline 
that drives the different scenario excursions provided the rationale for the 
different force structures as well.  In both phases of the operation, different allies 
might be available, each providing different assets to assist.  The three scenarios 










1 US (no 
A/C) No 
Allies 
2 0 0 0
2 US (Helos) 
No Allies




3 US (UAVs)  
No Allies
2 0 6                      
(2 Airborne)
0
4 US (UAVs) 
No Allies
2 0 6                      
(4 Airborne)
0
5 US (Helos) 
and Green
2 4                
(2 
Airborne)
0 4                      
(1 Airborne)
6 US (UAVs) 
and Green
2 0 6                       
(2 Airborne)




















7 US (UAVs) 
and Green
2 0 6                       
(4 Airborne)
4                      
(1 Airborne)













8 US (UAVs) 
No Allies
3/1 0 0 9                      
(4 Airborne)
9 US (Helos) 
No Allies




10 US (No 
A/C)   
No Allies



















11 US (UAVs) 4/1 0 4/0                      12                     
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and Green (1 P-3 
Airborne)
(6 Airborne)
12 US (UAVs) 
and White
4/1 0 0/4                    
(1 E-2 
Airborne)
12                   
(6 Airborne)
13 US (UAVs) 
and White 
and Green
5/1 0 4/4                    
(1 P-3 and 1 E-
2 Airborne)
15                   
(6 Airborne)
14 US (Helos) 
and White 
and Green
5/1 9                  
(3 
Airborne)
4/4                    
(1 P-3 and 1 E-
2 Airborne)
0















3/1 0 0 0
16 US (Helos)  
No Allies




17 US (UAVs) 
No Allies
3/1 0 0 9                      
(6 Airborne)
18 US (Helos) 
and Green
3/1 6                
(3 
Airborne)




















19 US (UAVs) 
and Green 
3/1 0 4                        
( 1 Airborne)
9                      
(6 Airborne)
Table 43: Phase 1 (Low Density) Scenario Breakdown
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3.  General Asset Characteristics
a. Destroyers
The core of the interdiction force was the destroyer (DDG), which is 
modeled after the US Arleigh Burke class DDG.  For these simulations, a patrol 
speed of 15 knots (kts) and an intercept speed of 25 kts were assigned.  The 
DDG has sensor capabilities which allowed it to detect surface contacts at 12 
nautical miles (nm) and identify at 7 nm.  Once the destroyer detected and 
intercepted the suspect vessel, it launched a boarding party which conducted the 
interdiction.  In simulation-time this took at least one hour with an expected value 
of three hours.  
b. Helicopters
Each destroyer in the simulation had the capability to launch the 
SH-60R Seahawk helicopter.  This helicopter had a patrol speed of 120 kts.  The 
sensors onboard the helicopter allowed it to detect surface vessels at a range of 
60 nm, and identified those vessels at a range of 9 nm, at the assigned patrol 
altitude of 1000 feet.  The helicopters were launched one every four hours for two 
hour sector patrol missions, resulting in 50% coverage by air assets.  This 
assumption was based primarily on an anticipated crew-day for the aircrew.  
c. Maritime Patrol Aircraft
In order to allow for the introduction of other force structures that 
could be evaluated against the baseline scenario, the scenario development 
efforts included allied nations along with the coalition.  With the addition of 
Country Green to the scenarios, a Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) became 
available to the MIO task force.  The MPA was modeled after the P-3 Orion 
aircraft.  This aircraft has the ability to detect surface targets at a range of 60 nm, 
and identify them at a range of 9 nm.  The patrol was modeled as a ladder 
search at an airspeed of 200 kts and an altitude of 2000 ft.  The P-3 maintained a 
patrol presence throughout the duration of any scenario of which it is a part.
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d. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
The unmanned aerial vehicles in these simulations were loosely 
modeled after vertical takeoff unmanned aerial vehicles (VTUAVs) currently 
under development by the US military.  The primary differences between the 
helicopters modeled were reduced sensor capabilities and improved endurance.  
These helicpoters had the ability to detect surface targets at 20 nm, and identify 
them at 7 nm.  They flew at 1000 ft and 100 kts.  The UAVs launched every four 
hours on four-hour sector patrol missions, maintaining nearly continuous patrol 
presence throughout the scenarios of which they were a part.
e. Airborne Early Warning Aircraft
Another asset that might become available to the interdiction task 
force in later phases of operations was an Airborne Early Warning Aircraft, which 
was modeled after the E-2C Hawkeye.  This aircraft has increased detection 
capability, but no identification capability, and serves as a communications relay 
center and data fusion center.  These aircraft fly an orbit pattern in the center of 
the region of interest at an altitude of 28,000 ft.  At this altitude, the E-2 can 
detect surface contacts at 200 nm, but has no identification capability.  
f. Patrol Craft
The patrol craft introduced in the scenario with the addition of allies 
are identical to the destroyer in motion, sensors, and tactics.  The only difference 
is that the patrol craft did not have the capability of deploying helicopters or 
UAVs.
g. Commercial Ships
The commercial ships modeled in these scenarios were built on a 
large cargo ship construct from the pre-existing database.  They moved through 
the region of interest at 18 kts.  In the Phase 0 scenarios, there were 200 
commercial ships and a single hostile ship that was designated the suspect 
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vessel.  In the Phase 1 scenarios, there were 150 commercial ships and 50 
‘suspect vessels’ carrying contraband.  In Phase 1 (High Density) these vessels 
appeared identical to the interdiction force.  In the Phase 1 (Low Density) 
scenarios, there was significantly less traffic, with ten commercial ships and only 
two suspect vessels in the scenario.
For a copy of the NSS scenario files and databases, please write to 
"Graduate School of Systems Engineering and Applied Sciences, Attn: Professor 
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The results presented in Figure 57, shows the vital importance of 
having aviation assets available to assist in this type of scenario.  Keeping in 
mind that in Phase 0, the goal was to locate and intercept a known suspect 
vessel while operating in an area of high commercial traffic density.  This Phase 
of operations also assumed there was highly reliable intelligence available on the 
identity of the target vessel.  Scenario 1 showed the results of the simulation 
when there were no aviation assets available and the only way to detect and 
identify the suspect vessel was with the surface search assets available.  With 
only two destroyers able to conduct the search, the key MOE, percentage of 
times the suspect vessel was found, was less than 30%.  In Scenario 2, the 
inclusion of the ability to launch helicopters increased the rate of successful 
interception of the suspect vessel from 39 to 53 percent.  While it was part of the 
reason that destroyers were so valuable in this type of operation, the inability to 
launch a helicopter highlighted the potential impacts of adverse weather and 
limited logistics support in this region.
The next important realization from the Phase 0 results was the 
relative value of UAVs versus helicopters and P-3s.  From the differences 
between Scenarios 2 and 3, where the interdiction force changed from having 
two destroyers each operating a helicopter to two destroyers each operating a 
UAV, the impact of the UAV’s greater endurance and lower maintenance 
requirements can be seen.  While the helicopter had greater sensor capabilities, 
these capabilities were clearly outweighed by the greater availability of the UAV.  
This difference realized an effectiveness increase  from 60 to 72 percent 
effectiveness.
While the UAV contributed significantly to the force effectiveness, 
the addition of multiple UAVs appeared to have very little impact.  In scenario 4, 
the sortie rate of the UAV was increased so that at any given time, each 
265
destroyer had two UAVs conducting search patrols.  This increased sortie rate 
only yielded a 6 percent increase in effectiveness.  This was due to the fact that 
the addition of another asset was masked by the near continuous coverage 
afforded by the greater endurance of the UAV as well as the limited search range 
of the UAV. 
In scenario 5, two helicopters were used for patrolling, but with 
“Country Green” added to the coalition.  The addition of this country allowed 
access to an airfield, and with a Maritime Patrol Aircraft detachment stationed 
there.  This detachment was able to provide the interdiction force with continuous 
coverage.  As is shown here, two helicopters and a P-3 provide nearly the same 
effectiveness as two (or four) UAVs, with a success rate of 66 to 78 percent.
Scenario 6 and 7 provided the best overall interdiction force 
effectiveness for Phase 0.  In these two scenarios, the effect of using UAVs 
combined with the P-3 was very distinct.  In Scenario 6, the reduced sortie rate 
for the UAV along with the P-3 yielded a successful mission 84 to 93 percent of 
the time.  In Scenario 7, with increased UAV sorties and the P-3, the success 
rate was 89 to 96 percent.  
b. Phase 1 (High Density)
In Phase 1 (High Density), the simulations showed that in high 
traffic density areas, the availability of surface search assets was much more 
important than aircraft.  In these scenarios, the high traffic density resulted in the 
search assets moving from one boarding to the next, rarely having to spend a 
significant amount of time looking for their next boarding.  It was this 
phenomenon that led to the development and exploration of Phase 1 (Low 
Density).  The Phase I (High Density) scenarios also included the addition of 
"Country White" to the coalition.  As described in the Operations Management 
section, Country White made available an E-2 Hawkeye aircraft which had the 
ability to detect targets at long ranges, but since it typically operated at high 
altitudes, it was unable to identify targets.  Country White also made available a 
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surface patrol craft to assist in boarding operations, which was a critical element 
in these scenarios.
In Scenarios 8, 9, and 10, the mean number of vessel boardings 
was  statistically the same, with a mean of approximately 20 vessels being 
boarded in each scenario.  Among these three scenarios, the interdiction force 
consisted of three destroyers and one surface patrol craft, with the difference 
between the scenarios being the addition of two helicopters in scenario 9 and 
four UAVs in scenario 8.  The only real discernible differences between the 
overall effectiveness of the three scenarios was the slightly wider spread in the 
data.  The fact that the data was normally distributed both above and below the 
means reflected the lack of significant impact of aircraft in these scenarios.
In Scenarios 11 and 12, the addition to the coalition of Countries 
Green and White brought not only the availability of land-based aircraft, but also 
additional surface search assets.  The increase from four to six surface search 
assets (along with their organic UAV assets) enabled the interdiction force to 
increase the number of vessels searched per 24 hour period from approximately 
20 to approximately 27, a 35% improvement.
Scenarios 13 and 14 brought the total surface search assets 
available to the interdiction force up to six, a mix of five destroyers and one patrol 
craft.  This increased the overall effectiveness of the interdiction force up to 33 
vessel boardings.  
c. Phase 1 (Low Density)
The results of Phase 1 (High Density) illustrated the fact that 
aircraft did not contribute significantly to the overall effectiveness of the 
interdiction force when the number of potential MIO targets greatly exceeded the 
capacity of the MIO task force.  However, the addition of surface forces did 
linearly improve the success rate in those types of scenarios.  This led to the 
question of aircraft relevance in a scenario where there were very few 
commercial ships spread over a very large area.  These scenarios incorporate 
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twelve ships in a 200 x 300 nm area.  Five scenarios exploring this type of 
situation were presented.
In the first three scenarios of Phase 1 (Low Density), there were no 
maritime patrol aircraft involved in the search.  The lack of this type of asset in 
such a large area with such widely dispersed targets was immediately apparent.  
Scenarios 15, 16, and 17 showed the interdiction force was only able to board 
2.0 to 2.6 ships per 24 hours, with no statistical difference between the three 
scenarios, which differ only in the number of aircraft available that assisted in the 
search.
Scenarios 18 and 19 again showed the importance of having a 
long-range patrol capability with high on-station time.  The addition of the P-3 
asset in these scenarios nearly doubled the approximate number of vessels 
boarded in the scenario to 4.0 to 4.5 vessels boarded.  While this was certainly a 
significant improvement over the scenarios without the P-3, the primary driving 
factor in these scenarios remained the great distances to be covered by the 
surface search assets.
6.  Model Challenges and Limitations
NSS is a modeling tool that is still in development.  The lack of a mature, 
tested tool created significant challenges throughout the learning and 
programming process that were not apparent at the onset of analysis with NSS.  
Particularly challenging was the reliability of the system.  Initially, (through the 
programming phase), the system proved to be very stable, and there were few 
problems.  However, once the task of running the simulations began, the system 
was subject to frequent crashes and lock-ups.  These crashes and lock-ups 
caused not only the loss of data and programming work, but also required 
outside resources to reset the system, which commonly delayed the resumption 
of work by several hours.  
Although NSS appeared to be extremely flexible and allowed the analyst 
to program whatever was desired, it ultimately was a combat engagement model 
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that required several creative work-arounds before the team could simulate the 
required interactions.  These work-arounds included the ‘boarding-party’ 
interaction, as well as representations of aircraft tactical responses and 
communications.
a. The Boarding Process
The ‘boarding party’ interaction was the first significant challenge 
posed by NSS.  A representation of the time delay incurred by a search asset 
when it encountered and boarded a vessel was needed.  Being primarily a 
combat model, NSS had the capability to replicate combat interactions using 
detection and identification sensors, weapons with varying degrees of accuracy 
and damage potential and targets of varying degrees of susceptibility.  There 
was, however, no pre-programmed delay interaction that lent itself to 
representing the boarding interaction.  In order to overcome this issue, the 
boarding interaction was represented as a combat engagement.  First, a general 
period for each boarding (including transit and preparation) of approximately 
three hours was assumed.  Then, an inverse binomial was built in Microsoft 
EXCEL™  that had three variables: number of shots, delay between shots, and 
probability of hit.  Using these three variables, a distribution was built to replicate 
the time to search a vessel, with primary concern placed on the mean search 
time.  The final distribution is shown in Figure 60.  The parameters used were 
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Figure 60: Vessel Boarding Time Distribution
Next, the team constructed a ‘boarding party weapon’ on board 
each of the searching assets with these same three parameters.  Using this 
‘weapon’ and building the interaction between it and the commercial ship being 
searched, a boarding was then modeled as an engagement.  This engagement 
began once the interdiction force vessel closed to within two nautical miles of the 
target vessel and repetitively ‘fired’ the boarding party ‘weapon’.  This “trick” 
allowed the analyst to use the number of weapon misses and number of weapon 
hits to replicate and measure the mean search time. 
b. Aircraft Behaviors and Tactics
The next significant challenge was the aircraft tactical behaviors.  While 
NSS was incredibly proficient in ship based tactics, chain of command effects, 
etc., the behaviors of aircraft in real world MIO's were not readily available.  
Specifically, aircraft lacked the ability to track and trail a target.  For example, if a 
P-3 Orion, in the simulation, were to identify a surface contact as hostile, the 
aircraft would not remain with that hostile target until a surface assets arrived.  
The P-3 simply continued along its search path and if the ship eventually 
dropped off the P-3’s radar there was no guarantee that the MIO vessels would 
find the hostile vessel.  This caused serious issues in Phase 0 simulations, where 
the entire force was searching for one suspect vessel.  However, there was not a 
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great impact on the Phase 1 scenarios where every vessel was suspect and 
having the MIO vessels simply proceed toward higher density areas of 
commercial traffic was enough.
To overcome this difficulty, a construct in the Phase 0 model called a relay 
was created.  This was a ship with a large sensor swath width, covering all of the 
AOR, with a 20,000 ft mast to ensure no LOS issues with the RADAR.  This ship 
was stationed in the center of the area of interest, but had no classification or 
identification capability.  Therefore when the simulation started, the commander 
(an NSS construct) had a full “picture” of the area, but no classification or 
identification of any of the vessels, similar to a low-resolution satellite image.  
However, the relay had the ability to track targets once classified and identified 
by other vessels.  If the P-3 flew by the red ship and then lost contact, the relay 
vessel would continue to track the red ship and vector the MIO vessels towards it 
simulating the P-3 staying on station. 
This “trick” was only effective in Phase 0, since once the red ship was 
found there was no negative effect of the air assets continuing to search 
(because there were no more enemies).  However, if this same model was used 
to search for two, three, or more enemy vessels, the aircraft tactics in NSS would 
have to be fixed and/or a different work around would have to be found.





MANA was designed by the Defence Technology Agency which is 
an agency of the New Zealand Defence Force.
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c. Description
MANA is an agent based simulation (ABS), meaning that each 
entity in the simulation is controlled by decision making algorithms, instead of 
specific behaviors dictated by the programmer63. The primary advantage of 
MANA over larger physics based programs is the detail and high fidelity of 
MANA.64 “MANA and similar programs are often called complex adaptive 
systems (CAS) because of the way the entities within them react to their 
surroundings. There are some common properties associated with MANA and
other CAS combat models. First, the “global” behavior of the system emerges as 
the result of many local interactions. Second, CAS are an example of a process 
of feedback not present in “reductionist”, top-down models. Third, CAS cannot be 
analyzed by decomposition into simple independent parts. The final common 




MANA was chosen for several reasons.  It was felt that this type of 
combat model would be the best tool to investigate questions regarding ship 
boarding activities.  The software is unclassified and therefore could be used by 
all members of the modeling and simulation team.  Also, everyone within the 
MANA modeling team had a small amount of prior experience with MANA. Lastly, 
the MANA interface and output was simple.
Strengths:
 Simple user interface and output
 Easy to create terrain maps based on ship layouts
                                           
63 James W. Beaver and others, “Systems Analysis and Alternative Architectures for Riverine Warfare 
in 2010” (MS Diss, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 65
64 Ibid, 65
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 Trigger states useful for simulating inspection times
Weaknesses:
 Model and output sometimes too simple when working on 
complex problems
 Agents do not easily navigate terrain resulting in the 
excessive use of waypoints
 Challenging to translate attributes of a urban warfare model 
to inspection of a ship
The MANA simulations generated were an attempt to create a 
complex adaptive system for important real-world factors of combat such as: 
spontaneous change of plans due to the evolving battle conditions, the influence 
of situational awareness on units when deciding on a course of action,65 and the 
importance of sensors and how to best use them to gain an advantage.66  
Learning the basic interface takes little time, however certain limitations within 
the application can prove to be a hindrance for more complicated modeling 
needs.  As such, the use of MANA in this study was meant as a low resolution, 
high throughput program. 
b. What to Model and Questions to Answer
Simulating various ship boarding activities was initially considered 
because of a close relation to urban combat, for which MANA was designed. The 
modeling and simulation team looked into two distinct ship board scenarios. 
Search: the simulation of ship search and inspection by the 
boarding party composed of task oriented teams.  Several angles were explored 
to determine what scenarios best suited the MANA applications. 
Basic questions to be answered by search model: 
                                           
65 James W. Beaver and others, “Systems Analysis and Alternative Architectures for Riverine Warfare 
in 2010” (MS Diss, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 65
66 Ibid, 65
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 How much time does it take to search a ship?
 Given there is contraband on board, what percentage of 
instances was it found by the boarding party?
Combat: the simulation of a boarding party encountering a 
hostile crew element, with conflict arising at the initial onset of boarding 
operations, or out of a subdued crew instigated by aggressor agents on the ship, 
resulting the sudden escalation of hostilities.  
Basic questions to be answered by the combat model 
include:
 How many boarding party deaths occured when a ships 
crew becomes hostile?
 How much time did it take to neutralize the hostile crew?
c. Ship Variations
Two variations of ship layouts were modified into MANA terrain 
maps. All Search and Combat scenarios were run on both ship variations. A 
container ship with dimensions of 121 x 25 meters can be seen in Figure 61. 
Figure 62 shows the ship layout diagram for a 400 TEU RORO/LOLO Container 
Vessel built by Singapore Technologies Marine Ltd, which was the basis for the 
Container Ship. A Cargo Dhow with dimensions of 26 x 9 meters is shown in 
Figure 63. On these diagrams, the gray color represents areas where agents 
could not cross. The walls of the containers and outlines of both ships are gray 
representing where inspectors could not travel or cross. White represents terrain 
with no cover where inspectors could move easily. The pink area on the 
container ship diagram represents container spaces where movement was 
slightly slowly. Similarly, the light green and dark green on the cargo dhow 
represented the engine room and cargo areas that would be navigated slowly. 
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Figure 61: Container Ship (121 x 25 meters)
Figure 62: Actual Ship Layout Diagram by Singapore Technologies Marine 
Ltd
Figure 63:  Cargo Dhow (26 x 9 meters)
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3. Search Model
a. Overall Search Model Approach/Assumptions
A full factorial study with three sets of parameters was conducted.  
Parameters included whether or not it was a cargo ship or container ship under 
study, visual search versus employment of the Ion Mobility Spectrum (IMS) kit 
described in chapter VI, and the number of inspection teams (two versus three).
Search Variables
a) Ship:               Cargo Dhow Container ship
b) Sensor:      Visual search only IMS kit
c) Search Team: 2 teams of inspectors 3 teams of 
inspectors
Table 44: Search Permutations
Search 
Permutation #
Ship Type Sensor # of 
Search 
Teams
1 Cargo Dhow Visual (Eyeballs only) 2
2 Cargo Dhow Visual (Eyeballs only) 3
3 Cargo Dhow IMS 2
4 Cargo Dhow IMS 3
5 Container Ship Visual (Eyeballs only) 2
6 Container Ship Visual (Eyeballs only) 3
7 Container Ship IMS 2
8 Container Ship IMS 3
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Differences in the layout of the two ships were explained in the 
previous section (2.c.) and were applicable to the Combat model. 
Sensor comparisons were made between an IMS based 
contraband detector and a baseline visual search, with the inspectors’ performing 
visual searches. The IMS sensor could only detect explosives and drugs.  
Therefore, it was important to note the contraband being considered is either 
drugs or explosives.  While visual search could clearly indentify any type of 
contraband it was only compared to the IMS abilities. For modeling purposes, the 
entire process of making one IMS swipe/scan was assumed to take forty 
seconds with no deviation.  The forty second time accounted for twenty seconds 
to take the swipe and twenty seconds for analysis, and was considered as an 
upper limit.  The twenty second IMS analysis time was based on research done 
by the Search Team (Chapter VI).  Visual search characteristics for the container 
ship and cargo dhow were modeled somewhat differently as a result of specific 
searching methods inherent to each type of ship.  These differences are 
explained later. 
The search team variable compared two versus three teams of 
inspectors. Each inspection team consisted of a pair of inspectors.  Based on 
input from SEA-13 members experienced with MIO operations, two and three 
teams were modeled in order to be as realistic as possible.  In practice, out of a 
given boarding party of eight individuals, two would detain the crew and two 
would interview the captain. This left two pairs of individuals to do the actual 
inspection.  Therefore, a larger boarding party of ten members would result in 
three inspection teams.  The remaining non-searching members of the boarding 
party were not simulated as their actions were assumed to have little effect on a 
physical search of the ship.
Details about the models are best explained by breaking the 
models into the “Container Ship Search Model” and the “Cargo Dhow Search 
Model”. 
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1. Cargo Dhow Search Model 
Approach/Assumptions and Measures of 
Effectiveness
The cargo dhow search model was comprised of the first four 
permutations seen again in Table 45:
Table 45: Cargo Dhow Permutations
Search 
Permutation #
Ship Type Sensor # of 
Search 
Teams
1 Cargo Dhow Visual (Eyeballs only) 2
2 Cargo Dhow Visual (Eyeballs only) 3
3 Cargo Dhow IMS 2
4 Cargo Dhow IMS 3
Three Measures of Effectiveness were considered for the “Cargo 
Dhow Search Model.”
1) Time to complete search of the Cargo Dhow 
2) Percentage of ships carrying contraband that was 
discovered
3) If contraband found, distribution of time to find contraband
1.1 Cargo Dhow Visual Search
NOTE: All screen shots of MANA displayed in the following 
figures are taken from the “Visual Search, 2 Inspection Teams” model.  
In the visual search models, it was assumed that the search 
teams would split up the search areas equally. The search path was 
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drawn arbitrarily to cover as much ground as possible without losing 
practicality. The search path for the “Visual Search, 2 Inspection Teams” 
model variation is shown in Figure 64.   
     (a)
     (b)
Figure 64: Search Path for (a) Team 1 (b) Team 2
A screen shot of the personality settings for the search 
teams using visual search is shown in Figure 65. Each personality setting 
can range from -100 to 100. For example, +100 for the “Enemies” means 
agents would have an affinity to be drawn to enemies. A -100 for 
“Enemies” indicates agents would stay away from enemies. To ensure 
each search team would stay in its own search areas, higher weighting 
was assigned to “Next Waypoints”. The “Uninjured Friends” setting was 
given a weighting of 50, so that the two individuals within a team would 
more than likely stay together during the search. In order to more 
realistically model the search process it was assumed inspectors would
stop and examine certain areas closely for a small amount of time. These 
Points of Interest (POI) represented an inspector opening a closet, moving 
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a heavy object, or closely scrutinizing a particular area. Points of Interest
(POI) were simulated as immobile enemies. “Enemy Threat 2” (POI) 
inspector attraction was set to 10 so that the search team would approach 
POI once they detected it, while “Enemy Threat 1” (contraband) was set to 
20 so the search team would approach the contraband once detected. It 
was assumed that the search team would tend to approach contraband 
more than POI if both were detected at the same time. This explains the 
difference between the weighting set for Enemy Threat 1 & 2.
Figure 65: Personality of Search Teams Using Eyeballs
The “Ranges” tab for the search team is shown in Figure 66. 
The movement speed was set as 4/100 (0.04) grid square per time step, 
which is equivalent to a movement speed of 75 meters per hour. This 
speed was significantly slower than the normal walking speed of a human. 
However, it was assumed that it was extremely difficult for the search 
teams to maneuver in fully loaded cargo dhows, where there is no proper 
footpath and the teams would need to climb up and downs to access 
areas of interest.  It is important to note that while this search speed may 
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not be indicative of the search speed of teams under all circumstances, is 
was used as a mean time across a variety of circumstances.  It is also 
important to note that this rate of movement was chosen to provide a 
basis for comparison of the other factors which impact the time to search.  
It would be possible to model different search times to reflect different 
scenarios, i.e. pre-boarding intelligence, search techniques, etc., but due 
to time and resource constraints, only this search speed was used.
Sensor height was set to 2 meters, which is a close 
approximation of human height. When no POI or contraband were present 
the search team would turn their heads around at a slew rate of 90 deg 
per second.
Figure 66: “Ranges” tab for Search Teams Using Eyeballs
The sensor settings are shown in Figure 67. The sensor was 
modeled after the capability of human eyes to detect and classify objects 
at a distance of 12.5m (24 grid squares) with a probability of detection of 
40%, derived from research in chapter VI.  Other sensor classification 
characteristics were determined with the assumption that human eyes 
281
would be able to classify objects with greater accuracy as they moved 
closer, with a 95% chance of classifying them at the range of 3 meters. 
The “Detect” setting was modeled on the input that human eyes needed 
15 sec of processing time.  It was also assumed that human eyes had an 
aperture angle of 180 degrees facing the front. 
The acuity = 1.7 when the light level was greater than about 
0.1 Lambert. A Lambert (luminance) was equal to 1/pi candela per square 
centimeter. A point source of one candela intensity radiates one lumen 
into a solid angle of one steradian. Thus, one needed two pixels per line 
pair, and that means a pixel spacing of 0.39 arc-minute. This assumed 
there was sufficient light to activate the cones in the eye, equivalent to 
daylight background luminance.  So, it depended on the size of the object, 
the contrast of the object, the lighting conditions, and the dark adaptation 
coefficient of the eye. 
Figure 67:  Sensor Settings of Search Teams Using Eyeballs
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The weapons settings are shown in Figure 68. It was 
assumed the inspector would search (shoot) the POI or contraband within 
a 1 meter radius (two grid squares).
Figure 68: Weapons Settings of Search Teams Using Eyeballs
Once again, Points of Interest (POI) were randomly placed 
targets in the Cargo Dhow to simulate areas of which the search teams 
would pay more attention.  The POI were configured to be spaced out 
evenly with a minimum of 1.5 meters (three grid squares) from each other.  
Two placement areas were defined for the POI so as to prevent MANA 
from placing them on the middle foot path.  Thirty POI were simulated.
Contraband was randomly placed in the cargo areas or 
engine room.  The placement areas specified were slightly different from 
that for the POI, as it is assumed traffickers of contraband items would try 
to hide their items in highly concealed locations, which was among the 
cargo or in the engine room. Only one contraband item was simulated.
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The trigger states provided by MANA were used to model the 
search time required per POI.  During the search, the inspection team 
would be immobilized for a uniformly distributed 2 to 4 minutes (120 - 240 
steps) while inspecting each POI. 
The “Visual Search, 3 inspection Teams” was very similar to that of 
the “Visual Search, 2 Inspection Teams,” except the search path was 
covered by three teams instead of two. Obviously, the addition of one 
more inspection team resulted in less area to cover for each individual 
team. 
1.2 Cargo Dhow IMS Search
The “Cargo Dhow IMS Search” models were similar to the 
“Cargo Dhow Visual Search” models except for the following changes:
 Change of sensor characteristics and trigger states to 
model that of an IMS sensor instead of visual search
 Each team was only allocated one IMS sensor, and 
for modeling simplicity the two man teams were 
modeled with one agent
 Swipe locations replaced POI (explained below)
As with visual search, IMS was simulated by using multiple 
trigger states.  Swipe locations were simulated much like the POI 
categorized under enemy status. Upon reaching a swipe location the 
inspecting agent shot and killed the swipe location (which from the 
inspecting agents’ view was a weaponless, defenseless, stationary 
enemy).  After “shooting” and “killing” the swipe location the inspecting 
agent stood still for forty seconds simulating time for the entire swipe/scan 
process. After standing still the agent acquired a sensor for one second
that could detect the contraband with a probability of detection of 95%.  
These time and probability parameters were derived from the Search 
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Report (Chapter VI). The sensor was assumed to be perfect with respect 
to false alarms.  If no contraband was detected the agent returned to its 
default state. However, if there was a positive detection then the inspector 
changed trigger states and sought the detected contraband.
The “IMS Search, 3 Inspection Teams” model was similar to 
the “IMS Search, 2 Inspection Teams” model except for the search paths, 
which were the same as their respective “Cargo Dhow Visual Search” 
variations.
2. Container Ship Search Model
Approach/Assumptions and Measure of 
Effectiveness
There were many similarities between the “Container Ship 
Search Model” and the “Cargo Dhow Search Model,” however; there were 
also some unique differences.  Container ships had multiple levels of 
containers stacked on top of each other.  For the purpose of simplifying 
the model only the first deck of level containers were considered. It would 
be expected that any level above the first would take much more time to 
inspect due to the necessity of ladders or climbing equipment.  Another 
difference was the distribution of cargo and increased number of locations 
for hiding contraband.  The majority of the time a Cargo Dhow might have 
bags of rice or other random cargo stacked up in piles out in the open. On 
container ships everything is in individual containers.  The detailed 
assumptions that go along with the container ship will be explained in the 
following sections.  The “Container Ship Search Model” is comprised of 
the last four permutations seen again in Table 46:
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Table 46:  Container Ship Permutations
Search 
Permutation #
Ship Type Sensor # of 
Search 
Teams
5 Container Ship Visual (Eyeballs only) 2
6 Container Ship Visual (Eyeballs only) 3
7 Container Ship IMS 2
8 Container Ship IMS 3
There was only one Measure of Effectiveness considered for the 
“Container Ship Search Models”:
 Time to complete search of the first level of containers 
Unlike the “Cargo Dhow Search Model,” percentage of ships 
discovered with contraband was not determined because of the assumption that 
inspecting teams would be searching each container. Thus, whatever probability 
of detection was given to the visual and IMS sensors would be the resultant 
percentage of ships found More simply stated, if the agents have a 95% 
probability of detection and every container is searched then the contraband 
would be found 95% of the time. This differs from the Cargo Dhow search which 
was more literally modeled in which agents had a 95% probability of classification 
only if they were looking at the specific location of the contraband.
2.1 Container Ship Visual Search
For the visual search it was assumed that each container on 
the first level would be opened and inspected quickly. The entire time 
spent opening, closing, and inspecting each individual container was 
assumed to be uniformly distributed between six and ten minutes. This 
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distribution of time was determined by SEA-13 team members, some with 
experience of ship boarding and searching. The visual search was 
basically simulated by placing POI within each container.   Agents needed 
to be precisely guided when a lot of edges and corners existed.  As a 
result, the model was waypoint intensive which reduced overall 
randomness within the model.  One inspection team’s set of waypoints 
can be seen in Figure 69.  Also seen in Figure 69 the insides of the 
containers were triangles. This modification to the original layout was
necessary to prevent agents from getting stuck, however it did not detract 
from proper implementation of the model. Movement speed was set at
73/100 equivalent to 2 miles/hr, which is a slow walking pace. 
The distribution of time spent per container simulates a
variance in opening time and the level of detail the search team decided to
spend on the inspection of a particular container. Points of interest for 
inspection were once again modelled as enemy squads that could not 
move. It was important to note POI in this model served more as a method 
to represent the random searching time of each container, which was 
slightly different than the more literal intent of POI in the cargo dhow 
model.
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Figure 69:  Container ship waypoints for one inspection team
2.2 Container Ship IMS Search
A swipe location was placed outside of every container.
Waypoints were set up to guide the inspection teams to all swipe locations 
outside all containers. One inspection team’s set of waypoints can be 
seen in Figure 70. Using IMS equipment, the inspection team was not 
required to open and search each container. Hence, the search process 
was more efficient. Movement speed was at 73/100 which was about 2 
miles/hr, same as visual search speed. Detection range at 3 pixels was 
sufficient to ensure all swipe locations (simulated the same as in the cargo 
dhow model) are visited. When the inspection team engaged each swipe 
location, it triggered a delay which simulates the swipe/scan time of 40 
seconds (same as cargo dhow parameters). 
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Figure 70:  Container Ship IMS Search waypoints
c. Results/Analysis
1. Cargo Dhow Search Model Results
Significant assumptions that greatly affect modeling results for the 
“Cargo Dhow Search Models” were as follows:
 Number of POI and time to inspect each POI (visual search, 
30 POI, 2 to 4 minutes uniformly distributed each)
 Number of swipe locations and analysis time (IMS search, 
30 swipe locations, 40 second analysis time)
 Probability of detection for both visual search and IMS 
search (95% for both visual and IMS, however, terrain cover 
handicaps visual search abilities)
 Inspector’s movement speed (75 meters per hour)
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Whether or not the reader agrees with the significant assumptions
made, the important take away when viewing the results is the relative difference 
between the four sub-models.  Assumptions were kept the same in each model 
except for the necessary modifications inherent to each independent variable 
being compared.  The “Visual Search, 2 Inspection Teams” model were 
considered to be the baseline scenario.  Table 47 shows the results for the 
primary Measures of Effectiveness.  Figure 71 and Figure 72 graphically show 
the results for mean time to search the cargo dhow and percentage of runs 
contraband was found, respectively.  Close to what would be expected, 
employment of a third inspection team took approximately 70% of the time it took 
two inspection teams. The use of IMS lowered search time to approximately 70% 
of the baseline visual search inspection time.  When both the IMS and a third 
inspection team were employed, inspection time was halved compared to the 
baseline visual search with two inspection teams.  The low detection percentage 
for both visual searches was due to the low detection parameters set in the 
model, corresponding to the difficulty of finding concealed contraband. Once the 
IMS sensor detected the contraband the agent’s personality was changed to only 
seek out the contraband, rather than continue to follow waypoints or inspect 
other POI.
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Table 47: Cargo Dhow Search Model Results
Cargo Dhow Search Model 
Results (Sample of 30 runs)
Mean Time to Search 
Cargo Dhow with 95% 
CI 
Percentage of Runs 
Contraband was Found with 
95% CI
Visual Search, 2 Inspection 
Teams
105.8 ± 0.4 minutes 36.7 ± 17.2 %
Visual Search, 3 Inspection 
Teams
77.1 ± 0.3 minutes 36.7 ± 17.2 %
IMS Search, 2 Inspection 
Teams
77.5 ± 0.5 minutes 93.3 ± 17.2 %
IMS Search, 3 Inspection 
Teams
54.1 ± 0.3 minutes 76.7 ± 17.2 %
Note the small 95% confidence interval for search time.  The lack of 
deviation is most likely due to the movement of agents, which was highly 
dependent on waypoints.  As discussed earlier, agents had to be closely guided 
in order to not get caught on edges or in corners.  Movement becomes less 
random as the number and proximity of waypoints increase.  In real boardings 












































Time to complete search of Cargo Dhow, Comparison of 
Search Team Size and Sensor (95% CI too small to be seen) 























































Percentage of Runs Contraband was Found on Cargo Dhow, 
Comparison of Search Team Size and Sensor (95% CI Included) 
Figure 72: Percentage of Runs Contraband was Found on Cargo Dhow
Figure 73 through Figure 76 shows histograms of an additional 
MOE that was considered. Time when contraband was found is of importance 
when considering maritime interdiction operations in which the inspecting force 
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turns over violators to a host country. Search times would be shorter considering 
once one contraband item was found, the search is over. Obviously, there would 
be ships which do not have any contraband that get searched, which would 
further complicate approximating ship’s search time. The results are very random 
for all four models which makes sense. Depending on where the contraband was 
placed and where inspectors start searching, illicit goods can either be found 
early or late into the search.
Time when Contraband is Found





































Figure 73:  Time when Contraband is Found (2 Teams, Visual)
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Time when Contraband is Found


















Figure 74: Time when contraband is found (3 Teams, Visual)
Time when Contraband is Found


















Figure 75: Time when Contraband is Found (2 Teams, IMS)
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Time when Contraband is Found






















Figure 76: Time when Contraband is Found (3 Teams, IMS)
2. Container Ship Search Model Results
Significant assumptions that greatly affect modeling results for the 
“Container Ship Search Models” were as follows:
 Distribution of time to search each container (visual search, 
six to ten minutes uniformly distributed)
 Swipe locations placed outside of every container (IMS 
search, simulates each container being swiped)
Table 48 shows the results from the container ship search model.  
Figure 77 graphically shows the same results for mean time to search the 
container ship.  The addition of one more inspection team continued to result in a 
search time 70% of the baseline time using two inspection teams.  There was a 
vast improvement in search time when using the IMS sensor.  Search time using 
IMS was approximately one eighth of the baseline visual search time. Due to 
both the larger size of the container ship and necessity to visually inspect each 
container, the improvement in search time using IMS was much more prevalent 
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for the Container Ship. It was important to note these results are highly 
dependent on the specified time to open and inspect containers. 
Table 48: Container Ship Search Model Results
Container Ship Search Model 
Results (Sample of 30 runs)
Mean Time to Search 
Container Ship with 95% CI 
Visual Search, 2 Inspection 
Teams
7.91 ± 0.06 hours
Visual Search, 3 Inspection 
Teams
5.26 ± 0.08 hours
IMS Search, 2 Inspection 
Teams
0.91 ± 0.06 hours
IMS Search, 3 Inspection 
Teams
0.64 ± 0.02 hours
Time to complete search of first level of Container Ship, Comparision 
































Figure 77:  Time to Complete Search of First Level of Container Ship
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d. Further Study
Adding probabilities of false detections would be an excellent 
addition to the search models. Sensitivity analysis on specified parameters was 
not done here but may provide greater insight. A different modeling program 
might prove more capable than MANA. 
4. Combat Model
a. Combat Model Approach
Combat was simulated using MANA by means of implementing a 
force- on-force approach of red hostile elements attacking a blue force that had 
been inserted onto the ships. The combat model was simulated on both the 
Container Ship and the Cargo Dhow.  A total of ten boarding team members and 
ten hostile ship crew members were modeled under the scenarios involving the 
Container Ship.  A total of four boarding team members and six hostile crew 
members were modeled under the scenarios for the Cargo Dhow.  Two 
conditions were created; one for the Container Ship and another for the Cargo 
Dhow.  The scenarios created are as follows:
1) Initially Subdued Crew:  the initial processing of the ship's 
crew escalated into a hostile situation.  A portion of ship's crew was initially 
mustered under the watch of a guarding force.  The boarding party interrogated 
the captain of the ship.  Two hostile agents engaged the boarding party at first 
opportunity. Once a gunshot occurs, the mustered crew entered an aggressive 
state and attacked the boarding team personnel located at their location.
2) Initially Hostile Crew:  the boarding party performed a 
dynamic insertion into the ship with a hostile crew of armed agents.  For 
methodical purposes, the initial process of insertion is omitted.  The boarding 
team conducted movement to contact the hostile crew members, neutralizing 
them.  The scenario ended when all ten elements are neutralized.  
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b. Combat Model Approach/Assumptions and Measures of 
Effectiveness
For the purpose of the combat model, a series of assumptions were 
made with respect to the boarding team and the hostile elements:
Boarding Team:  Boarding team members were modeled to have 
assault rifles with a 30 round capacity and an additional 30 rounds of ammo. 
Body armor was selected with settings designed such that each blue element 
needed 2 hits to be killed.  Movement speed was set to 3 km/hr (walking speed) 
and accuracy of the search team members was set to 1, assuming best case 
properties for the search forces.  On the initiation of the attack by the hostile 
elements, the boarding party followed predetermined way-points to conduct the 
search and neutralization of hostile elements. Once contact was made with the 
hostile crew, the boarding team agents took into consideration the cover 
available and move to the next way-point at a reduced rate. 
Hostile Elements: 'Red' hostile agents were equipped with assault 
rifles with a 30 round capacity and additional 30-round reload. The movement 
rate of hostile elements was assumed to be slower (1 km/h), as the hostiles were 
presumed to apply suppression rather than an advance to corner and defeat the 
boarding and searching elements.  Accuracy was set to 80% and body armor 
was excluded, meaning that hostile elements could be neutralized in one shot.  
Hostile agent movement settings were configured for preference for cover and 
concealment from the boarding team and were less inclined to engage the 
boarding team directly. Hostile agents were also set to attempt ambush positions. 
Measures of Effectiveness: to assess the performance of the 
force and equipment configurations for the red and blue forces, the following 
MOEs were determined and measured from MANA over 30 runs: 
a) Mean boarding team casualties per run
b) Mean hostile crew casualties per run
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c) Mean time of run to decisive end
c. Results/Analysis
Table 49 shows an overall summary of the combat model results.











# of Blue 
Wins (out 
of 30)
# or Red 
Wins (out 
of 30)




2.3/10 10/10 30 0 95.8 seconds
Cargo Dhow, 
Initially Subdued
2.1/4 6/6 30 0 14.4 seconds
Container Ship, 
Initially Hostile
5.6/10 9.0/10 19 11 11 minutes
Cargo Dhow, 
Initially Hostile
2.5/4 5.3/6 19 11 62.3 seconds
i) Initially Subdued:  
a) TEU Container Ship:  All 30 runs completed with a 
decisive ending resulting with a boarding team victory.  Mean boarding team 
casualties stood at 2.30+/-0.09 persons.  Mean hostile crew casualties stood at 
10.00+/-0.00.  The mean time taken to reach a decisive end by the boarding 
team was 95.8+/-1.6 seconds (1.59 min +/- 1.6 seconds). 
b) Cargo Dhow:  All 30 runs completed with a decisive 
ending resulting with boarding team victory. Mean Boarding Team Casualties 
were recorded at 2.13+/-0.06.  Mean Hostile Crew Casualties were 6.00+/-0.00.  
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Mean time to a decisive end was recorded at 14.4 +/-1.2 (0.24 min +/- 1.2 
seconds).  
An interesting observation was that both scenarios end under two 
minutes, suggesting that a subdued crew at the early onset of the boarding led to 
a potentially short conflict should one arise, irrespective of the size of the ship.  
Early exertion of control on the ship could have played a role in this. 
ii) Initially Hostile:  
a) TEU Container Ship:  Mean casualties taken by the 
boarding party are 5.63 +/-0.45.  Of 30 runs, the boarding team was the victor in 
19 of them.  Mean Hostile Crew Casualties were 9.00+/-0.34 at 11 wins.  The 
mean time taken to end each conflict was 704.5+/-102.7 seconds (11mins +/-
2.11mins).  
b) Cargo Dhow:  30 of 30 runs completed.  Mean 
Boarding team casualties stood at 2.50+/-0.24.  Mean hostile crew casualty 
numbers were 5.33+/-0.19.  The mean time to a decisive win was 62.3+/-2.5 
(1.03+/-2.5 seconds).
Intuitively, one expects the larger ship to have a more extended 
conflict than the smaller cargo dhow.  This is so in the MANA simulations.  
Combat on the Container Ship with the current configurations and performance 
were shown to result in approximately 50% casualties in the boarding group of 10 
personnel.  This is the same for the smaller ship, which had fewer hiding places 
and small deck space to fight within.  
d. Further Study
Increasing Ship Complexity:  The formulation of a generalized 
model for the combat simulation was not considered as it was assumed that the 
general layout of a container ship would reasonably be the same for all standard 
300
TEU carrying ships.  It would therefore be interesting to determine if the impact of 
ship complexity on the outcome of combat situation.  This model would evaluate 
the performance of the boarding party in general situations and its potential 
performance if the party was expected to board a ship other than a cargo vessel. 
Combat Evolving out of Search Underway:  For methodical 
purposes, the combat situations derived either occur spontaneously due to an 
agitator or are already part of the initial situation.  It is reasonable to expect that 
search inspectors may be attacked during a search.  In considering this situation, 
two questions arose:
 Would it be better if the inspectors adopted a clear-secure-inspect 
approach to moving from compartment to compartment, or 
enforced a complete clear, secure and continuous search of the 
ship?  In the event of a combat situation arising, which of these 
options would perform better?
 Would the involvement of forward sensors have improved the 
process and the favorable outcome of a combat situation?  UGVs 
and man-operated sensors have been employed desert and urban 
terrain.  Would they have been any impact with respect to a 
combat situation on a ship? 
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APPENDIX B. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING INFORMATION
A.  DOMAIN PROCESS MODEL DESCRIPTION
The DPM is formulated for problem solving, but in its abstraction, focuses 
on prototyping trade studies to reach ahead to solutions that then become the 
drivers for more detailed analyses.  The essential domains are requirements, 
behaviors, architecture, and validation/verification.  The dynamics of the Domain 
Process Model and the operational process is defined by the Behavioral Rules.  
These Behavioral Rules describe the interconnections among the Enterprise 
Activities (organic in a logistically barren environment) according to the following 
paradigms: start and end of a process; or join and iteration.  To guarantee 
consistency among the Enterprise Activities and the functional entities derived 
from the functional decomposition, a set of capabilities that fulfill the Enterprise 
activity requirements are specified by scenarios (or UML).  Within each domain 
the analysis proceeds as follows:
1.  Requirement interactions
A requirement (from the requirements’ domain) interacts with the 
Behavior Domain, which in turn interacts with the Architecture Domain, which is 
likewise interactive with the V&V Domain.  This interaction takes place in the 
Process Domain, the harbinger of analyses and trade-offs. 
2.  Requirement derivations
The requirements are derived as normal in the Systems 
Engineering Process, representing the customer’s view(s) of the system or 
system of systems.  The primary means for deriving requirements is through 
Functional Analysis (mainstay being functional decomposition and synthesis). 
306
3.  Requirement and behaviors
Each requirement is facilitated by a behavior (captured in the 
Behavior Domain).  Behaviors are typically the result of UML (Universal Modeling 
Language) Activity diagrams (called Workflow Activity Diagrams) that represent 
the structural and functional enterprise objects.  For example, the operations 
such as enterprise operations (organic), human resources, and equipment 
resources are captured in workflow concepts using “use cases”.  Dropping the 
formality of UML, and retaining the notion of Workflow Activity Diagrams within 
Scenarios, suffices sufficiently to map requirements to behaviors. 
4.  Requirement and architecture
The Behavior Domain interacts with the Architecture Domain by 
allocating behaviors to physical components.  The results of that allocation are 
considered by trade-studies and recorded in the Process Domain. 
Each trade-study and modeling activity is verified and validated in the V&V 
Domain with inputs from the Requirements Domain and the Architecture Domain. 
The ultimate application of the DPM is to derive modules of functionality 
(activities and processes) that are independent of each other.  A module 
implements an indivisible function, having only one input and one output.  
Independence means that the function of the module is unaffected by the source 
of the input, the destination of its output, and the history of the module.  Modules 
must be separately testable and have uniform work content.  Such refinements 
are the signs of a robust process and design.  Looking over the application of 
DPM to SEA-13 implies that modules of work should offer flexibility in changing 
the aggregate unit to improve performance (and therefore quality).  This flexibility 
is enhanced by dividing the tasks up into major functionalities.  The result is a 
change made to one module should have only local effects for each change to 
that module of work. 
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B.  FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSITION OF ‘TO DO A MIO’
1.0 Provide Logistic Support
1.1 To Transport
1.1.1 Communicate with US TRANSCOM
1.1.2 Establish requirements for supplies at critical nodes
1.1.3 Establish requirements for movement of supplies between 
nodes and point of departure.
1.1.4 Establish requirements between nodes and resupply areas
1.1.5 Establish nodes
1.1.6 Establish resupply areas
1.1.7 Determine point of departure.
1.1.8 Monitor logistics
1.1.8.1 Analyze equipment availability
1.1.8.2 Monitor levels at nodes
1.1.8.3 Monitor levels at resupply areas
1.1.9 Determine equipment availability
1.1.10 Coordinate sustenance operations
1.1.11 Activate reserve assets
1.2 To Maintain
1.2.1 Conduct corrective maintenance
1.2.2 Conduct preventative maintenance
1.2.3 Track numbers and frequencies of failures
1.2.4 Obtain external assistance
1.2.4.1 Ability to reach-back to OEM
1.2.4.2 Ability to reach-back to higher level depot 
expertise
1.2.5 Send irresolvable defects to higher level depot. 
1.3 To Supply









1.3.10 Disposal of end items (repairables and consumables) 
2.0 Provide for Information Superiority
2.1 Conduct Communications
2.1.1 Select appropriate equipment
2.1.1.1 Determine worst-case ranges
2.1.1.2 Determine worst-case environmental 
conditions
2.1.1.3 Determine worst-case data-rate needs
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2.1.1.4 Match channel impediments and requirements 
with comms equipment capabilities
2.1.2 Acquire comms equipment
2.1.3 Disperse comms equipment to operating personnel
2.1.4 Perform training on operation of communications gear
2.2 Do Intelligence work
2.2.1 Plan Information Collection
2.2.1.1 Plan for biometric collection
2.2.1.2 Determine need for document exploitation
2.2.1.3 Determine need for non-networked computer 
exploitation (NNCE)
2.2.2 Collect Information
2.2.2.1 Maintain a chain of custody of intelligence
2.2.2.2 Collect Biometric Information
2.2.2.2.1 Take face pictures
2.2.2.2.2 Take fingerprints
2.2.2.2.3 Take Iris photographs
2.2.2.3 Collect document information
2.2.2.3.1 Create digital images of documents
2.2.2.3.2 Search for documents
2.2.2.4 Collect information from non-networked 
computers (NNC)
2.2.2.4.1 Gain physical access to NNC
2.2.2.4.2 Copy computer hard-drives
2.2.2.4.3 Search computer hard-drives
2.2.2.4.4 Offload gathered data
2.2.3 Process and Explain information
2.2.3.1 Move information
2.2.3.1.1 Move collected information from target ship 
to parent ship
2.2.3.1.1.1 Electronically transmit information
2.2.3.1.1.1.1 Render information into 
transmittable form
2.2.3.1.1.1.2 Encrypt information at 
Target ship
2.2.3.1.1.1.3 Transmit information from 
Target ship to parent ship
2.2.3.1.1.1.4 Receive information at 
parent ship
2.2.3.1.1.1.5 Decrypt information at 
parent ship
2.2.3.1.1.1.6 Verify success of 
transmission at parent and 
target ship
2.2.3.1.1.2 Physically move information
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2.2.3.1.1.2.1 Package information for 
safe handling
2.2.3.1.1.2.2 Apply appropriate 
markings
2.2.3.1.1.2.3 Identify route to physically 
move captured information
2.2.3.1.1.2.4 Identify information carrier
2.2.3.1.1.2.5 Move information
2.2.3.1.1.2.6 Unpackage information
2.2.3.1.2 Move collected information from parent ship 
to off ship subject matter expert (SME)
2.2.3.1.2.1 Identify route to SME
2.2.3.1.2.2 Encrypt Information
2.2.3.1.2.3 Transmit from parent ship to SME 
via identified route.
2.2.3.1.2.4 Receive information at SME
2.2.3.1.2.5 Decrypt information
2.2.3.1.2.6 Verify success of transmission
2.2.3.2 Translate captured documents to Parent ship 
native language




3.1 Determine force requirements/mix
3.2 Determine Mission
3.3 Contingency planning
3.3.1 Handle confiscated ship disposal
3.3.2 Handle disposal of toxic/elicit cargo
3.4 Assign parent ships to target ships
3.5 Maintain a common operational picture
3.5.1 Determine friendly force status
3.5.1.1 Communicate with friendly forces
3.5.1.2 Receive position/status reports from friendly 
units
3.5.2 Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness
3.6 Disperse orders to friendly forces
4.0 Maneuver
4.1 Receive mission/orders
4.2 Launch UAV for ISR
4.3 Intercept compliant adversaries (level 1)
4.3.1 Close to within VHF radio range 
4.3.2 Instruct target vessel via bridge to bridge radio, channel 16.
4.3.3 Observe vessel response
4.3.4 Position parent ship for ideal employment of boarding team
4.3.5 Launch boarding teams
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4.3.6 Support boarding teams
4.3.7 Recover boarding teams
4.4 Intercept non-compliant adversaries (levels 2 and 3)
4.4.1 Launch armed UAV or armed manned helicopter
4.4.2 Launch armed USV
4.4.3 Utilize Rules of Engagement
4.4.4 Demonstrate a show of force
4.4.5 Fire warning shots
4.4.6 Employ non-violent weapons
4.4.7 Implement disabling fire
4.4.8 Conduct battle damage assessment
4.4.8.1 Determine if boarding is now level 1
4.5 Intercept hostile adversaries (level 4)
4.5.1 Same procedures as  4.4.
4.6 Protect the boarding team
4.6.1 Provide armed presence in vicinity of boarding team
4.6.2 Utilize rules of engagement
4.6.3 Conduct ISR in vicinity of boarding team
4.6.4 Communicate with the boarding team
4.6.5 Respond to calls for fire from the boarding team
5.0 To Board
5.1 Assemble boarding teams [8 member teams]
5.1.1 Receive/process/disseminate information/intelligence on 
vessel to be boarded.
5.1.1.1 Determine classification of the ship
5.1.1.2 Determine compliant status
5.1.1.3 Determine non-compliant status
5.1.1.4 Determine opposed status
5.1.2 Determine equipment for boarding based on ship’s status
5.1.3 Conduct boarding brief on methods and procedures to use to 
board the target vessel.
5.1.3.1 Determine insertion/extraction method
5.1.3.1.1 Prepare for air insertion/extraction
5.1.3.1.2 Prepare for sea insertion/extraction
5.1.3.2 Conduct communications
5.1.3.2.1 Conduct pre-emptive communications 
check
5.1.3.2.2 Conduct communications between team 
members
5.1.3.2.3 Conduct communications between teams 
and parent ship.
5.2 Launch boarding teams (Sea/Air)
5.2.1 Launch scout team(s)
5.2.1.1 Conduct initial check of vessel (SH-
60/UAV/Scout team)
5.2.1.2 Confirm the vessel is safe to board
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5.2.1.3 Approach and board vessel
5.3 Board Vessel (Approx 8 member team)
5.3.1 Board sweep team for initial security investigation (2 
members)
5.3.1.1 Provide initial check of ship for 
personnel/suspicious activity.
5.3.2 Board engineering team (2 members)
5.3.2.1 Consult with target ship’s main engineer
5.3.2.2 Inspect target ship’s engineering spaces
5.3.3 Board Security team (1-2 members)
5.3.3.1 Muster the crew on the forecastle
5.3.4 Board boarding officer & assistant boarding officer
6.0 Search
6.1 Determine search methodology (exhaustive, random or targeted)
6.2 Determine search target set (weapons, narcotics, people, etc)
6.3 Determine needed asset mix to search a ship
6.3.1 Determine number of people needed
6.3.2 Determine amount of time needed
6.3.3 Determine a probability of detection
6.3.4 Determine a probability of false alarm
6.4 Transport search equipment to or from the parent and target ships.
6.5 Search the ship
6.5.1 Unpack containers
6.5.2 Repack containers
6.5.3 Search inside containers
6.5.4 Conduct swabs for IMS analysis
6.5.5 Conduct IMS analysis
6.5.6 Utilize search equipment
7.0 Recover
7.1 Utilize armed assets to provide security for boarding team
7.1.1 Communicate with supporting assets
7.1.2 Transmit status to supporting assets
7.1.3 Receive warnings from supporting assets
7.2 Disembark from target ship
7.3 Return to parent ship
8.0 Detain
8.1 Communicate with detained ship
8.2 Determine weapons availability
8.3 Match weapons to target
8.4 Determine weapons payload
8.5 Utilize show of force against detained ship
8.6 Utilize warning shots against detained ship
8.7 Utilize disabling fire against detained ship
8.8 Conduct BDA against detained ship
8.9 Utilize non-lethal weapons against detained ship
9.0 Destroy
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9.1 Determine weapons availability
9.2 Match weapons to target
9.3 Determine weapons payload
9.4 Determine CEP for intended weapon
9.5 Assess battle damage
9.6 Report event
10.0 Legal
10.1 Develop Rules of Engagement
10.2 Communicate intelligence into evidence
10.3 Determine status of displaced persons
10.4 Extradite captured personnel to host-nations
10.5 Ensure detainee rights upheld
10.6
11.0 Abort
11.1 Determine threat scenario
11.2 Determine needs for additional assets
11.3 Determine time to withdraw
11.4 Launch additional ISR assets
11.5 Launch additional fire support assets
11.6 Launch SAR assets
11.7 Launch additional RHIBs or helicopters for PAX transfer
11.8 Integrate new assets into command and control scheme
11.9 Retrieve search equipment/team (expeditiously)
11.10 Retrieve boarding team (expeditiously)
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Global Shipping lanes are vital to the new Global Economy.  
Despite recent advances in transportation and aircraft, ships still remain the 
cheapest way to move large amounts cargo, a long distance.  The maritime 
environment provides a route for neutral, friendly, and enemy forces to move 
cargo, material, and people in the busy shipping lanes.  As a part of the 
continuing war on terror, Maritime Intercept and Security operations are a 
growing set of capabilities required to protect United States flagged vessels and 
maintain the ocean free for international trade.  The loss of the sea lanes would 
be catastrophic to the United States and her Allies.  The goals of the operations 
are hard to define but critical to protect; therefore operations may be terminated 
upon reaching a political environment conducive to ending operations.
b. Policy Goals
Military conditions leading to mission accomplishment are 
impossible to verify.  Worthy goals such as the elimination of terrorism, 
smuggling, or piracy are impossible to measure.  However, goals such as the 
achievement of theater security may be measured modestly through the 
observation of free flow of maritime trade in the AO and through a measurable
reduction in incidents of piracy and maritime terrorism.
c. Non-US National Political Decisions
Since shipping lanes are global by nature, the U.S. government and 
NGOs should be ready to cooperate and facilitate operations to support free 
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trade in the maritime environment.  The U.S. is committed to U.N. Conference on 
the Law of The Sea (UNCLOS) even pending ratification by the Senate.  This 
document provides guidelines to nations on the enforcement of sovereignty in the 
maritime environment, and the commitment to have fee use of the seas for the 
purpose of trade. 
d. Operational Limitations
Operations shall be limited by the U.N. Conference on the Law of 
the Sea, including but not limited to international convention regarding territorial 
waters and international straits.  Although the United States has not formally 
ratified this document it abides by the principles of the document.  
The Area of Operations is assumed to be logistically barren, which 
means all items are available but their expected arrival time and lifetime is not 
known.  Therefore, the force must be self-sustaining for a period of at least 90 
days.  The force must also be capable of conducting robust search operations 
and the Visit Board and Search aspects of the MIO mission.  U.S. forces must 
also be capable of protecting U.S. flagged vessels and U.S. territory in the 
region.  
2. Area of Concern
a. Operational Area
The Battle Space is defined as any Littoral or Open Ocean area in 
the World.  The U.S. and coalition will establish Maritime Security Zones with 
international cooperation to protect all shipping and interdict all disruptive cargo 
in the operating area.
b. Area of Interest
The force shall be concerned with any high interest shipping lanes, 
defined by high density traffic of a multi-national nature and a frequent 
recurrence of piracy.  The force shall also monitor critical choke points in its AO 
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due to the significance these passages hold to the global economy and a global 
interest in keeping these straits open to traffic.  The force must also be capable 
of searching a large area for specific targets for intercept.
3. Deterrent Operations
The force will be capable of conducting deterrent operations at any time 
during the operations.  These operations will include the escort of U.S. flagged 
vessels the enforcement of the UNCLOS principles, and defense of U.S. EEZ 
and sovereign waters. 
4. Risk
Risk to friendly units includes loss of life and equipment, infringement on 
sovereign nations’ territorial waters, and impedance of Maritime trade (via 
boarding operations).
5. Adversary Forces
Adversary forces are not traditional state-based military organizations.  
The adversaries belong to three distinct groups: Disruptive, pirate, and smuggler.
a. Adversary Centers of Gravity
Disruptive organizations use merchant traffic to achieve their 
political goals.  The maritime shipping lanes are their center of gravity.
Pirates target merchant traffic for the purpose of financial profit.  
They require a home base from which to conduct raids on shipping.  The pirates’ 
center of gravity is the coastal home village.
Smugglers exploit the sea lanes to move their various goods for 
financial profit.  The smugglers’ center of gravity is the maritime shipping lanes.









b. Adversary Courses of Action
(1) General:   
The enemy will spread its ideals to regional states to achieve 
a governments aligned with their ideals.  The will use any means to transport 
illegal cargo across the maritime domain.  They will not hesitate to attack neutral 
and adversary forces to achieve their endstate.
(2) Adversary’s End State:  
The formation of a group of disruptive states with the same 
ideology in the region is the political and economic goal.  
(3) Adversary’s Strategic Objectives:   
To prevent U.S. and Allied Nations use of the shipping lanes 
without acknowledging the disruptive state as regional power.  
(4) Adversary’s Operational Objectives:   
Deny use of Global straits to the global economy.
(5) Adversary’s Concept of Operations:   
Utilize the busy straits to move equipment and personnel 
within the region to achieve regional goals.  Disrupt the straits using any means 
while protecting shipments and enemy supplies incoming to the home island.
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c. Other Adversary Forces and Capabilities
Coalition forces can expect enemy shipping up to 300 tons with 
weapons up to 50 cal and RPG.  The enemy will also use large commercial ships 
but will not protect the cargo; instead it will rely on the volume of traffic to 
disguise its true intent.  The enemy may resort to hidden explosive and suicide 
attacks to achieve its goals.
d. Adversary Reserve Mobilization
None, the enemy has mobilized to its full extent.
6. Friendly Forces
a. Friendly Centers of Gravity
(1) Strategic:  
The disruption / destruction of U.S. flagged cargo vessels 
through the straits.  Also the disruption / destruction of goods destined to or from 
U.S. ports
b. Multinational Forces
Due to the global nature of international channels and shipping 
lanes the U.S. expects to work with a coalition force.  Regional allies, regional 
support agencies, or countries with similar economic interests would all be 
potential force contributors.  The protection of global straits will also receive 
attention from the United Nations and other international governing bodies.
c. Supporting Commands and Agencies
The Commander would expect significant support from the 
Department of State in building a coalition and members of the combined force.   
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7. Assumptions
a. Threat Warning and Timeline
Not Included due to General Nature of these CONOPS
b. Pre-positioning and Regional Access
Regional access is expected from Coalition partners providing 
forces.
c. In-Place Forces
Within the organic force, various ships will carry different numbers 
and varieties of MIO Boarding Teams (BTs).  The teams shall be VBSS and 
HVBSS capable.  PC/FFG will carry two BTs each, while DDG/CG and LPD/LSD 
will carry three BTs each.  LHD/CVN will carry four BTs.  The 
LPD/LSD/LHD/CVN shall be SOF capable.
d. Strategic Assumptions
Non-organic forces in the AO are expected to be fluid and vary by 
region.  However, it is assumed that UAV/USV/UCAVs are available and that 
there are Red Cross assets in place in the region.
Because AO is considered logistically barren, there will be no 
logistic support.  Forces must be sustainable for 90 days.
UN support, if any, will be limited.
e. Legal Considerations
(1) International Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, to 
include the UNCLOS will apply.  MIO during Transit Passage and in Littoral 
Areas must be handled carefully and in accordance with UNCLOS.
(2) United States Law
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(3) Host nation and Coalition laws
(4) ROE will be limited.  Self Defense always applies.
(5) Status-of-Forces Agreements
(6) Other bilateral treaties and agreements including 
Article 98 agreements
B. MISSION
1. To deny Disruptive/Criminal/Pirate organizations from moving 
people, goods, weapons, or supplies through the established Maritime Domain.
2. To keep Sea Lanes open for trade and commerce while denying 
the enemy the ability to resupply or damage coalition states.
C. EXECUTION
1. Concept of Operations
a. Commander’s Intent
(1) Purpose and End State  
Operation will be terminated based on conditions of the 
political environment.  When policy goals have been met and the political 
environment is conducive to ending operations, the Coalition leaders will issue 
orders to terminate operations.
(2) Objectives
To conduct Maritime Intercept Operations, spanning the 
continuum of force as required, with zero friendly losses.
Orientation on adversary’s strategic and operational COGs.
Protection of friendly strategic and operational COGs.
(3) Effects
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 Reduction in disruptive/pirate events.
Increase in cooperation from local mariners and 
governments, such as an increase in reports of suspicious activity and an 
increase in local law enforcement participation.
b. General
(1) JFC’s military objectives, supporting desired effects, 
and operational focus
(2) Orientation on the adversary’s strategic and 
operational COG’s
(3) Protection of friendly strategic and operational COG’s
c. PHASE OPERATIONS
Found in Chapter 3 
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APPENDIX D. INDIVIDUAL PLATFORM RESULTS
(Characteristics used in evaluation were derived from the source: Jane’s Fighting ships)
The following are the results and breakdown of the 108 ship platforms based on 10 characteristics.  Each characteristic was weighted and then 

























Tarawa class (LHA) 0.26 1.15 1.15 0.72 0.38 1.15 1.03 0.90 1.15 1.15 9.05
LHA 6 class 0.26 1.15 1.15 0.62 0.45 1.15 1.03 0.90 1.15 1.15 9.01
Wasp class (LHD) 0.26 1.15 1.15 0.62 0.38 1.15 1.03 0.90 1.15 1.15 8.95
Ticonderoga class cruisers (US) 0.51 1.04 1.04 0.82 0.51 1.04 0.92 0.81 1.15 1.04 8.88
Arleigh Burke class (US) 0.51 1.04 1.04 0.82 0.51 1.04 0.92 0.81 1.15 1.04 8.88
Keelung (Kidd) class (Taiwan)
0.58 1.04 1.04 0.92 0.51 1.04 0.72 0.81 1.15 1.04 8.85
Spruance class (US) 0.51 1.04 1.04 0.82 0.45 1.04 0.92 0.81 1.15 1.04 8.82
San Antonio class LPD (US) 0.26 1.15 1.15 0.62 0.38 1.15 0.82 0.90 1.15 1.15 8.74
Austin class LPD (US) 0.26 1.15 1.15 0.62 0.38 1.15 0.82 0.72 1.15 1.15 8.56
De la Penne (Italy) 0.51 1.04 1.04 0.82 0.45 1.04 0.72 0.72 1.15 1.04 8.53
Hobart Class (Australia) 0.51 0.92 0.92 0.82 0.51 1.04 0.72 0.81 1.15 1.04 8.45
Jeanne de Arc (France) 0.45 1.04 1.15 0.82 0.38 0.81 1.03 0.54 1.15 1.04 8.41
Cheng Kung class (KWANG HUA 1 
PROJECT) (Taiwan)
0.45 1.04 0.92 0.82 0.45 0.81 0.92 0.81 1.15 1.04 8.41
Alvaro de Bazan (Spain) 0.51 0.92 0.92 0.82 0.45 1.04 0.72 0.81 1.15 1.04 8.38


























Freedom class (LCS) 0.45 0.35 0.92 1.03 0.51 1.04 0.92 0.81 1.15 1.15 8.33
Elli (Kortenaer) class (Greece) 0.45 0.81 0.92 0.82 0.45 1.04 0.92 0.72 1.15 1.04 8.32
Oliver Hazard Perry Class (Australia)
0.45 0.92 0.92 0.82 0.45 0.81 0.92 0.81 1.15 1.04 8.29
Oliver Hazard Perry class (US) 0.45 0.92 0.92 0.82 0.45 0.81 0.92 0.81 1.15 1.04 8.29
G-Class (OH Perry) (Turkey) 0.45 0.92 0.92 0.82 0.45 0.81 0.92 0.81 1.15 1.04 8.29
Anzac Class (Australia)
0.51 0.81 0.92 0.82 0.45 1.04 0.72 0.81 1.15 1.04 8.27
Iroquois (Canada) 0.45 0.92 1.04 0.82 0.51 1.04 0.82 0.45 1.15 1.04 8.24
Barbaros class (MEKO 200TN type) 
(Turkey) 0.51 0.81 0.92 0.82 0.51 1.04 0.72 0.72 1.15 1.04 8.24
ENDURANCE CLASS (Singapore)
0.38 1.04 1.15 0.41 0.38 1.15 0.92 0.72 1.04 1.04 8.24
Maestrale (Italy) 0.45 0.92 0.92 0.82 0.45 1.04 0.72 0.72 1.15 1.04 8.23
Hydra class (Meko 200 HN) (Greece) 0.51 0.81 0.92 0.72 0.45 1.04 0.72 0.81 1.15 1.04 8.17
Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry (LSD) 0.26 1.15 1.15 0.62 0.38 1.15 0.41 0.72 1.15 1.15 8.15
Santa Maria (Spain) 0.45 0.92 0.92 0.82 0.45 0.81 0.72 0.81 1.15 1.04 8.09
Broadsword class Type 22 (UK) 0.45 0.92 1.15 0.82 0.45 0.81 0.72 0.54 1.15 1.04 8.05
Bremen (Germany) 0.51 0.92 1.04 0.82 0.45 0.81 0.72 0.54 1.15 1.04 8.00
AHMAD YANI (VAN SPEIJK) CLASS 
(FFGHM) 0.38 0.92 0.92 0.72 0.45 1.04 0.72 0.63 1.15 1.04 7.97
Daring class Type 45 (UK) 0.38 0.81 0.92 0.72 0.45 1.04 0.92 0.54 1.15 1.04 7.97
Type 42 (UK) 0.45 0.92 1.04 0.82 0.45 0.81 0.72 0.54 1.15 1.04 7.94


























Kang Ding (La Fayette) class (Kwang 
Hua 2 project) (Taiwan)
0.45 0.81 0.92 0.62 0.38 1.04 0.72 0.81 1.15 1.04 7.94
Halifax (Canada) 0.38 0.92 0.92 0.82 0.45 1.04 0.72 0.45 1.15 1.04 7.90
La Fayette (France) 0.45 0.81 0.92 0.72 0.38 1.04 0.72 0.63 1.15 1.04 7.86
GEARING (WU CHIN III 
CONVERSION) (FRAM I) CLASS 
(Taiwan) 0.51 0.92 0.92 0.82 0.26 1.04 0.72 0.45 1.15 1.04 7.83
MULTIROLE VESSELS (LPD/APCR)
0.26 0.92 1.04 0.31 0.32 1.04 0.92 0.81 1.15 1.04 7.81
FATAHILLAH CLASS (FFG/FFGH)
0.45 0.81 0.58 0.82 0.45 1.04 0.72 0.72 1.15 1.04 7.77
Duke class Type 23 (UK) 0.45 0.81 0.92 0.82 0.45 0.81 0.72 0.54 1.15 1.04 7.71
Vasco da Gama (Portugal)
0.38 0.69 0.58 0.62 0.45 1.04 0.92 0.54 1.15 1.04 7.41
Thetis class (Denmark)
0.45 0.46 1.04 0.51 0.45 1.04 0.72 0.54 1.15 1.04 7.40
FORMIDABLE CLASS (Singapore)
0.45 0.46 0.81 0.82 0.45 0.81 0.72 0.81 1.04 1.04 7.40
Baleares (Spain) 0.51 0.92 1.04 0.82 0.32 1.04 0.41 0.00 1.15 1.04 7.26
Baptista de Andrade (Portugal)
0.38 0.69 0.58 0.62 0.45 1.04 0.72 0.54 1.15 1.04 7.21
KAKAP (PB 57) CLASS (NAV III and 
IV) (LARGE PATROL CRAFT) 
(PBOH)
0.32 0.69 0.58 0.82 0.45 0.81 0.72 0.63 1.15 1.04 7.21


























Tariq (Amazon) (Pakistan) 0.51 0.81 0.92 0.82 0.51 1.04 0.63 0.69 1.15 0.00 7.09
Horizon (France) 0.51 0.81 0.92 0.82 0.45 0.00 0.72 0.54 1.15 1.04 6.96
STEREGUSHCHIY CLASS 
(PROJECT 20382) (FFGH)
0.45 0.00 0.92 0.72 0.38 0.81 0.72 0.72 1.15 1.04 6.91
Georges Leygues (France) 0.45 0.81 0.92 0.82 0.45 1.04 0.72 0.54 1.15 0.00 6.90
Knox class (Taiwan)
0.45 1.04 0.92 0.72 0.32 0.81 0.00 0.45 1.15 1.04 6.90
Tourville (France) 0.45 0.92 1.04 0.82 0.38 0.81 0.72 0.54 1.15 0.00 6.83
Zulfiquar (Leander) (Pakistan) 0.38 0.92 0.92 0.72 0.45 0.81 0.63 0.69 1.15 0.00 6.68
Joao Coutinho (Portugal)
0.45 0.46 0.46 0.62 0.45 0.81 0.41 0.54 1.15 1.04 6.38
KI HAJAR DEWANTARA CLASS 
(FFGH/FFT) 0.45 0.81 0.92 0.51 0.38 0.81 0.72 0.63 0.00 1.04 6.27
Braunschweig (Germany) 0.45 0.46 0.00 0.62 0.38 0.81 0.72 0.54 1.15 1.04 6.17
TACOMA TYPE (LSTH)
0.32 0.92 1.04 0.31 0.38 1.04 0.92 0.81 0.00 0.00 5.74
Floreal (France) 0.45 0.46 0.35 0.62 0.38 0.81 0.72 0.63 1.15 0.00 5.56
Artigliere (Italy) 0.32 0.81 0.92 0.92 0.45 1.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 5.50
Joao Belo (Portugal)
0.38 0.81 0.92 0.62 0.38 1.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 5.19
Descubierta (Spain) 0.45 0.69 0.81 0.72 0.38 1.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 5.13
SAMADIKUN (CLAUD JONES) 
CLASS (FF) 0.38 0.92 0.92 0.41 0.38 1.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 5.10
River PC (UK) 0.38 0.12 0.35 0.51 0.38 1.04 0.00 0.00 1.15 1.04 4.97
Suffren (France) 0.45 1.04 1.04 0.82 0.38 1.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.77


























Pyrpolitis (Hellenic 56) class (Batch 1) 
(Greece) 0.45 0.35 0.92 0.72 0.38 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 4.67
Armatolos (Osprey 55) class (Greece) 0.45 0.35 0.92 0.72 0.38 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 4.67
Ho Hsing class (LARGE PATROL 
CRAFT) (Taiwan) 0.19 0.69 0.58 0.62 0.51 1.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 4.67
SIGMA CLASS (CORVETTES) (FS)
0.38 0.81 0.58 0.72 0.38 0.81 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.40
KAPITAN PATIMURA (PARCHIM I) 
CLASS (PROJECT 1331) (FS)
0.38 0.69 0.58 0.51 0.38 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 4.40
Jin Chiang class (LARGE PATROL 
CRAFT) (Taiwan)
0.38 0.58 0.58 0.62 0.38 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 4.38
Laskos (La Combattante III) class 
(Greece)
0.51 0.35 0.35 0.82 0.45 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 4.32
Offshore patrol vessel (Taiwan)
0.26 0.35 0.58 0.62 0.38 1.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 4.26
Offshore patrol craft (Taiwan)
0.19 0.35 0.58 0.82 0.45 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 4.23
Niels Juel class (Denmark)
0.45 0.46 0.35 0.72 0.38 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 4.21
TODAK (PB 57) CLASS (NAV V) 
(LARGE PATROL CRAFT) 
(PBO)(Indonesia)
0.32 0.46 0.58 0.62 0.38 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 4.21
SINGA (PB 57) CLASS (NAV I and II) 
(LARGE PATROL CRAFT) (PBO)


























Coastal patrol craft (Taiwan)
0.19 0.46 0.58 0.72 0.38 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 4.18
Machitis class (Greece)
0.38 0.35 0.35 0.72 0.38 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 4.14
VICTORY CLASS (Singapore)
0.45 0.35 0.00 0.92 0.51 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 4.08
Hunt PC (UK) 0.38 0.12 0.35 0.51 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.15 1.04 3.94
PULAU RENGAT (TRIPARTITE) 
CLASS (MHSC)
0.26 0.46 0.58 0.31 0.45 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 3.90
Yun Hsing class (COASTAL PATROL 
CRAFT) (Taiwan)
0.19 0.46 0.58 0.51 0.26 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 3.85
DAMEN STAN PATROL 3507 
(PATROL CRAFT) (Singapore)
0.26 0.23 0.00 0.92 0.51 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 3.77
Niki (Thetis) (Type 420) class 
(Greece) 0.38 0.35 0.35 0.51 0.32 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 3.76
KAL-36 PATROL CRAFT (PB)
0.26 0.23 0.00 0.92 0.45 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 3.71
Kilic (Turkey) 0.45 0.35 0.58 0.92 0.38 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.49
FEARLESS CLASS (Singapore)
0.45 0.23 0.00 0.51 0.45 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 3.49
Tolmi (asheville) class (Greece)
0.45 0.23 0.00 0.62 0.26 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 3.40
Pao Hsing class (COASTAL PATROL 
CRAFT) (Taiwan)
0.19 0.35 0.00 0.51 0.32 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 3.22


























DAGGER CLASS (FAST ATTACK 
CRAFT-MISSILE) (PTFG)
0.45 0.46 0.58 0.82 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.76
Yildiz class (FPB 57 type)(Turkey) 0.45 0.35 0.58 0.92 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.68
Azmat (Huangfeng/Osa-I) (Pakistan) 0.32 0.35 0.69 0.92 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.67
Votsis (La Combattante IIA) (Type 
148) class (Greece) 0.45 0.35 0.35 0.92 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.51
Roussen (Super Vita) class (Greece)
0.45 0.35 0.35 0.82 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.47
Larkana (Pakistan) 0.32 0.35 0.69 0.62 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.29
Jalalat (Pakistan) 0.26 0.35 0.69 0.62 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.23
AUK CLASS (Philippines)
0.32 0.46 0.69 0.41 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.21
SEA WOLF CLASS (FAST ATTACK 
CRAFT-MISSILE) (Singapore)
0.38 0.35 0.00 0.92 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.17
Rajshahi (Town class) (Pakistan) 0.26 0.23 0.69 0.62 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.05
TOMAS BATILO (SEA DOLPHIN) 
CLASS (FAST ATTACK CRAFT) 
(Philippines) 0.26 0.23 0.00 0.92 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.79
CYCLONE CLASS (COASTAL 
PATROL SHIP) (Philippines)
0.13 0.23 0.00 0.92 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.67
SAN JUAN CLASS (Philippines) 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.62 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.29
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APPENDIX E. RESULTS FOR OPTIMIZATION OF FORCE STRUCTURE BASED ON MANPOWER
Appendix E shows the results of the Excel solver breakdown of ships to form the force structure to be compared with the three baseline 
Expeditionary Strike Groups with manpower being held constant.  The results displayed are from an imposed 10 ship constraint as well as an 
unconstrained version to show feasibility as discussed in Chapter V.
Qty Ship class Total Manpower Performance
1
Type 42- Batch 
Destroyer 599 7.94
1 Muavenet (Knox) 250 8.38












Arleigh Burke class 
large multirole 
destroyers 724 17.77
10 Max people 4143
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Max performance 87.12
Constraint: Total # of ships Max ships deployable 
10 10
Force Package 1: Total Manpower Performance
1x LHA, 1x Ticonderoga CG, 1x DDG, 1x 
LSD, 1x LPD, 1x FFG 4143 86.39
Force Package 2:
1x LHD, 1x LPD, 1x LSD, 1x FFG, 2x 
DDG 4218 86.22
Force Package 3:




Joao Coutinho (2), Machitis class(2), Laskos (La Combattante III)(2), Niki (Thetis) (Type 420)(2), Pyrpolitis 
(Hellenic 56)(2), Armatolos (Osprey 55) (2), Votsis (La Combattante IIA) (2), Tolmi (asheville) (2), Freedom 
class (LCS)(2), Kilic (2), Azmat(2), Larkana (2), Rajshahi (2), River PC(2), Hunt PC (2), Jin Chiang (2), 
Offshore patrol vessel (2), Offshore patrol craft (2), Coastal patrol craft (1), Pao Hsing (2), Braunschweig (2), 
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APPENDIX F. RESULTS FOR OPTIMIZATION OF FORCE STRUCTURE BASED ON THE # OF 
HELICOPTERS.
Appendix F shows the results of the Excel solver breakdown of ships to form the force structure to be compared with the three baseline 
Expeditionary Strike Groups with the number of helicopters being held constant.  The results displayed are from an imposed 10 ship constraint as 






1 Arleigh Burke class 2 8.88
1 Type 45- Daring Destroyer 1 7.97
2 AHMAD YANI (VAN SPEIJK) CLASS (FFGHM) 2 15.95
2 Ticonderoga class cruisers 4 17.77
2 Keelung (Kidd) class (DDGHM) 2 17.69
2 Jeanne de Arc 18 16.82
Total 29
Total 85.09





1x LHA, 1x Ticonderoga CG, 1x DDG, 1x LSD, 1x LPD, 1x FFG 31 86.39
Force Package 2:
1x LHD, 1x LPD, 1x LSD, 1x FFG, 2x DDG 31 86.22
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Force Package 3:
1x LHD, 1x LPD, 1x LSD, 1x FFG, 1x DDG 29 85.69
Unconstrained:
31 31 82.2
2 Alvaro de Bazan, 2 Santa Maria, 2 Hobart, 2 Anzac, 2 Hydra, 2 Austin, 2 Whidbey Island, 2 Muavenet (Knox), 2 
Barbaros (Meko 200), 2 Type 22 Broadsword, 2 Type 42 Batch, 2 Type 45 Daring, 2 Cassard, 2 Keelung (Kidd), 1 
Kang Ding, 2 Ahmad Yani 
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APPENDIX G. RESULTS FOR OPTIMIZATION OF FORCE STRUCTURE BASED ON THE # 
OF RIGID HULL INFLATABLE BOATS
Appendix G shows the results of the Excel solver breakdown of ships to form the force structure to be compared with the three baseline 
Expeditionary Strike Groups with the number of RHIBs being held constant.  The results displayed are from an imposed 10 ship constraint as well 
as an unconstrained version to show feasibility as discussed in Chapter V.
QTY Ship Class





Keelung (Kidd) class 
(DDGHM) 2 8.85
1 G-Class (OH Perry) 1 8.29
2
Cheng Kung class 
(KWANG HUA 1 
PROJECT) (FFGHM) 2 16.82
2 Arleigh Burke class 4 17.77
2 Ticonderoga class 4 17.77




Number of ships Max ships deployable 
10 10
Force Package 1:
1x LHA, 1x Ticonderoga CG, 1x DDG, 1x LSD, 1x LPD, 1x FFG 17 86.39
Force Package 2:
1x LHD, 1x LPD, 1x LSD, 1x FFG, 2x DDG 17 86.22
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Force Package 3:
1x LHD, 1x LPD, 1x LSD, 1x FFG, 1x DDG 15 85.69
Unconstrained:
17 17 81.7
1 Type 42 Batch, 2 Cassard, 2 Bremen, 2 Cheng Kung, 2 G-class (OHP), 2 
Jeanne de Arc, 2 FFGs, 2 Santa Maria, 2 Type 22 Broadsword 
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APPENDIX H. IBIS MOBILE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM
Appendix H is a summary of L-1 Identity Solution’s IBIS Mobile Identification System.  It 
details a summary of the equipment’s functions, performance and system requirements, and 
specifications.  Its use is further discussed in Chapter VII.
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APPENDIX I. HAND-HELD INTERAGENCY IDENTITY 
DETECTION EQUIPMENT
Appendix I is a summary of L-1 Identity Solution’s Hand-Held Interagency Detection 
Equipment.  It gives a detailed summary of the equipment and its functions.  It also shows the 
system specifications and requirements needed to operate this equipment.  Its use is 
discussed in Chapter VII.
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APPENDIX J. ROBOTIC SAILBOAT
As described in chapter seven, one candidate system for consideration 
in a system to conduct large area maritime surveillance was the robotic 
sailboat.  Specifications for that craft are below.
Figure 78:  Autonomous Unmanned Surface Vehicle (AUSV) 
Characteristics
Figure 79:  Marketing Information from Harborwing Technoligies, Inc.
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APPENDIX K. SELECTION FOR THE UAV
A. SELECTION PROCESS FOR THE UAV
1. Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP)
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) was used to evaluate the three 
suitable UAV candidates (A160 Hummingbird, MQ-8B Fire Scout and 
Seamos) and select the best platform based on the evaluating criteria.
The evaluating criteria used in AHP analysis are external payload 
(weight), endurance, capabilities (existing + projected), interoperability, ease 
of integration and program risk.  The weights of the criteria are provided below 
and were based on the priority of mission success.
a. External Payload (weight – 13.6%).  
The requirement for external payload is not less than 100kg.  
The higher the payload the platform can carry will be given a higher score.  
b. Endurance (weight – 11.4%).  
The requirement for endurance is not less than 3 hours.  The 
platform with the higher endurance will be given higher score.
c. Capabilities (weight – 17.6%).  
The UAV should have surveillance, identification, force 
protection, targeting and precision attacked capabilities.  The platform with the 
larger roles will be given a higher score.  In some cases, the UAV might not 
be equipped with the required capabilities but there are programs on-going to 
integrate the capabilities on the UAV.  Special consideration will be given for 
these cases.
d. Interoperability (weight – 18.0%) 
Interoperability is a critical consideration in the integration of the 
platform on the surface ship.  If the level of interoperability is high, the 
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platform can utilize the existing facilities of the ship to operate and maintain 
the platform.  
e. Ease of Integration (weight – 19.1%) 
Ease of integration is usually the main consideration when 
integrating an outside platform on the surface ship.  The new platform will 
have its own dedicated control station, special equipment and maintenance 
requirements and the ease of integrating these systems will decide the score 
for this criteria.  
f. Program Risk (weight – 20.3%) 
Program risk would involve many factors such as the ability to 
meet the schedule, the level of new technology and integration involved, 
funding and etc.  
Figure 80:  Criteria Weight
The ability of the 3 UAVs in meeting the criteria are tabulated 
below.  
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Ability to meet Criteria
Criteria
Fire Scout Hummingbird Seamos
External Payload 320 kg 136 kg (300 lbs) 150 kg
Endurance +5 hrs 24-36 hrs 4 hrs
Capabilities
- Surveillance & 
Identification
Yes No Yes
- Targeting Yes No Yes
- Precision Attack Planned No No
Interoperability High High Medium
Ease of Integration High Medium Medium
Program Risk Low High Medium
Table 50: Criteria for UAV Selection
Based on AHP run, MQ-8B Fire Scout has a global weighted 
evaluation of 56.7%, A160 Hummingbird of 26.8% and Seamos of 16.5%.  
Figure 81: Global Weightage for UAV Selection
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Figure 82: Head to Head Weightage Between Fire Scout and Humming 
Bird
Figure 83: Head to Head Weightage Between Fire Scout and Seamos
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Figure 84: AHP Results for UAV Selection
It is recommended, based on AHP results, to select Fire Scout 
(56.7%) as the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle for MIO mission.  
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B.  TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
1. Technical Specification for A160 Hummingbird (US)
Figure 85: A160 Humming Bird
Length: 35 feet
Rotor Diameter: 36 feet
Gross Weight: 4,300pounds
Engine: P&W PW207D Turboshaft
Speed: 140knots
Ceiling: 30,000fts
Total Flight Time: 30 to 40 hrs 






2. Technical Specification for MQ-8B Fire Scout (US)
Figure 86: MQ-8B Fire Scout
Length Folded: 22.87 ft (7.0 m)
Rotor Diameter: 27.50 ft (8.4 m)
Height: 9.42 ft (2.9 m)
Gross Weight: 3150 lbs (1,428.8 kg)
Engine: Rolls-Royce, Model 250-C20W
Speed: 125+ Knots
Ceiling: 20,000 ft (6.1 km)
Total Flight Time with Baseline Payload: 8+hrs 
Total Flight Time with 500 lb Payload: 5+ hrs
Estimated range with Baseline Payload: 110nm
Payload Weight: 320kg
Current Payload: EO/ IR/ LD BRITE Star II, UHF/ VHF 
Comm relay, COBRA Mine Detector, Airborne Comm Package
Weapon Payload: Hydra Universal Rail launcher with 4 70mm 










Engine: One 450 hps Rolls-Royce 250-C20R Turboshaft
Speed: 90kts (max), 55 to 80kts (cruise)
Ceiling: 12,000ft
Total Flight Time: 4.7hrs
Estimated range: 110nm
Payload: 150kg








APPENDIX L. SELECTION PROCESS FOR THE USV
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) was used to evaluate the three 
suitable USV candidates (Protector, Spartan and Silver Marlin) and select the 
best platform based on the evaluating criteria.
Similar to the criteria used in UAV selection, the evaluating criteria 
used in the AHP analysis are External Payload (weight), Endurance, 
Capabilities (existing + projected), Interoperability, Ease of Integration and 
Program Risk.  However, their weights are different from UAV criteria.  Again, 
the weights are selected in terms of mission success priority.  
1. External Payload (weight – 18.0%)
The requirement for external payload is not less than 1500lbs.  The 
higher the payload the platform can carry, the higher the assigned score.  
2. Endurance (weight – 7.0%)
The requirement for endurance is not less than 10 hours.  The platform 
with the higher endurance will be given a higher score.
3. Capabilities (weight – 15.6%)
The UAV should have surveillance, identification, force protection, 
targeting and precision attacked capabilities.  The platform with the larger 
roles will be given a higher score.  In some cases, the UAV might not be 
equipped with the required capabilities but there are programs on-going to 
integrate the capabilities on the UAV.  Special consideration will be given for 
these cases.
4. Interoperability (weight – 18.7%)
Interoperability is a critical consideration in the integration of the 
platform on the surface ship.  If the level of interoperability is high, the 
platform can utilize the existing facilities of the ship to operate and maintain 
the platform.  
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5. Ease of Integration (weight – 18.9%)
Ease of integration is usually the main consideration when integrating 
an outside platform on the surface ship.  The new platform will have its own 
dedicated control station, special equipment and maintenance requirements.  
The ease of integrating these systems will decide the score for these criteria.  
6. Program Risk (weight – 21.8%)
Program risk would involve many factors such as the ability to meet the 
schedule, the level of new technology and integration involved, funding and 
etc.  
Figure 88: Criteria Weightage for USV Selection
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The ability of the 3 USVs in meeting the criteria are tabulated below.  
Ability to meet Criteria
Criteria
Protector Spartan Silver Marlin
External Payload 2,200 lbs 5,000lbs 5,500 lbs
Endurance Unknown 48 hrs 24 hrs
Capabilities
- Surveillance & 
Identification
Yes Yes Yes
- Targeting Yes Yes Yes
- Show of Force Yes Yes Yes
- Precision Attack No Planned No
Interoperability Medium High Medium
Ease of Integration Medium High Medium
Program Risk Medium Low Medium
Table 51: Criteria for USV Selection
Based on AHP analysis, the Spartan USV has a global weighted 
evaluation of 56.9%, Protector at 16.3% and Silver Marlin at 26.8%.
Table 52: Global Weight for USV Selection
Figure 89:  Head to Head Between Spartan and Silver Marlin
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Figure 90: Head to Head Between Spartan and Protector
Figure 91: AHP Results for USV Selection
It is recommended, based on AHP results, to select Spartan (56.9%) 
as the Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) for MIO mission.  
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A. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
1. Technical Specification for Protector (Israel)
Figure 92: Protector





Current Payload: EO/FLIR/IR surveillance 
Laser Range Finder
Loudspeaker + microphone






2. Technical Specification for Spartan (US)
Figure 93: Spartan













Figure 94: Spartan USV fitted with GAU-17 Gatling Gun (Proposed)
Figure 95: Spartan USV fitted with Hellfire (Proposed)
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APPENDIX M. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF LETHAL 
WEAPONS
A.  TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF LETHAL WEAPONS
1. AGM-114M HELLFIRE Missile
Figure 96: AGM-114M Hellfire Missile
Primary Role: Used to engage and destroy naval and urban targets.  It is 
reported to be capable of sinking or disabling a vessel between 500 to 700 tons 
and is effective against fast attack craft and landing craft.
a. General Characteristics
Diameter = 7 inches
Length = 1.63 m 
Weight = 48kg
Effective Range = 0.5km to over 8km
Max Time-of-Flight (TOF) = 39s
Unit cost = US$77K
Propulsion = Single stage solid propellant
Max speed = >1.3 Mach
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b. Seeker Characteristics
Seeker = Semi-Active Laser Seeker
Mode = LOBL or LOAL
The target is illuminated by a laser designator aimed by a fire-
control system/operator.  The designator need not to be together with the 
launcher and can be located several kilometers away in a co-operative mode of 
operation.  
c. Warhead Characteristics 
Type- Blast fragment warhead (externally scored steel case 
designed to break into around 100 even-sized shrapnel fragments supplemented 
by incendiary pellets)
Weight - 12.5kg 
Explosives-  PBXN 109 Pyrophoric warhead
Fuse = Impact + delay fuse to detonate after penetration for 
maximum effects against small frigates.
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2. FGM-148 JAVELIN Missile
Figure 97: FGM-148 Javelin Missile
Primary Role: Man-portable medium-range close combat/anti-armor 
weapon system.  
a. General Characteristics
Diameter = 5 inches
Length = 1.1 m 
Weight = 49.5lbs (full up system)
Effective Range = 75m to 2.5km 
Max Time-of-Flight (TOF) = Unknown
Unit cost = US$80K
Propulsion = 2 stage solid propellant
b. Seeker Characteristics
Seeker = Infrared Homing 
Mode = LOBL
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The Javelin is equipped with an imaging infrared seeker which is 
based on a cadmium mercury telluride (CdHgTe) 64x64 staring focal plane array 
in the 8 to 12 micron band.  
c. Warhead Characteristics
Type = Tandem shaped charge HEAT 
Weight = 8.4kg
Precursor warhead to initiate explosive reactive armor and a main 
warhead to penetrate base armor.  
d. Launch System Characteristics
Launch system consists of a Command Launch Unit (CLU) and 
Launch Tube Assembly (LTA).  The CLU has a thermal sight which is used to 
find, target and fire the missile.
e. Other Characteristics
The soft launch capability of the Javelin allows it to have only a 
minimal black blast area.
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APPENDIX N. SELECTION PROCESS FOR NON LETHAL 
WEAPONS
A.  SELECTION PROCESS FOR NON LETHAL WEAPONS
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) was used to evaluate the three suitable 
weapon types, namely: water cannon, remote long range acoustic device (LRAD-
R) and mobility denial system (MDS) for deployment on the selected USV 
platform.
The evaluating criteria used in AHP analysis are ease of integration, 
equipment operating range, ease of operation, weapon effectiveness and 
maintainability.  The weights of the criteria are provided below.
1. Ease of Integration (weight – 21.7%) 
Ease of integration is usually the main consideration when integrating an 
external weapon/payload on the USV.
2. Effective Operating Range (weight – 27.5%) 
The effective operating range of the weapon should allow maximum stand 
off range between the operating platform and target of interest.
3. Weapon Effectiveness (weight – 37.6%)  
Weapon effectiveness compares the “lethality” of the weapon, i.e.  the 
extent in which the effects of the weapon can influence its target.
4. Weapon Maintainability (weight – 8.5%)  
Consider the ease of maintaining the weapon system when operating in a 
littoral environment and the need to store any accessories.
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5. System Weight (weight – 4.7%)  
As the USV as a limited payload allowance, the weight of the weapon 
selected is also an important consideration.  
Figure 98: Criteria Weight for Non Lethal Weapon Selection
Table 53 shows the ability of the three non-lethal weapons in meeting the 
criteria.  
Ability to meet Criteria
Criteria
Water Cannon LRAD-R MDS
Ease of Integration High
High 















System Weight 250 lbs 
(estimated)
230 lbs 900 lbs
Table 53: Criteria for Non Lethal Weapon Selection
Based on AHP analysis, the Water Cannon System has a global weighted 
evaluation of 37.9%, LRAD-R of 52.3% and MDS of 9.8%.  It is therefore 
recommended to select LRAD-R as the non-lethal weapon to be integrated onto 
the Spartan USV.
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Figure 99:  Global Weight for Non Lethal Weapon Selection
The output charts from AHP run are shown below.
Figure 100:  Head to Head Between LRAD and Mobility Denial System
Figure 101: Head to Head Between LRAD and Water Cannon
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Figure 102: AHP Results for Non Lethal Weapon Selection
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B.  TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
1. Technical Specification for High Pressure Water Cannon 
System
Figure 103: High Pressure Water Cannon System
Pressure:11 kPa
Weight: 200 lbs (estimated)
Effective Range: 50-60m
2. Technical Specification for Remote Long Range Acoustic 
Device
Figure 104: Long Range Acoustic Device
Gross Weight: 230 pounds
Dimensions: 44”W x 20”D x 49”H
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Maximum SPL: 151dB instantaneous tone @ 1 meter
Beam Width: +/- 15o at 2khz
Power: 600 Watts (Peak Consumption)
Source: American TechnologyTM Corporation product catalogue
3. Technical Specification for Anti-Traction Mobility Denial 
System
Figure 105: Anti-Traction Mobility Denial System
Formula: Polyacrylamide powder mixed with water to produce 
an extremely slippery surface.
Acts on: Concrete, asphalt, mowed grass, packed earth, and 
wood, tile, and vinyl floors
Capacity: 300 gallons on platform transportable system
Range: Reaches 100ft
Area Covered: 120,000 sq ft
Weight: 900 lbs
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